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L INTRODUCTION
Of all the skills that good lawyers must possess, the ability to counsel
clients effectively may be the most critical.' To counsel clients about their legal
problems, lawyers must be knowledgeable about substantive and procedural
law. They must be able to engage in strategic planning. They must have well-
developed interpersonal skills.2 They must be able to predict with some degree
of certainty the likelihood of certain results occurring as a result of particular
action(s) or failure(s) to act.? They must effectively communicate to the client
the many nuances of their craft in understandable and non-technical language.
They must have a breadth of vision that enables them to present to clients a
wide range of alternatives and options to consider and weigh. Yet the lawyer's
vision must be deep as well as wide, for the counselor must be able to assist the
client in examining the underlying reasons for her goals and contemplated
actions.4 In Anthony Kronman's terms, "[tihe wise counselor is one who is able
to see his client's situation from within and yet, at the same time, from a
distance, and thus to give advice that is at once compassionate and objective."5
Definitions of legal counseling6 abound, from the deceptively simple,7
through the relatively technical, 8 and the highly specialized,9 to the almost
1. See, e.g., T. SHAFFER & J. ELKINS, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING IN
A NUTSHELL 2 (2d ed. 1987) ("counseling is the heart and soul of lawyering").
2. See, e.g., Goodpaster, The Human Arts of Lawyering: Interviewing and
Counseling, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 5, 8 (1975) ("the best lawyer-counselors are those who rec-
ognize the human encounter in counseling, who are really open to and accept their client, who
respond to the whole person of the client, and who help their clients help themselves"); Feldman
& Wilson, The Value of Interpersonal Skills in Lawyering, 5 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 311 (1981)(reporting on study that showed that "clients' would rate lawyers with high relational skills and
low legal competence higher than lawyers with low relational skills and high legal competence).
3. See generally G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS:
MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY 966-1080 (1978).
4. See A. WATSON, THE LAWYER IN THE INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING
PROCES 11-12 (1976).
5. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 866 (1987).
6. I use the term "legal counseling" to connote the counseling that lawyers conduct in
the course of a lawyer-client relationship. While distinguishing legal counseling from other
forms of counseling, such as psychotherapeutic counseling, I do not mean to imply that counsel-
ing in the lawyer-client relationship should only concern itself with narrow conceptions of the
requirements of the legal system or statements of substantive law. Rather, I argue for a broader
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lyrical.' 0 But under any definition of the term, an examination of legal coun-
seling must address the complex interactions11 and negotiations12 between
lawyers and clients concerning the variety of decisions within the lawyer-client
relationship. Legal counseling inevitably raises questions about the proper role
of the lawyer with respect to her13 client and the degree of the client's
participation in the decisionmaking process. Who should decide what actions to
take - lawyer, client, or a combination of the two? Is the lawyer's
conception that eschews legalism in favor of a richer understanding of the client's concerns and
goals.
7. See, e.g., D. GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATION: THEORY AD APPLICATIONS 184(19 89) ("Counseling can be defined as the interaction between the lawyer and the client as they
decide how to achieve the client's best interests") (emphasis in original). Gifford's definition is
so broad that it appears co-extensive with the lawyer-client relationship itself.
8. David Binder and Susan Price define counseling as: "MIhe process by which
lawyers help clients reach decisions. Specifically, 'counseling' refers to a process in which po-
tential solutions, together with their probable positive and negative consequences, are identified
and then weighed in order to decide which alternative is the most appropriate." D. BINDER & S.
PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 135
(1977).
9. Some commentators equate client counseling with importuning clients on moral is-
sues. According to David Luban:
"Client counseling" is simply a shorthand way of describing a complex kind of
lawyer-client negotiation in which the lawyer brings his or her phronesis [practical
wisdom] in order to divert clients away from projects that harm the common
good. Client counseling may mean kindling the clients' consciences, but more
often it will mean inventing alternative ways for clients to satisfy their interests.
Sometimes it means persuading clients that the course of action they propose will
harm them even when that is not necessarily so. In other instances, client
counseling will require threatening to withdraw from a representation or refusing
to follow a client's instructions. In extreme cases, it means telling the client that if
he does not back away from a course of action, the lawyer will blow the whistle
on him.
Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 717, 737-38
(1988).
10. Consider the definition of legal counseling that Thomas Shaffer and Robert
Redmount have proposed:
Legal counseling is an exercise in value choices: the choice between legality and
authority, between historical tradition and immediate needs and circumstances,
between transcendent social values and immediate private preferences, between
possibility and compulsion, between humanistic concern and the values of rigor
and discipline, between concern for self and concern for others, between self-
limiting honesty and self-aggrandizing seeking, between the exercise of power
and the predominance of humane concern, between change and constancy - the
list of opposites could go on.
T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 19-5 (1980). The
authors go on to denounce the tendency to see counseling as an essentially technical and minis-
terial activity. Id.
11. Like D. Gifford, supra note 7, Joseph Harbaugh and Barbara Britzke define coun-
seling broadly as interaction and argue that the two most important components of counseling are
advising (reporting on factual developments and placing those developments in a legal context)
and guiding ("the process of assisting the client in making decisions with respect to what action
ought to be taken based on the lawyer's advice"). J. HARBAUGH & B. BRr'zKE, PRIMER ON
NEGOTIATION: A VIDEO HANDBOOK 15-16 (1984).
12. See Sarat & Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW
& SOC'Y REV. 93, 96, 125 (1986) ("Lawyer-client interaction involves attempts to negotiate
acceptable resolutions of problems in which lawyers and clients usually have different agendas,
expectations, and senses of justice.").
13. I use masculine and feminine pronouns interchangeably throughout this article to
refer to both lawyers and clients.
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professional role to make decisions for the client, advise the client about what
decision the client should make, or simply lay out the options and let the client
decide? Should client decisions be judged by an informed consent standard?
These questions are not unique to the lawyer-client relationship - in some
sense they arise in all professional/layperson relationships - but they have
particular salience within that relationship.
The traditional view of legal counseling (and the lawyer-client relation-
ship generally) maintains that the client should make the critical decisions
concerning the overall goals of the representation, with the lawyer exercising a
great deal of influence over how such decisions are made and what the actual
decisions are. This view holds that the client should stand by passively while
the lawyer lays out all relevant legal considerations for the decision and
indicates what decision he believes, as a matter of his professional judgment, the
client ought to make. The lawyer then urges the client to make the rec-
ommended decision. The client-centered or participatory model of counseling,
with the client empowered to make decisions for him or herself, is a response
to this traditional model.
Advocates for the client-centered model have made a number of argu-
ments, based variously on philosophical, political, psychological, ethical and
utilitarian grounds, for their model's superiority over the traditional approach.
Some of the model's most committed advocates are clinical law teachers, who
have adopted it for use in both live-client clinical law programs and simulation
courses. David Binder and Susan Price's 1977 text, Legal Interviewing and
Counseling: A Client-Centered Approach,14 has been the primary influence on
these teachers. In their book, Binder and Price propose a counseling model that
concretizes their particular version of client-centeredness. Both the number of
educators who have adopted the book's and the relative paucity of academic
criticism that it has received 6 suggest the extraordinary influence of the model
within clinical education circles.
But if the Binder and Price model has not been subjected to substantial
academic criticism, the concept of client-centered counseling has, at least
implicitly. Some writers have criticized its emphasis on client autonomy to the
exclusion of other values, especially in circumstances in which the client is not
the powerless, disadvantaged client that most clinical programs represent.
Others have suggested that client-centered counseling is too time-consuming and
14. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8.
15. See Gifford, The Synthesis of Legal Counseling and Negotiation Models:
Preserving Client-Centered Advocacy in the Negotiation Context, 34 UCLA L. REV. 811, 811
n.21 (1987) (94 schools have adopted Binder & Price text).
16. There are of course exceptions. Stephen Ellimann has made the most explicit criti-
cism. See Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1987) (arguing that Binder
and Price model contributes to lawyer manipulation of clients). Don Gifford and Paul Tremblay,
respectively, suggested criticisms of the model, but did not go into such criticisms in depth and,
in any event, adopted the model despite their reservations. See Gifford, supra note 15, at 821-
22, 830 (criticizing Binder and Price counseling model for unduly simplifying the counseling
process, for its de-emphasis of conversational give-and-take between lawyer and client, and for
neglecting pre-negotiation counseling), and Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer
Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 515, 529 n.65(eschewing an in-depth critique of Binder and Price but criticizing the model for its inattention to
interpersonal dynamics between lawyer and client).
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economically infeasible for practicing attorneys. They see the strict client-
centered lawyer's reticence towards his client -his unwillingness even to
suggest what the client ought to do for fear that he will unduly influence the
client's choice - as denying guidance to the clients that need it most. And if,
as some argue, one goal of the counseling process is to foster an often con-
tentious dialogue between lawyer and client, the client-centered lawyer's
excessive deference to her client denies important dialogic opportunities and
results in an unnecessarily impoverished decisionmaking process.
Part II of this article describes briefly the traditional counseling model
and outlines the Binder and Price client-centered counseling model developed in
response to it. Part m assesses and re-examines the arguments for client-
centered counseling. It contends that some of these arguments do not withstand
close examination, while others may support a more limited or contextualized
version of client-centeredness than advocated to date. Specifically, arguments
based on autonomy and socio-historical developments in the professions provide
the strongest support for a broad form of client-centeredness. The argument
based on political empowerment provides strong support for clients who
historically and currently need political empowerment, but does not apply to
clients who possess substantial economic, social and political power. The
psychological argument, when properly limited, can provide powerful support
for client-centeredness, but the full therapeutic implications of the argument are
troubling. Finally, some arguments, in particular the ethical argument and the
utilitarian argument that cient-centeredness produces better results for clients,
are simply unproven.
In Part IV, the article examines the arguments against client-centeredness
in general and the Binder and Price version in particular. These counter-
arguments, which emanate from both traditional and Critical Legal Studies
perspectives, fail to support the complete rejection of cient-centeredness but do
illuminate the contextual limitations on its sweep. In particular, they suggest
some limitations on the psychological and autonomy arguments supporting
client-centeredness. But the critics of cient-centeredness have, for the most
part, failed to come to grips with the risks inherent in their proposed
alternative approaches. In both Parts III and IV, the article offers some
speculations about the nature of the client, lawyer, and lawyer-client relation-
ship interests affected by adoption or rejection of client-centered counseling.
This approach recognizes that it is not possible to write about these entities as if
there were not enormous differences within these categories that substantially
affect any analysis of the virtues of client-centeredness.
In Part V, the article contends that the Binder and Price client counseling
model, if applied judiciously and with attention to the variety of contextual
factors suggested by the above analysis, can provide a useful model for
appropriate client-centered lawyering. The article contends, however, that in
one critical aspect of the counseling process, the discussion between lawyer and
client of the client's alternative courses of action, the Binder and Price model
perpetuates an excessively lawyer-centered approach. Part V proposes a
variation on the Binder and Price model that is truer to a client-centered
lawyer's approach to counseling. The article then applies this model to a client
counseling simulation that the author has used in an interviewing, counseling
and negotiation course and attempts to demonstrate how the proposed variation
1990]
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on the Binder and Price model results in a richer counseling session. Finally,
the article considers some possible criticisms and limitations of this variation on
the Binder and Price model.
11. CLIENT-CENTERED COUNSELING DEFINED
A. The Tradilonal Model
Traditional legal counseling reflects an absence of meaningful inter-
change between lawyer and client. The client comes to the lawyer with some
idea about his problem. The lawyer asks questions designed to adduce the
information necessary to place the client's problem within the appropriate
conceptual box. At the proper time, he counsels the client by essentially con-
ducting a monologue: the lawyer tells the client something of the nature of his
actions on the client's behalf and then advises the client about the course of
action he recommends. The lawyer may go into great detail about the rationale
for his advice. Alternatively, she may provide a relatively terse recitation of
technical advice and let the client decide how to proceed. The lawyer is
concerned with the client's reaction to his advice but tends not to value client
input, for he believes that the client has little of value to contribute to the
resolution of his legal problem. 17 Lawyer and client are likely to talk at, rather
than with, each other. Any assurance that the lawyer provides to the client -
and it could be substantial - is likely to be based on the client's perception that
the lawyer is "taking care of matters" rather than on a belief that the lawyer
truly tried to understand the client as a whole, complex person.s
In general, the traditional legal counseling model assumes that clients
should be passive and delegate decisionmaking responsibility to their lawyers;
that ineffective professional service is relatively rare; that professionals give
disinterested service and maintain high professional standards; that effective
professional services are available to all who can pay; and that professional
problems tend to call for technical solutions beyond the ken of laypersons. 19
17. See Reed, The Lawyer-Client:A ManagedRelationship?, 12 ACAD. MGMT. J. 67,
76 (1969) (survey of civil lawyers in which majority believed clients were generally unhelpful in
generating solutions to legal problems). See also former Justice Fortas' approving description
of Thurman Arnold's approach to lawyering, in which he describes Arnold as never allowing a
client "to dictate or determine the strategy or substance of the representation, even if the client
insisted that his prescription for the litigation was necessary to serve the larger cause to which he
was committed." Fortas, Thurman Arnold and the Theatre of Law, 79 YALE LJ. 988, 996
(1970).
18. Cf. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 100-02 (1984)(criticizing trust relationship between patient and doctor when based on analogy to earliest stages
of infant-parent relationship and arguing instead for trust based on the doctor's ability to help the
patient make his own decisions).
19. See D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: VHO'S IN CHARGE? 13 (1974) (table
1.1). Continuing legal education publications are a rich source of the assumptions that underlie
traditional legal practice. See, e.g., Shrager, How to Handle a New Client: The Initial Interview
in a Medical Negligence Case, in TnE PRACTICAL LAWYER'S MANUAL ON LAWYER-CLIENT
RELATIONS 45,47-48 (1983) (lawyers should be wary of clients who overly complain about the
medical profession) [hereinafter THE PRACTICAL LAWYER'S MANUAL]; Savitz, How to Handle
a New Client: The Initial Interview with a Business Client, in THE PRACTICAL LAWYER'S
MANUAL at 55, 62 (lawyers must control interview because clients tend to ramble and provide
unnecessary information); Shull, Personalized Service, in THE PRACTICAL LAWYER'S
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B. The Binder and Price Counseling Modk2o
Client-centered counseling is a critical component of client-centered
lawyering.21 Client-centered counseling may be defined as a legal counseling
process designed to foster client-decisionmaking.22 Its goal is not only to
provide opportunities for clients to make decisions themselves but also to
enhance the likelihood that the decisions are truly the client's and not the
lawyer's. To accomplish these goals, client-centered counselors must attend to
the means they employ in the counseling process, as well as the end of client
decisionmaking they attempt to achieve.
Binder and Price describe a relatively straightforward, but highly struc-
tured, legal counseling model23 to be used in litigation contexts. 4 With respect
MANUAL at 117, 118 (lawyer should keep client informed of developments in his case by send-
ing copies of pleadings and correspondence; even though client is unlikely to understand the
information he will at least know that the lawyer is doing something); Bebout, Promoting
Clients' Acceptance of Lawyers' Fees in THE PRACTICAL LAWYER'S MANUAL at 139, 140(same; clients also need to be conditioned to pay lawyers' fees).
20. The Binder and Price model, though by far the most popular model of client-
centered counseling, is not the only one. See, e.g., T. SHAFFR & J. ELKINS, supra note 1,
Ch. 7. This article addresses differences between the Binder and Price and other models when
relevant to the topic under discussion.
21. See Ellmann, supra note 16, at 744.
22. I prefer the term "client decisionmaking" to "client-centered decisionmaking"
because of the former's emphasis on the client as actual decisionmaker. In theory, a lawyer
could be client-centered in his approach and still act paternalistically towards the client, so long
as his actions were designed to serve the client's interests as he understood them. On this read-
ing of client-centeredness, even the most traditional, paternalistic lawyers could embrace the
term. Both Paul Tremblay and Mark Spiegel have used the term "client decisionmaking" at times
in their work to signify client-centered counseling. See Tremblay, supra note 16, at 545 n.125;
Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession,
128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 107 (1979). Tremblay also uses the term "client-based decisionmak-
ing," but that term seems to have the same liabilities as client-centered decisionmaking. See
Tremblay, supra note 16, at 526 (a decision could be based on the client and his needs and yet
not be by the client). The term "client-participatory decisionmaking" has the advantage of sug-
gesting the need for the client to take an active role in the decisionmaking process, but unfortu-
nately would also be consistent with a model of counseling in which the client merely con-
tributed her views to the lawyer who then made the ultimate decision. See infra note 204 and
accompanying text. My choice of the term "client decisionmaking" is not meant to suggest that
its use is unprblematic, however. The focus on the client as decisionmaker tells us little about
the process by which the client is to make the decision(s) in question. A lawyer could still
dominate the decisionmaking process and yet the client might still make the formal decision. As
I use the term, "client decisionmaking" connotes a client-based counseling process (or means)
that leads to client decisionmaking (end) in more than a formal sense. The use of client-
decisionmaking as both means and ends parallels the definition and use of the term
"normalization" regarding services for people with developmental disabilities. See W.
WOLFENSBERGER, B. NiuE, S. OLSHANSKY, R. PERsKE & P. Roos, THE PRINCIPLE OF
NORMALIZATION IN HUMAN SERVICES (1972). If nothing else, the term "client decisionmak-
ing" is the shortest of these various circumlocutions.
If "client decisionmaking" is a tolerable substitute for "client-centered decisionmaking,"
however, I have not found a comparable substitute for "client-centered counseling." "Client
counseling" is too broad a term, embracing the entire area of legal counseling. "Client-based
counseling" and "client-participatory counseling" have the same defects noted above. Thus,
despite its imperfections, I continue to adopt the convention of calling the kind of counseling that
fosters client decisionmaking "cient-centered counseling."
23. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8, at 135-91. The discussion of legal counsel-
ing follows an extensive discussion of interviewing. Id. at 1-134. Binder and Price (as well as
others, see, e.g., G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 3, Chs. 3 & 8), separate out these
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to the basic go/no-go decision25 about whether to litigate,.2 the lawyer frst sets
out the legal alternatives for the client.27 Next, she solicits the client's input on
generating additional alternatives. Then, the lawyer engages the client in a
discussion of the positive and negative consequences of the options. These
consequences include not only the legal consequences, as to which the lawyer is
enjoined to make predictions of the most likely outcome of each alternative, but
the social, psychological and economic consequences as well. 28 Finally, the
lawyer assists the client in weighing these consequences with an eye towards
having the client make the final decision.
lawyering skills for pedagogical purposes even though interviewing and counseling often blend
together during particular sessions between lawyer and client. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE,
supra note 8, at v-vi; cf. Gifford, supra note 15, at 829 (separation of counseling and negotiation
processes causes theorists to miss areas of overlap between two). Although this article does not
purport to discuss the Binder and Price interviewing model in any depth, the reader should at
least understand the context in which the legal counseling session described in the text would
occur. The Binder and Price lawyer first conducts an initial interview in which she learns the
client's stated goals for the representation and what the lawyer believes to be the relevant facts of
the situation. Binder and Price propose that interviews be conducted in three stages: preliminary
problem identification; chronological overview; and theory development and verification. D.
BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8, at 53. At the first interview, the lawyer generally gives only
cursory legal advice subject to further legal and factual research. Id. at 99-103. In addition to
discussing techniques of questioning, the authors devote a great deal of attention to the psycho-
logical aspects of interviewing and using the technique of active listening to build rapport with
clients. Id. at 20-37. Subsequent to the interview, the lawyer presumably would conduct legal
research and a factual investigation to enable her to advise the client on the legal ramifications of
his possible courses of action. At the counseling session, the lawyer would present the options
to the client for his consideration.
24. Binder and Price state that their interviewing and counseling models are meant to
apply explicitly to litigation contexts only, and not to planning or transactional settings (such as
preparation of a will or setting up a corporation). D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8, at v.
Nevertheless, the authors note that similarities between interviewing and counseling exist in all
legal settings, 1d. at vi, and two book reviewers opined that the overall Binder and Price
approach is aplicable to non-litigation settings as well. See Frank & Krause, Book Review, 18
CREIGHTON L REV. 1427, 1437 (1985). It would seem that the book's focus on litigation is
particularly relevant to its interviewing model because that model is predicated on the lawyer
obtaining a chronological overview of the facts that would be inapplicable to a will interview, for
example. For the most part, this article assesses the use of client-centered counseling
approaches in litigation or mixed litigation and planning situations, unless the context indicates
otherwise.
25. See J. FREUND, LAWYERING: A REALISTIC APPROACH TO LEGAL PRACTICE 268
(1979) (defining go/no-go decision in part as "whether or not to proceed with a possible course
of action....").
26. Although Binder and Price explicate their model with respect to "the basic decision
to litigate," they maintain that the model is also fully applicable to "auxiliary" dilemmas (such as
whether to consult a spouse) that arise during the consideration of litigation. D. BINDER & S.
PRICE, supra note 8, at 135. See also D. BINDER & S. PRICE, INSTRUCTOR'S MANUAL FOR
LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 147 (1979) ("The
definition of counseling provided in the text is also generally applicable to decisions other than
those involving whether or not to litigate.").
27. Throughout their discussion of the lawyer-client relationship, Binder and Price
assume that an individual client comes to see an individual lawyer concerning what the client
believes to be a legal problem. For the purposes of the explication of the Binder and Price
model, I retain this convention.
28. For a criticism of Binder and Price's failure to include moral and political concerns
among these non-legal consequences, see Elliann, supra note 16, at 748-50. Ellmann argues
that the non-legal consequences Binder and Price describe relate principally to the client's self-
interest. Id. at 748.
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Binder and Price set out their philosophy of client decisionmaking and its
rationale as follows:
The ultimate decision regarding which alternative should be chosen
should be based upon an evaluation of which alternative is most
likely to bring the greatest client satisfaction. If a decision is to be
made on the basis of maximum client satisfaction, there first must
be knowledge of the importance or value which the client attaches
to each of the consequences involved. Only when the client's
values are known can there be a determination of which
alternative, on balance, will provide maximum client benefit.
However, it is our belief that, by and large, lawyers cannot know
what value clients really place on the various consequences. We
therefore conclude that lawyers usually cannot determine which
alternative will provide maximum client satisfaction and that deci-
sions should be left to the client.29
The authors argue further that the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility supports client decisionmaking30 and that the client will be more
likely to accept a decision if she has made it herself.31
The most controversial aspect 32 of Binder and Price's client-centered
counseling model is their great resistance to the lawyer giving the client her
opinion as to what action the client should take. The authors are concerned that
if the lawyer communicates her opinion to the client the latter will end up
making the decision that he believes the lawyer wants him to make rather than
the decision that is best for him. Because clients frequently "are remarkably
sensitive to, and easily swayed by, what they guess their lawyer thinks is best
for them," 33 it is crucial that the lawyer consciously communicate her neutrality
to the client.34 Although Binder and Price allow for the possibility that a client
who is an independent decisioumaker could receive the lawyer's opinion
without being overwhelmed by it, they are concerned about clients who are
passive decisionmakers or clients whom the lawyer is unable to categorize as
independent. They argue that, in cases where the client asks for the lawyer's
opinion about what to do, the lawyer should "parry the initial request with an
explanation about why the decision should be made by the client."35 Moreover,
as Stephen Ellmann observes, 36 Binder and Price apparently would not
recommend that the lawyer tell the client at the beginning of the counseling
29. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8, at 148-49 (emphasis in original).
30. Id. (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 and 7-8(1980)). For an assessment of this argument, see infra Part .A.5.
31. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8, at 153. In light of the many arguments that
could be made in favor of client-centeredness, see generally infra Part HI, it is striking that
Binder and Price proffer such limited rationales for its adoption.
32. See, e.g., Ellmann, supra note 16; at 744 (arguing that "manipulation is an integral
part of the lawyering Binder and Price recommend" insofar as they argue that the lawyer should
withhold her opinion from the client).
33. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8, at 166.
34. Id.
35. ' Id.at198.
36. Ellmann, supra note 16, at 745 (commenting that in the Binder and Price lawyer's
'Preparatory Explanation" at the beginning of the counseling session the lawyer makes no men-
tion of the possibility of giving advice to the client regarding his decision).
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session that the client could choose to have the lawyer give him her advice. 37
While Binder and Price describe a number of situations in whick client
decisionmaking may be inapplicable, 38 their emphasis on a client
decisionmaking model that eschews the lawyer's explicit presentation of advice
establishes them as perhaps the strongest advocates of unmediated client-
centeredness.
The Binder and Price model is an important contribution to our under-
standing of legal counseling in general and client-centeredness or client deci-
sionmaking in particular. The model's emphasis on the client's role in the
counseling process provides a needed response to the worst excesses of the
traditional lawyer-dominated model of counseling. Its view of the profes-
sional's role is also refreshing. Implicit in the model is a view of professional-
ism that does not depend upon mystification of laypeople or obfuscation of
those areas in which the professional's expertise is of questionable value to the
client.39 The assumptions of the model are fully consonant with developing
notions of informed consent in law and other disciplines.40 The model's
emphasis on psychological aspects of the lawyer-client relationship, while not
without controversy, serves a useful purpose in challenging the lawyer's tradi-
tional view of facts as objective and given. 41
The Binder and Price model is especially valuable as a model for
teaching client-oriented counseling to law students 42 Students have few models
for counseling prior to entering law school 4 3 Counseling seems to require a
37. Despite their recognition that independent decisionmakers are likely to be able to
resist the lawyer's influence, Binder and Price do not explicitly propose that lawyers of such
clients indicate that they are available to give more explicit advice if asked. The distinction
between independent and passive decisionmakers appears to relate to the lawyer's response to
client-generated attitudes or questions rather than to any reorientation in the lawyer's perception
of her role as counselor. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8, at 186-87 (where the
lawyer knows that the client retains independent decisionmaking capacity, "it may be quite
appropriate for the lawyer to comply with the client's request" for her opinion, so long as she
explains her rationale in light of her perception of the client's interests) (emphasis added).
38. See id. at 153-55 and 192-210 (client-centeredness may be inappropriate where
clients are truly incapable of making a decision; where clients have a strong belief in the appro-
priateness of the lawyer making the decision; or where the client has made a decision that would
cause him "substantial economic, social, or psychological harm in return for very little gain').
39. Cf. Stark, Why Lawyers Can't Write, 97 HARV. L REV. 1389, 1392 (1984)
(lawyers use obfuscatory language as instrument of deception).
40. See infra Part MA.4. Binder and Price refer explicitly to the informed consent
analogy in discussing how the lawyer's presentation to the client of the probable results of litiga-
tion enables the client to understand the litigation alternative. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra
note 8, at 160 n.2.
41. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Morris, Power and Responsibility Among Lawyers and Clients:
Comment on Ellmann's Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 781, 809 (1987). As Elliott
Milstein has observed to me, some of the Binder and Price book's more categorical statements
about interviewing and counseling could be understood as purposely overstated in order to chal-
lenge (and even manipulate) students' preconceptions about the lawyer-client relationship. To
the extent these statements seem to be overstatements they may be consciously so.
Commentators, however, have tended to accept the Binder and Price formulations at face value.
43. The absence of models of the counselor would appear to extend to lawyers them-
selves, as well as students. See Mindes & Acock, Trickster, Hero, Helper: A Report on the
Lawyer Image, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 177, 185 (descriptions of the "Helper" image of
the lawyer, analogous to the counselor, are rare), 207, 212 (lawyers see themselves as
"Helpers", and clients see lawyers as "Helpers" as well, but lawyers systematically underesti-
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mix of judgment and skill that daunts students. The description of the
counseling model, complete with transcript excerpts of counseling sessions that
make the lessons of the text less abstract,"4 can empower students otherwise
quite fearful of the prospect of counseling clients. The model's focus on the
importance of the client's role in counseling (and the concomitant limitation of
the professional's role) serves as an antidote both to the absence of the client
from many parts of the law school curriculum and to many law students' easy
acceptance of hierarchical relationships between elites and non-elites 45 With
the exceptions to be noted below, the Binder and Price model is useful as a
prescriptive model for students even if its descriptive value of what lawyers
actually do in counseling clients is more problematic. 6
III. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF
CLIENT-CENTERED COUNSELING
Clinical teachers' widespread acceptance of the Binder and Price client-
centered counseling model has tended to submerge the debate about the
desirability of the client-centered approach in general. 4 7 Advocates for client-
centered approaches have made a number of arguments in support of the
concept,48 but some of these arguments have been less than fully developed.
And while many clinical teachers have accepted client-centeredness
wholeheartedly, legal commentators writing from different perspectives have
challenged at least some of the assumptions underlying the concept.
The arguments for client-centered counseling may be divided into two
broad, if somewhat overlapping, categories: systemic arguments, directed
mate the degree to which clients see lawyers in this light). Students who enter law school
directly from undergraduate education, with limited life and employment experiences prior to law
school, often have had few opportunities to engage in any kind of counseling. In contrast, chil-
dren engage in negotiation behavior from an early age (as any parent can attest, children negoti-
ate over bedtime, bathtime and other activities even before they are able to talk) and have the
opportunity to observe trial lawyer behavior, however imperfectly rendered, on television and in
other mass media.
44. There are many examples in Binder and Price of such transcripts. See, e.g., D.
BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8, at 176-80 and 188-89. The disadvantage of the transcripts is
that, despite the authors' warnings about applying their model too literally, the transcripts may
contribute to students' attempts to parrot the versions of interviews and counseling sessions
reproduced in the text. As a result, many students believe that the model is too mechanistic.
45. See generally Kennedy, Legal Education As Training for Hierarchy, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 40 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). But see Morris, supra
note 42, at 785 n23 ("[C]urrent law students do not impress me generally as presenting much of
a danger of overwhelming anyone with the strength of their convictions about anything.').
46. See infra note 342. With their colleague Paul Bergman, Binder and Price are in the
process of revising their textbook. Based on an examination of a draft chapter on client counsel-
ing, there is some indication that the revised text, while retaining the essence of the client-
centered approach described above, adds some nuances that serve to qualify some of the
specifics of client-centered counseling techniques discussed in the firstedition.
47. Cf. Tremblay, supra note 16, at 526 n.49 (noting paucity of literature critical of
informed consent as applied to lawyers, defined as roughly equivalent to dlient-centeredness);
Gifford, supra note 15, at 815 ("Unlike the near universal acceptance of the client-centered
modelfor client counseling, there is little agreement among legal negotiation theorists regarding a
preferred prescriptive model for the lawyer as negotiator.") (emphasis added).
48. Actually, the literature on lawyering contains few extended defenses of client-
centeredness per se. For a discussion of two of the defenses that have been proffered, see infra
note 63.
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towards analyzing the relationship between the lawyer/client dyad and the legal
and political system in which it operates ("macro" analysis), and arguments that
look specifically to the lawyer-client relationship and seek to address client and
lawyer functioning within it ("micro" analysis).49 Within these broad categories
there are a number of sub-arguments on behalf of client-centered counseling.50
A. Systemic Arguments
The systemic arguments for client-centered counseling comprise a
number of sub-arguments: the philosophical argument, which sees client-cen-
teredness as enhancing individual client autonomy; the political argument,
which views the development of client-centeredness as a means of empowering
economically and politically disadvantaged clients; other political trends, such
as feminism, supporting client-centeredness; the socio-historical argument,
which attempts to connect developments in the legal profession with parallel
changes in professional/layperson relationships in other professions, especially
medicine (with its focus on informed consent doctrine); the ethical argument,
principally related to the precepts of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct; the psychological
argument, which relates client-centered lawyering to developments in client-
centered or nondirective psychotherapy; and the argument that client-
centeredness produces better results for clients. Some of these arguments,
while often made, appear on closer examination to provide questionable, or at
most limited, support for client-centered lawyering. Only by examining
critically these arguments can the advantages and disadvantages of a client-
centered approach be weighed responsibly.
1. The Philosophical Argument: Enhancing Client Autonomy
The core argument supporting client decisionmaking is that it enhances
the client's individual autonomy. Autonomy, or self-determination, means that
a person can choose and act freely, according to her own life plan.51 There are
many possible defimitions of autonomy,52 but the capacity to make choices is a
49. I borrow the micro/macro distinction, in a slightly different form, from Menkel-
Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories About Lawyering, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
555, 556 (1980).
50. Any effort to categorize the client-centeredness arguments such as the one proposed
in the text runs the risk that the reader will see bright lines where dimmer lines are intended. The
purpose of this (or any) categorization is to simplify understanding of the basic issue by organiz-
ig the arguments along lines that one hopes are at least plausible. But the particular categorical
scheme proposed is less important than an appreciation of the manifold arguments supporting
(and, in Part IV, opposing) elient-centeredness.
51. See J. CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE? 60 (1982).
52. See, e.g., R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT 235, 238 (1986) (defining autonomous action, which the authors
distinguish from autonomous persons, as action taken intentionally, with understanding, and
without controlling influences); Dworkin, Autonomy and Informed Consent, in 3 MAKING
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT
IN THE PATIENT-PRACITrIONER RELATIONSHIP 63, 70 (1982) (Pres. Comm'n for the Study of
Ethical Probs. in Med. & Biomed. & Behav. Res.) ("Autonomy is a second-order capacity to
reflect critically upon one's first-order preferences and desires, and the ability to either identify
with these or to change them in light of higher-order preferences and values.") [hereinafter
MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS]. Faden and Beauchamp observe that autonomy theorists
have tended to adopt either a freedom or authenticity model of autonomy. They suggest that the
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key component of the concept.5 3 Recognizing a person's autonomy is essential
to according respect to that person; respect for autonomy is a cornerstone of
liberal legal theory and of the American political system.54 It can be justified
for its intrinsic value and on utilitarian grounds.55
A person's autonomy can be compromised in a number of ways. One
such way is through paternalism,56 which operates in counterpoint to auton-
omy.57 Pure paternalistic actions, which by definition are taken to benefit the
person(s) whose will is being overbome,58 are problematic precisely because
authenticity model, associated with Dworkin among others, may be a too-demanding criterion
for autonomy unless it is seen clearly as an ideal. R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra, at 236-
37. See also id. at 236 (describing Stanley Benn's theory of autonomy and characterizing
Benn's autonomous person as "consistent, independent, in command, resistant to control by
authorities, and the source of his or her basic values and beliefs. The person's life as a whole
expresses self-directedness.') (citation omitted).
53. See, e.g., Ellmann, supra note 16, at 759-60 (describing essential components of
autonomy as the client's right to make her own choices, her capacity to make such choices and
her exercise of that choice-making capacity). The importance of the individual's capacity to
make her own choices is also central to Isaiah Berlin's oft-quoted (see, e.g., D. ROSENTHAL,
supra note 19, at 168) concept of positive liberty:
I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of what-
ever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own not of other men's, acts of will.
I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious pur-
poses, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from out-
side. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer - deciding, not being decided
for, self-directed.... I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking,
willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain
them by references to my own ideas and purposes.
Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in I. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 131 (1969).
While liberty and autonomy are closely related concepts, they are not identical. See Dworkin,
supra note 52, at 71.
54. See P. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 52, at 7-8; Luban, Paternalism and
the Legal Profession, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 454, 462; Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy:
Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 7 (1989). As feminist theorists
have observed, autonomy need not be conceived of as mindless atomism, but can include a per-
son's connections to and relationships with different social and political communities. See id. at
10-11.
55. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 52, at 73 (autonomy has intrinsic and instrumental
value). Accord Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The
Argumentfor Autonomy, 65 N.C.L. REV. 315, 336-39 (discussing deontological and utilitarian
rationales for autonomy).
56. Gerald Dworkin defines paternalism as "the interference with a person's liberty of
action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests
or values of the person being coerced." Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW
107, 108 (R. Wasserstrom ed. 1971).
Autonomy can also be violated on a person's behalf through coercion and manipulation.
See R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 52, at 258-62. For an extended discussion of the
blems of lawyer manipulation of clients and its concomitant denial of client autonomy, see
Elansupra note 16, and infra note 301.
57. See Dworkin, supra note 52, at 70 (paternalism is the denial of autonomy; auton-
omy is "the value against which paternalism offends").
58. Dworkin distinguishes paternalistic interference into pure and impure kinds. See
Dworkin, supra note 56, at 111. In pure paternalism, the person being benefitted is the person
coerced (or whose autonomy is being compromised). In impure paternalism, one person's
autonomy is restricted so that a third person may benefit. Dworkin gives as an example of the
latter a law that prevents people from manufacturing cigarettes so that cigarette users would not
develop lung cancer from cigarettes. Dworkin also uses pure and impure paternalism in another
sense in noting that many actions that are paternalistic are also justified on non-paternalistic
grounds (motorcycle helmet laws may bejustified as paternalistic protection of the motorcyclist
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they deny people their fundamental right to make their own decisions in their
own ways, even if those decisions could somehow objectively be shown to be
wrong.5 9
At least in American society, law plays an important function in facilitat-
ing an individual's ability to function autonomously. 60 As mediators and
interpreters of the law, lawyers are the conduits through which people can
express their autonomy.61 By creating mechanisms that empower their clients
to make their own decisions- in their own way, client-centered lawyers
contribute to their clients' autonomy.62
The importance of autonomy led at least two commentators to argue that
client decisionmaking with respect to all aspects of a lawsuit is presumptively
required.63 Few scholars dispute the importance of autonomy as a value.64 The
and as reflecting society's interest in not having the helmetless cyclist become a public charge).
Id. at 108.
59. See Ellmann, supra note 16, at 759-60 (citing J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (A.
Castell ed. 1947)).
60. See, e.g., Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and
Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617.
61. See, e.g., Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 YALE LJ. 1060, 1073 (1976); Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a
Professional System, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 191,204 (1977). For the role of lawyers as legiti-
mating agents, see infra note 115.
While Fried's focus on client autonomy is a useful starting point for analyzing the appro-
priate role for the lawyer in the lawyer-client relationship, his analogy of the lawyer as special-
purpose friend has been justly criticized. See Dauer and Leff, Correspondence: The Lawyer as
Friend, 86 YALE LJ. 573 (1977); Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and
Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 106-13. Cf. E. FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL
POWERS: A STUDY OF THE INSTrmTIONALIZATION OF FORMAL KNOWLEDGE 173 (1986) ("A
work relationship cannot possibly entail the particularism of an intimate social relationship in
which the full-blown uniqueness of an individual is plumbed and responded to freshly and in
which time, energy, and cost count for little."). But see Donagan, Justlfying Legal Practice in
the Adversary System, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS
123, 128 (D. Luban ed. 1983) (friendship analogy not necessary part of Fried's argument)
[hereinafter THE GOOD LAWYER]. Of course, as Tom Wolfe observes, a client may do better
with a lawyer than with a friend:
What did I tell you the first time you walked into this office? I told you two
things. I told you, 'Irene, I'm not gonna be your friend. I'm gonna be your
lawyer. But I'm gonna do more for you than your friends.' And I said, 'Irene,
you know why I do this? I do it for money.' And then I said, 'Irene, remember
those two things.' Idd'n 'at right? Did'n I say that?
T. WOLFF, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANMES 382 (Bantam Book ed. 1988).
62. Cf. Shaffer, Christian Theories of Professional Responsibility, 48 S. CAL. L.
REV. 721,744 (1975) ("the ethical practice of law turns on the lawyer's ability to help clients
arrive at essential choices, not on the ability to make choices for clients."); Jones v. Barnes, 463
U.S. 745, 759 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (role of criminal defense counsel "is to protect
the dignity and autonomy of a person on trial by assisting him in making choices that are his to
make, not to make choices for him") (emphasis in original).
63. Strauss, supra note 55, at 340; Spiegel, supra note 22, at 72. Both authors indicate
that the presumption can be overcome in certain circumstances, although they describe the
circumstances somewhat differently.
Strauss writes that client decisionmaking could be overcome for reasons of professional
autonomy (a client should not be able to insist that a lawyer act illegally), efficiency (when client
decisionmaking threatens to compromise the legal process itself, or when time is exceedingly
short and an attorney cannot communicate within the time-frame the information that would
allow a client to choose effectively) and the importance of other values. Strauss, supra note 55,
at 340-41. For example, Strauss would re-examine client decisionmaking if, given society's
strong interest in convicting only the guilty, it resulted in a greater number of innocent people
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dispute is over: (1) the extent to which other values, such as the moral
autonomy of the lawyer or third parties, may limit the exercise of autonomy, 65
and (2) whether a client-centered model of lawyering is the best route to
maximizing autonomy. The first issue will be discussed in Part IV.A.1, infra,
though at this point, two preliminary observations are in order. First, in
examining models of client counseling the question is less whether client-cen-
teredness fosters client immorality than whether it is any more likely to do so
than other client-counseling models. Second, it is not a necessary part of the
autonomy argument for client-centeredness that a client's autonomy can never
be overridden. Rather, if autonomy is an important value, client-centered
counseling is desirable if it furthers autonomy and is especially desirable if it
tends to further it more than other client-counseling models, so long as it does
not unduly trench upon other important values.
That leaves the second issue respecting autonomy and client-centered
counseling: does the model in fact maximize client autonomy? The principal
autonomy objection to the client-centered counseling model is that if the lawyer
acts paternalistically and exercises more power over her client's choices (and
over the manner in which the client considers those choices) the client's
being convicted. Id. She then argues that clients are capable of rational decisionmaking, and so,
implicitly, we need not fear that an expansion of client decisionmaking would lead to unjust or
incorrect results. This is a curious defense of autonomy because it seems to deny the extensive
discussion in other parts of the article concerning the importance of respecting autonomy even
when it might lead to wrong results. Moreover, it is easy to see how traditional, paternalistic
lawyers could use the laudable goal of limiting their clients' convictions to swallow completely
the presumption in favor of client decisionmaking.
Spiegel argues that presumptive client control is justified by a congeries of autonomy-
based interests, including the client's quasi-property interest in his case and his interest in being
adequately represented, as reflected in the structure of the legal system that makes parties the
masters of their fate and lawyers their representatives. Spiegel, supra note 22, at 73-77. The
latter argument sounds in terms of an agency-based rationale for client autonomy. See also D.
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 324, 324-26 (1988). But see Shultz,
From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L. 219, 275 &
nn.240-41 (1985) (agency analogy is as yet undeveloped in relationships between professionals
and lay persons). Spiegel restates his thesis as: "[A] lawyer should be affirmatively required to
obtain informed consent when client values or lawyer conflicts of interest are involved."
Spiegel, supra note 22, at 73. He then would allow clients to negotiate for either more or less
decisionmaking authority, though he would not allow clients to waive their right to informed
consent at the beginning of the relationship. Id. at 82-83. In Section IV of his article, Spiegel
suggests how his division of responsibility would work in specific cases. For example, he
would declare as a basic value the client's right to present his story in litigation. Id. at 123. The
client would be empowered to decide which claims to argue, witnesses to call, and forum in
which to file, as well as whether to ask for a jury or non-jury trial. Id. at 124. Because of the
high risk of lawyer disloyalty, a client would have the right to decide whether to file a lawsuit
and whether to conduct discovery. ldU
64. But see infra Part VA.1.
65. Even two of the strongest recent advocates for client autonomy, Charles Fried and
Stephen Pepper, recognize that in some circumstances autonomy must be limited. See Fried,
supra note 61, at 1076 (lawyer's duty is of exclusive concern for the client within the law)
(emphasis added), 1086 (lawyer is entitled to harm other persons so long as the harm is institu-
tionally sanctioned and not merely personal); Pepper, supra note 60, at 614 (lawyer is entitled to
act without moral opprobrium on behalf of a client so long as client's goals are legal, even if
immoral). As David Luban observed, if no restrictions on autonomy were permissible there
would be no rule of law at all. Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen
Pepper, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637,643.
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autonomy will actually be enhanced.66 The traditional lawyer's decisionmaking
superiority over the client is deemed to be based in part on the lawyer's
professional and technical training67 and in part on the lawyer's status as a
dispassionate decisionmaker. 68
This argument fails on several levels. First, even if lawyer paternalism
increased client autonomy in the long-run it would violate the notion of auton-
omy as a side-constraint.69 Second, the danger is great that a paternalistic
lawyer would construe a client's disagreement with her views as indicative of
the client's lack of sophistication and need for the lawyer's expertise rather than
a different (though rational) calculation about what choice to make.70 Third,
clients must make many decisions that do not primarily implicate the technical
expertise of the lawyer but instead implicate the client's personal values, wants
and desires; the client, not the lawyer, is the expert on these issues.71 Finally,
the traditional model's assumption that the lawyer will have the best interest of
the client at heart is overbroad and insufficiently sensitive both to conflicts of
interest between lawyer and client and questionable lawyer competence.72
When compared to the traditional counseling model, then, the client-
centered counseling model provides more assurance of client autonomy.73 Yet
66. See, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 22, at 85-86.
67. Id. at 86.
68. See Basten, Control and the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 6 J. LEGAL PROF. 7, 17
(1981).
69. J. CHILDRESS, supra note 51, at 64-65, draws the following distinction (after
Robert Nozick) between autonomy as a side-constraint and autonomy as an end or goal
If autonomy is a side constraint, it limits the pursuit of goals such as health and
survival; it even limits the pursuit of the goal of the preservation and restoration of
autonomy itself. In pursuing goals for ourselves or for others we are not permit-
ted to violate others' autonomy.... In contrast, when autonomy is viewed as an
end state to be realized, its function in moral argument is very different.
Autonomy is a condition, not a constraint, and the goal might be to minimize
damage to autonomy.... In this view, some violations of autonomy ...
might be justified because overall more autonomy would result, and that is the
desirable end state.
(emphasis in original). He goes on to argue that autonomy as a side constraint is more central to
the principle of respect for persons than is autonomy as an end state. Id. at 66. In essence,
Childress argues that the end of autonomy could not justify means that compromised autonomy.
70. This phenomenon certainly exists in the field of psychiatry where psychiatrists
have been skeptical of their patients' complaints about the side effects of psychotropic medica-
tions. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.NJ. 1978) (subsequent history omit-
ted).
71. See Spiegel, supra note 22, at 100-03; cf. Simon, supra note 61, at 52-55.
72. See Spiegel, supra note 22, at 87-99; D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 19, Ch. 4.
73. Both Basten, supra note 68, at 10, 19-23, and D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 19, at
2, allude to a third possible model of lawyering, the client-control model, in which the client
makes all decisions in the case and the lawyer plays no role in limiting the dient Ostensibly,
such a model might enhance client autonomy to a greater degree than client-centered approaches.
Both Basten and Rosenthal, however, conclude that no one actually advocates such a model.
But see Simon, supra note 61, at 141 (ideally every client would be her own advocate). If the
client-control model is defined as a model in which the client makes significant decisions with
the lawyer's input, it is indistinguishable from a client-centered model. To the extent the client-
control model allocates no role for the lawyer, it is tantamount to self-representation, and, as
such, resolves the issue of the lawyer's role by excluding him from the counseling relationship
altogether. Of course, even if a client-control model were superior to client-centered approaches
in enhancing autonomy, it might be less desirable as a lawyering model because of its failure to
satisfy other interests. See, e.g., Sammons, Meaningfud Client Participation: An Essay Toward
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in one important sense, client-centered lawyering, at least as defined by Binder
and Price, may be inconsistent with maximizing client autonomy. As noted
previously,74 Binder and Price in general require lawyers to refrain from
giving clients their opinions on what alternatives the clients should choose.
They apparently allow no room for lawyers to attempt consciously to persuade
their clients to make particular decisions. But some informed consent theorists
have asserted that persuasion is not only an acceptable but a necessary part of an
autonomous relationship.75 If so, the Binder and Price lawyer denies her client
autonomy by eschewing the use of persuasion.
This is a serious argument, but one that, in my judgment, proves too
much. Although I will postpone, for now, the full consideration of persuasion's
role in enhancing client autonomy,7 6 several preliminary considerations are in
order. Whether persuasion enhances or detracts from client autonomy will
depend on a number of circumstances, including the nature of the relationship
between lawyer and client, the power difference between them, their values,
and the nature of the legal problem. Where, in particular and carefully limited
cases, persuasion may enhance autonomy, the client-centered lawyer is, or
ought to be, permitted to use the technique. But given the propensity of
lawyers, and perhaps law students, to act paternalistically toward their clients,77
a client-centered model that establishes a presumption against the lawyer's use
of persuasion is preferable to one that presumes persuasion is acceptable
behavior.
2. Client-Centeredness: The Political Argument
Like all social relationships, the lawyer-client relationship does not exist
in a vacuum. It is subject to political, social and economic trends in society.
a Moral Understanding of the Practice of Law, 6 J. L. & REL. 61, 72-73, 87 (1990) (lawyer
allows client to participate in resolving disputes otherwise too complex for the client; lawyer also
"provides the distance the client needs from himself as a moral agent").
Client-control questions have arisen in the criminal law area concerning, e.g., the crimi-
nal defendant's right to self-representation, recognized in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806
(1975), and his right to control the issues his lawyer presents on appeal, rejected in Jones v.
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983). The issue of lawyer vs. client control in criminal cases, and the
consequences of its resolution for federal habeas corpus law, are, for the most part, beyond the
scope of this article. For a discussion of these issues, see Berger, The Supreme Court and
Defense Counsel: OldRoads, New Paths -A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9 (1986).
While perhaps not rising to the level of a model, some Critical Legal Studies ("CLS")
approaches question the autonomy-enhancing aspects of dient-centeredness and, on some read-
ings, seem to argue that CLS approaches enhance client autonomy to a greater degree. See,
e.g., Simon, supra note 61, at 134-35, 139. These criticisms are discussed infra in Part IV.
74. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Thompson, Psychological Issues in Informed Consent, in 3 MAKING
HEALTH CAREDECIsiONs, supra note 52, at 83, 99 ("few would object" to a physician exercis-
ing influence over a patient's choice by offering advice so long as she communicates information
in an accurate and non-manipulative manner); R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 52, at
261-62, 346 (persuasion, defined as "the intentional and successful attempt to induce a person,
through appeals to reason, to freely accept - as his or her own - the beliefs, attitudes, values,
intentions, or actions advocated by the persuader," is not problematic for informed consent and
can even facilitate autonomous decisions).
76. See infra Part IVA.1.
77. See, e.g., Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM.
RTS. 1, 19 (1975); Bellow, The Limits of Humanistic Law Teaching, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 592,
644 (1978).
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Client-centered lawyering must be placed in the particular political and histori-
cal context in which it arose.78 Moreover, political situations change. Even if
client-centered lawyering and counseling served certain political values when it
was introduced, there is no assurance that it continues to serve those same
values, or that those values have the same significance today. In this sub-section,
I will attempt to analyze briefly two aspects of the politics underlying client-
centeredness: the political influences upon the development of client-
centeredness and political values that continuing fealty to the concept might
serve. My goal here is to place client-centeredness in context and thereby
suggest both the possibilities and some potential limitations on its broad
applicability.
The origins of client-centered lawyering are inextricably bound up with
the development of "modem" clinical legal education79 itself. Full exploration
of this development would present a fascinating story but one that unfortunately
is beyond the scope of this article. 80 Nevertheless, modem clinical legal
education developed in the crucible of the political activism of the 1960's and
early 1970's.81 Many of the proponents of the client-centered approach were
78. See S. Macaulay, Lawyer-Client Interaction: Who Cares and How Do We Find Out
What We Need To Know? (Working Paper 1984, Disputes Processing Research Program,
University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School). Any brief sketch such as this one of the politi-
cal and intellectual antecedents of an idea (here, client-centered Iawyering or counseling) risks
either oversimplifying (and therefore trivializing) the nature of those influences or overstating
their power in a teleological fashion. Such an approach also risks oversimplification of the idea
itself. See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 15, at 819 n.40, where the author argues among other
things that Charles Fried's lawyer-as-friend analogy is "the most widely accepted contemporaryjustification for the lawyer-client relationship" and therefore has influenced the development of
counseling models. See also id. at 817-20 (brief discussion of "political and intellectual trends
[that] conditioned" law teachers to adopt the Binder and Price model) (emphasis added). Even if
Gifford were right in his characterization of the response to Fried's lawyer-client model, and I
do not believe that he is, in order to buttress the claim of influence one would still have to asaess
whether teachers of client counseling referred to Fried's model as justification for their accep-
tance of client-centered practices. There is little evidence that they have done so. Bellow and
Moulton's THE LAWYERING PROCESS, an influential book for clinical educators, see infra note
85, does include a lengthy excerpt from Fried's article, but also includes a lengthy criticism (by
William Simon) and raises its own concerns with the model Fried proposes. See generally G.
BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 3, Ch. 2, especially 65, 115-16. Cf. Auerbach, What
Has the Teaching of Law to Do with Justice?, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 466-71 (1978) (Fried
and clinical teachers described as representing divergent responses to the purposes of legal edu-
cation). While Fried's focus on client autonomy is useful (though hardly original), I do not
think that his influence on client-counseling models has been established. In sum, I think
Gifford paints with too broad a brush here. In order to avoid similar problems, I will attempt to
restrict my discussion of political and other antecedents of client-centered counseling to those
that can be reasonably well-documented.
79. For a discussion of earlier efforts to establish clinical education programs at law
schools, see R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850's
TO THE 1980's 214-16 (1983).
80. For a brief description of this history, see R. STEVENS, supra note 79, at 214-16,
240-41. See also Barnhizer, The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its Theory and
Implementation, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 67, 68-69 (1979); Wizner & Curtis, "Here's What We
Do": Some Notes About Clinical Education, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 673, 674-76 (1980).
81. Many commentators have noted this connection. See, e.g., Auerbach, supra note
78, at 470 and, more recently, Barrette, Content in Context: A Process of Clinical Teaching and
Learning, 14 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 45, 51 & n.11 (1987); Panel Discussion: Clinical Legal
Education:Reflections of the Past Fifteen Years and Aspirations for the Future, 36 CATH. U.L.
REV. 337, 341 (1987) (remarks of Dean Hill Rivkin) ("It was the societal legacy of the sixties,
however, that most shaped clinical education.") [hereinafter Panel Discussion]; and Bamhizer,
518 [VOL. 32
CLIENT-CENTERED COUNSELING
former legal services or public interest lawyers who entered academia as
clinical law teachers.82 The experience of these lawyer-teachers with poor
clients had a profound effect on their assessment of problems in the lawyer-
client relationship and their proposed solutions8 3 In particular, these teachers'
goals of empowering politically disadvantaged clients provided a rationale for
client-centered practice on behalf of poor people. 4
Any discussion of clinical teachers must start with Gary Bellow, one of
the founders of modem clinical education, as well as one of its most prominent
influences. 85 Consequently, Bellow's background and views about lawyering
assume particular importance in charting the origins of client-centered coun-
seling and lawyering. Bellow's short but influential 1977 article, Turning
Solutions Into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience,86 described a number of
practices in which legal services lawyers engaged that raised troubling questions
about how those lawyers dealt with their clients. Among other things, Bellow
The University Ideal and Clinical Legal Education, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1 (forthcoming
1990).
82. Barnhizer, supra note 81, at 1, 18 & n.3, 70-71 (large percentage of clinical fac-
ulty, identified as such in AALS Directory, who began teaching between 1968 and 1976 had
legal services backgrounds; lesser number from public defender and civil rights settings). My
interaction with clinical teachers at clinical teachers' conferences and workshops over the last
seven years bears out the impression that many clinical teachers continue to come from legal
services, public defender (and to a lesser extent) public interest backgrounds. Given the focus
of many "live-client" clinical programs on the legal problems of poor people, this connection is
likely to remain strong. Cf. Barnhizer, supra note 80, at 94 (background and interests of many
clinical teachers causes many clinical programs to focus on aspects of public interest practice).
83. Clinicians' felt need to restructure and redefine the lawyer-client relationship was
part of the broader experience of poverty lawyers at the time. See J. AUBRACH, UNEQUAL
JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 269-70 (1976) (describing
establishment of Office of Economic Opportunity legal services program).
84. William Simon, in Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32
STAN. L. REV. 487, 556 (1980), argues that the 'Tsychological Vision" that he believes ani-
mates the thinking of many clinical teachers in fact represents these teachers' abandonment of
legal services and public interest practice rather than an embodiment of it. For Simon, these
lawyers' frustration with the political realities of a progressive law practice leads them to de-
emphasize any political component to lawyering in their clinical teaching. If Simon is correct,
that sense of political frustration is likely to be even more intense after eight years of Reaganism.
But here, as elsewhere in his article, Simon engages in overbroad generalization that tends to
blunt the effectiveness of the otherwise provocative points he wishes to make. Rather than
viewing clinical teachers as burnt-out cases from practice, I prefer to see them as uniquely situ-
ated to study and profess about the relationship between theory and practice.
85. For Bellow's influence, see, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 49, at 558 (Bellow
generally regarded as the "theoretical father" of clinical education), and R. STEVENS, supra note
79, at 257 n.93 (Bellow was "[p]robably the most articulate spokesperson for intellectualized
clinical legal education") (citation omitted). With Bea Moulton, Bellow wrote TBE LAWYERING
PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978), the first
"casebook" for clinical teachers. Organized principally along the lines of such lawyering skills
as interviewing, negotiation, counseling, and case theory (though a major contribution of the text
is its explicit consideration of lawyer values), The Lawyering Process gathers an impressive
array of material drawn from such diverse fields as literature, sociology, psychology, and game
theory. While anecdotal evidence suggests that many students find the book frustrating, perhaps
because of the breadth of its focus, clinical teachers continue to draw significant inspiration from
it. See PanelDiscussion, supra note 81, at 357 (remarks of Philip Schrag).
In focusing on Bellow's influence, I do not mean to deny the significant influence of
numerous other early clinical teachers. But Bellow, while hardly representative of other clinical
teachers, was an articulate spokesperson for a viewpoint that gained wide acceptance within
clinical circles.
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asserted that, in the main, legal services lawyers tended to process their clients'
cases routinely; to define client problems narrowly; to impose solutions upon
clients without meaningful discussion; and to push their clients into accepting
settlements. 87 He urged that legal services lawyers recognize the political
dimension of their practice and discuss with clients the immanent political
choices their cases presented. He also stressed the need for legal services
lawyers to educate their clients and provide for greater client participation in
their cases.88
Bellow's advocacy for politically-conscious lawyering, empowerment of
poor clients, and increased client participation did not, of course, spring forth
suddenly in the 1977 article but was consistent with views he expressed con-
siderably earlier.8 9 His approach suggests a pressing concern with clients'
experience of powerlessness and their need for greater participation in both
societal institutions and the lawyer-client relationship.90 That focus on
increased client participation and empowerment was consistent with much of
86. 34 NLADA BRIUrASE 106 (Aug. 1977).
87. Id. at 108-09. Bellow's observations about the practices of legal services lawyers
were not unique, nor have the concerns he noted dissipated. See infra notes 352, 355.
88. NLADA BREFCAsE, supra note 86, at 119-22.
89. See Comment, The New Public Interest Layers, 79 YALE LJ. 1069, 1077,
1087-88 (1970) (interviews with Bellow discussing his views on importance of political orga-
nizing and political perspective for dealing with problems of poor people).
Interestingly, Bellow's views do not necessarily support a Binder and Price version of
cient-centeredness. In particular, his criticism of the professional pose of neutrality and his
advocacy for active engagement with the client's cause seem to distance him from the Binder and
Price technique. In Chapter 8 of The Lawyering Process, ("Counseling: The Circle Closes'),
Bellow and Moulton include an excerpt from Binder and Price on counseling. G. BELLOW & B.
MOULTON, supra note 3, at 1051. The authors note the Binder and Price argument that, because
of the subjectivity of client preferences, decisions must be left to the client, but add that "some
would argue that this subjectivity justifies more rather than less intervention." Id. In Chapter 2(" Being a Lawyer: The Problem of Values"), Bellow and Moultn attempt to convey the
complexity of cu.nent onceptions of legal practice and the lawyer-client relationship. While
noting teir view tht the legal profession "does not offer an adequate conception ofjustice" and
paysinsufficient attention to issues of class, race, and power, they note also the problems with
e alternative visions of lawyer-as-client's tool and lawyer-as-imposer-of-values. Id. at 116.
amidst these contradictions. But it does point the way, albeit hesitantly, to some
possible focal points: (i) the need to begin to articulate a less process-dominatedc nception ofjustice; (ii) the importance of the profession's paying attention to
problems of privilege (including its own) in American life, and the impact ofivng  e loperatio  of the legal system; ii) the responsibility of individual
lwers to experiment-- with each other and with clients 
-- with modes of rela-tionships which enhance mutuality, honesty and trust. ...
Id. See also Bellow & Kettlesn, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness inPublic Interest Practice, 51 B.U.L. REV. 337, 386-89 (1978) (suggesting lawyers take greaterresponsibility for fairness of clients' ends despite decrease in client autonomy).90. The Yale Law Journal Comm nt in which Bellow's observations about lawyeringrpoor people appeared also ontained a brief discussion about the client relationships that dif-ferent public interest lawyers attempted to foster. See Comment, supra note 89. at 1120-24.Several lawyers commented about the importance of empowering clients in the lawyer-clientrelationship, while noting the tension between individual client interests and broader politicalinterests that motivated the lawyers. For a brief discussion of these conflicts, see infra note 379.
520 [VOL. 32
CLIENT-CENTERED COUNSELING
the citizen participation and community control rhetoric of the 1960's and
1970's. 91 As Stephen Wexler wrote in a 1970 article:
The hallmark of an effective poor people's practice is that the
lawyer does not do anything for his clients that they can do or be
taught to do for themselves. The standards of success for a poor
people's lawyer are how well he can recognize all the things his
clients can do with a little of his help, and how well he can teach
them to do more. 92
While Wexler's observation was made in the context of advocating that
poverty lawyers focus more on community organizing than on solely legal
solutions, it is consistent with an enhanced role for the client within the lawyer-
client relationship.93
The political pedigree of client-centered lawyering is of more than his-
torical interest. The realization that it arose out of a law practice that dealt
primarily with poor people is essential to understanding the concept as it has
developed. Yet when clinical teachers write about clinical education issues
today, few stress the political underpinnings of client-cenitered approaches. 94
Rather, it is Critical Legal Studies adherents and others concerned with devel-
oping more explicitly political law practices who have stressed the need for
greater client participation in the lawyer-client relationship.95 Indeed, some of
91. See generally D. MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING (1969);
D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 19, at 167. See also Mazor, Power and Responsibility in the
Attorney-Client Relation, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1120, 1139 (1968) ([I]ncreased client participation
'!reflect[s] a growing realization that... there is in our society a renewed consciousness of the
importance of meaningful participation in matters concerning one's own fate .... ).
92. Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE LJ. 1049, 1055 (1970).
93. These developments in the legal field parallel those in other disciplines, such as
informed consent in medicine. See R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 52, at 87-88
(offering tentative hypothesis that informed consent, and its underlying themes of self-determi-
nation, individualism and autonomy, "were but instances of the new rights orientation that vari-
ous social movements of the last thirty years introduced into society," including, inter alia, civil
rights, women's rights, institutionalized persons' rights, and consumers' rights movements).
94. See Panel Discussion, supra note 81, at 342 (remarks of Dean Hill Rivkin)
(decrying decreased attention in clinical education to political issues); Barnhizer, supra note 81,
at 15, 32-33 (clinical movement's initial focus on social justice has been superseded by an em-
phasis on improved legal technique and skills). One must be careful here to distinguish between
what clinical teachers write about and what they do and teach. The absence of a substantial body
of political literature within contemporary clinical education is undeniably significant. In some
sense, what we choose to write about reflects who we are and what kind of discourse we value.
But the existence of substantial time and other pressures on "line" clinicians that militate against
production of scholarship means that the literature may be less a reflection of what is really going
on in clinical education than it would be in other more strictly academic pursuits. Put bluntly,
many people are too busy doing it to write about it. See also Remarks By Gary Bellow Upon
Receipt of the 1987 Award of the AALS Section on Clinical Legal Education, AALS SEC. ON
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. NEWSL. 13 (Nov. 1987) (clinical teachers feel strongly about
widespread injustice in legal system but write about it in excessively restrained manner).
95. See, e.g., Gabel & Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal
Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 369, 376, 407, 409
(1982-83) (urging "power-based" advocacy in which lawyer seeks to develop "a relationship of
genuine equality and mutual respect with her client" and to drop pretense of professional mys-
tique that serves to separate lawyers and clients); Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought,
36 STAN. L REV. 469 (1984) (advocating critical perspective on lawyering in which lawyers
and clients struggle in non-hierarchical fashion towards true community of interests, based in
part on lawyer s own political understanding); White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from
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these writers, far from embracing developing notions of cient-centeredness,
forcefully criticize the concept.96 But if poor and disadvantaged clients needed
empowerment in the 1960's and 1970's, it can hardly be contended that they
need it less so in the 1990's.97
Does its historical relationship to poverty law mean that client-centered
counseling should be restricted to representation of poor people? I do not take
the argument nearly that far. For one thing, middle-class clients may be signif-
icantly disempowered by the legal system. 98 Power, after all, is relative.
Middle-class white women may have a great deal of power in society at large,
but may feel essentially powerless if locked into an abusive domestic situation.
Middle-class white parents who are parents of children with mental disabilities
may be rendered helpless trying to get a recalcitrant school system to provide
statutorily-required educational services. 99 Even the businessperson, such as
the one in the simulation discussed in Part V of this article, may be powerless to
effectuate his goals because of his adversary's personal and financial power. I
do not mean to imply that these situations are all equivalent, or that they raise
the same political issues as access of poor people to the legal system. But if the
political argument for client-centeredness is an argument about the
redistribution of power, one must recognize that power can be redistributed in
any number of ways.
Certainly, to the extent that empowerment of clients provides a strong
argument in favor of client-centeredness, advocates for the concept must
Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIs. L REV. 699,740-41 (quoting South African
lawyer on importance of empowering clients in the lawyer-client relationship), 760-66(advocating lawyering for oppressed groups along lines of "third dimension" in which lawyers
(or, as the author describes them, outsiders) engage clients in process of dialogic reflection and
action rather than impose solutions on clients). See also Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L.
REV. 1 (1984); Note, Petitioning and the Empowerment Theory of Practice, 96 YALE LJ. 569
(1987) (written by Anita Hodgkiss).
Clinicians and CLS advocates do not, of course, comprise two entirely separate groups;
a number of people consider themselves to be involved with both movements. It is beyond the
scope of this article to attempt either to define the groups precisely or to draw distinctions among
clinicians (e.g., whether they teach in live-client, simulation or externship contexts, whether they
teach large-case or small-case clinics, etc.) insofar as such distinctions might affect their views
on the political component of lawyering. I also have consciously used the terminology in the
text - clinical teachers writing about clinical education issues - to indicate that the issue is not
whether clinicians are writing about political issues but whether their work reflects explicit inte-
gration of clinical and political themes in the same article.
96. The most vocal critic, of course, has been William Simon. For a discussion of his
criticisms of client-centeredness, see infra Part IVA.1.
97. It may be tempting to see cient-centeredness as inextricably linked with politically
progressive views, but some political conservatives also may be attracted to the concept. See
Are Lawyers Strangling Legal Services?, 14 HUM. RTS. 25, 26-27, 47 (Spring 1987)(interview with W. Clark Durant m, former chairman of the Legal Services Corporation under
President Reagan) (arguing for cient-centeredness, client-control, and deprofessionalization of
legal services).
98. See, e.g., D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 19 (discussing the experiences of middle-
class clients).
99. But see Handler, Dependent People, The State, and the ModernlPostmodern
Search for the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1010 (1988) (upper- and middle-
class parents of disabled children hold their own in administrative process while average lower-
class or minority parents do not) [hereinafter Dependent People]. See generally J. HANDLER,
THE CONDmoNs OF DIsCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, BUREAUCRACY Chs. 3 & 4
(1986).
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consider the nature of the client and specifically whether the clients in question
are so powerful as not to need further empowerment. For such clients,
political empowerment is not a compelling argument for a client-centered
approach to counseling.10o
Does client-centered counseling in fact contribute to empowering poor
and otherwise disadvantaged clients? There are a variety of ways to approach
answering this question. Clients empowered in their relationship with their
lawyer might carry over that sense of power to their relationship with
bureaucracies and other power structures. Furthermore, if client-centered
counseling values the client's individual experience by providing an outlet for
its expression within the lawyer-client relationship, clients could be expected to
have more opportunities to assert themselves authentically within whatever
system they are challenging (or being challenged by) by being able to insist to
their lawyers that their perspective gets heard. 01  Yet client-centered
counseling is not a panacea. It does not necessarily address the concerns of
some that focusing on legal rights for poor people diverts their attention from
the kind of political organizing likely to provide the only hope for fundamental
change in their circumstances. 02 And it may be less effective than the critical
lawyering techniques that some advocate in redressing fundamental economic
and political inequities. 103 Despite these concerns, however, the client-centered
lawyer's commitment to client dialogue, non-routine handling of client
problems, and the client's significant role in contributing solutions to his legal
problem would be salutary developments in poverty law practice.
100. See infra Part IVA.1.
101. Thus, the political argument for client-centered counseling provides support for a
freewheeling brainstorming session between lawyer and client over the various alternatives that
the client (as well as the lawyer) sees in the matter at hand. See infra Part V.
102. For recent efforts to address the problems and possibilities of rights-based dis-
course, see generally Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L REV. 589 (1986); Garth, Independent Professional Power
and the Search for a Legal Ideology with a Progressive Bite, 62 IND. LJ. 182 (1987).
103. See sources cited supra note 95. There are few explicit efforts to compare the rela-
tive political effectiveness (however defined) of client-centered and critical approaches. But see
Simon, supra note 84, at 523, in which the author criticizes decontextualized client-centeredness
that focuses on accepting feelings as perversely justifying the disempowerment of clients rather
than providing a rationale for overcoming it. Simon also criticizes politically liberal clinical
teachers who teach client-centeredness in one context (poverty practice) while sending their stu-
dents out to another context (the representation of powerful individuals and corporations) where
the lessons of cient-centeredness may not travel well. Id. at 523 n.238. Simon overstates the
problem considerably, tending to assume both that clinicians are politically naive and that all law
students come from elite institutions that serve as feeders to large corporate law firms. See
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem-
Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 783 n.117 (1984) (literature on lawyer dominance derives
from models of representation of poor and powerless clients; other different but troubling con-
cerns arise when considering the situation of powerful clients). I do agree with Simon's implicit
point that the critical lawyer's commitment to seek political change may make her better suited to
a more explicitly political style of lawyering than her client-centered colleague; I leave to others
the question of whether such a practice is more politically effective than more conventional
approaches. For a recent discussion of the role of the political lawyer, and the justifications for
his manipulation of clients for political purposes, see D. LUBAN, supra note 63, Ch. 14.
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3. Other Political Trends Supporting Client-Centeredness
While representation of poor people sensitized clinical educators to issues
of client-centeredness, other political trends have helped to sustain it. Most
significant of these trends is feminism, with its emphasis on the relational and
dialogic aspects of the lawyer-client relationship.104 Clinical teachers
influenced by feminist thought have emphasized the need to avoid professional
domination within the lawyer-client relationship.lOS Feminist theory's focus on
the experience of women's domination as a starting point for the transformation
of social relationships provides a way of understanding clients' sense of being
dominated and the need to move towards a more egalitarian, participatory kind
of lawyer-client relationship. 106 On the other hand, feminist theory's insight
that the dominant male discourse tends to characterize alternatives in either/or
terms provides a cautionary note for any analysis of client decisionmaking that
attempts to juxtapose lawyer domination and client domination as the only
available choices for the lawyer-client relationship.107
104. See generally Schneider, supra note 102; Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different
Voice: Speculations on a Woman's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 39 (1985)
[hereinafter Portia in a Different Voice]. Cf. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 103, at 763 n.28
(relationship between feminist theory and problem-solving negotiation).
105. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and
Legal Education or "The Fem-Crits Go To Law School," 38 J. LEG. EDUC. 61, 82-85 (1988)
(transformative thrust of feminist theory). Feminist-inspired distrust of professional domination
was also an important source of the challenge to the legitimacy of the medical establishment in
the 1960's and 1970's. See P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MMICINE 390-91 (1982).
106. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda of the Feminization of
the Legal Profession: Theories of Gender and Social Change, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 289,
316 (1989) (arguing that the feminist ethic of care would lead to client participation in decision-
making).
107. Cf. id. at 315. Feminists have not been the only ones concerned about the false
dichotomy between dominance and submission. See R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS:
THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT RE.ATIONS 99-100, 118-19 (1979).
The increasing number of women entering the legal profession may promote greater
resort to client-centered approaches to legal counseling. Carrie Menkel-Meadow has speculated
that women lawyers may be better able to empathize with clients and see a greater number of
issues affecting their clients than do their male counterparts. Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a
Different Voice, supra note 104, at 57-58. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 106, at
312-19 (speculations about the effect of increased numbers of women in the legal profession).
Carol Gilligan's book, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's
Development, which posits the greater tendency of women than men to adopt a relational moral-
ity of care in their moral reasoning patterns, has greatly influenced legal commentators interested
in the effect of gender differences on lawyering behavior. C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). In a recent study
applying Gilligan's categories to lawyers' opinions about legal and moral problems, the authors
(one of whom was a doctoral student of Gilligan's) opine that because women historically have
tended more towards a care orientation (as opposed to a more formalistic rights orientation) they
are more likely to bring contextual reasoning into their legal representation behavior. R. JACK &
.D. JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF
WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS 157-58 (1989). This greater use of contextual reasoning could
lead to an increased use of client-centered counseling approaches, in part because a lawyer con-
cerned with the rich context of the client's problem might be more attentive to a broader range of
issues than the lawyer who focuses on the client's narrow legal problem. For a discussion of
the potentially problematic side of contextual reasoning when applied to counseling clients about
moral issues, see infra note 286.
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4. The Socio-Historical Argument: Developments in the Other
Professions and Informed Consent
Critical to any conception of client-centeredness is the notion that the
client should play a greater role in the lawyer-client relationship. This focus on
the enhanced role of the lay client in the professional relationship is tied in part
to the demystification of the professional role and parallels recent developments
in other professions.' 08 A number of commentators have viewed the
development of informed consent doctrine in medicine as reinforcing greater
client involvement in the lawyer-client relationship. Yet while the informed
consent experience has contributed to the development of client-centered
approaches in law, the analogy between the two concepts is an imperfect one.
This section discusses the critique of professionalism and developments in
informed consent. It attempts to draw distinctions between the different senses
in which informed consent has been used in order to clarify the utility of the
concept for client-centered advocates.
Although the historical and sociological literature on the professions is
far too extensive to be summarized here, it is possible nevertheless to sketch out
some general themes. Modern professions grew in influence in the United
States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Their growth
coincided with the rise of industrial capitalism and corporate power, 09 and was
I am not aware of any studies on whether minority lawyers are any more likely to be
client-centered than whites. Nevertheless, the speculations here might be interesting. Cf.
Franklin, Differential Clinical Assessments: The Influence of Class and Race, 59 SoC. SERv.
REV. 44, 57 (1985) (empirical study in which black social workers were found likely to be more
non-directive with clients than were white social workers). But cf. Berman, Counseling Skills
Used by Black and White Male and Female Counselors, 26 J. COUNSEL. PSYCHOLOGY 81
(1979) (black male and female counseling students in study more likely to use directive counsel-
ing style than whites). See generally B. SOLOMON, BLACK EMPOWERMENT: SOCIAL WORK IN
OPPRESSED COMMUNITIES (1976). It would also be interesting to study whether lawyers from
particular ethnic or cultural groups are more or less likely to employ client-centered approaches.
Some studies in non-legal counseling fields purport to show that minority counselees, in
contrast to white, middle-class clients, prefer directive over non-directive counseling styles.
See, e.g., Ponce & Atkinson, Mexican-American Acculturation, Counselor Ethnicity, Counselor
Style, and Perceived Counselor Credibility, 36 J. COUNSEL. PSYCHOLOGY 203 (1989) (group
of Mexican-American college students preferred directive over non-directive counseling style);
id. at 207 (citing studies showing that Blacks, Mexican-Americans, American Indians, and
Asian-Americans prefer active over passive counseling styles); Atkinson, Matsui & Maruyama,
Effects of Counselor Race and Counseling Approach on Asian Americans' Perceptions of
Counselor Credibility and Utility, 25 J. COUNSEL. PSYCHOLOGY 76, 81 (1978) (majority of
Asian-American students in study preferred directive over non-directive style). These studies
may not translate well to the legal counseling field because the definitions of directive and non-
directive counseling do not correlate closely with client-centered and traditional legal counseling
approaches. See, e.g., id. (directive style defined as "logical, rational, structured;" non-directive
"affective, reflective, ambiguous"). One thing is clear, however. lawyers must be aware of cul-
tural and racial (and gender) differences with their clients that may impede the success of their
legal counseling efforts. See Kessler, The Lawyer's Intercultural Communication Problems
With Clients From Diverse Cultures, 9 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 64 (1988); Note, Cross-
Cultural Legal Counseling, 18 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1475 (1985).
108. That developments in law may parallel those in other professions does not neces-
sarily mean, however, that concepts that are useful in one profession can be applied mechani-
cally in another. See Berger, supra note 73, at 34-35 & 35 n.144.
109. M. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALIsM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 4-6
(1977).
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closely tied to the increasing power and influence of the middle class.110
Bledstein well summarizes the essential characteristics of the profession as it
developed in the late nineteenth century and as it has continued to evolve:
As commonly understood, a profession was a full-time occupation
in which a person earned the principal source of an income.
During a fairly difficult and time-consuming process, a person
mastered an esoteric but useful body of systematic knowledge,
completed theoretical training before entering a practice or
apprenticeship, and received a degree or license from a recognized
institution. A professional person in the role of a practitioner
insisted upon technical competence, superior skill, and a high
quality of performance. Moreover, a professional embraced an
ethic of service which taught that dedication to a client's interest
took precedence over personal profit, when the two happened to
come into conflict 111
Professionals also typically enjoy a significant amount of autonomy in at least
some of aspects of their work.112
Perceptions of the role of professionals in society and the esteem in
which professionals are held have changed significantly in recent years. Early
110. See generally B. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM 80-128
(1976).
111. Id. at 86-87. Bledstein's criteria are roughly equivalent to those identified by other
students of the professions, but different writers tend to stress different characteristics. For
example, Richard Wasserstrom notes that professions constitute largely self-regulating economic
monopolies; are associated with high prestige and, frequently, economic well-being; often
address deeply personal concerns of clients; and involve, at bottom, a significant interpersonal
relationship between professional and layperson. Wasserstrom, supra note 77, at 1-2 n.1.
Interestingly enough, his definition does not include any explicit recognition that professionals
enjoy a substantial degree of autonomy in their work, a characteristic that many see as critical to
the professional enterprise. See J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 22 (1982) (identifying traditional sociological view that professionals
have an unusual degree of autonomy with respect to their clients, based on their superior kmowl-
edge base). Wilbert Moore adds to the concept of the profession its commitment to a calling,
that is, "an enduring set of normative and behavioral expectations" to which its members seek to
adhere. W. MOORE, THE PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND RULES 5 (1970). At some level, all
definitions of professions and professionals are problematic in that they tend to mix descriptive
and evaluative criteria. See E. FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE
SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE 3 (1970). See also Morgan, The Evolving Concept of
Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L REV. 702,704 (1977) (no consensus within literature
on definition of a profession). For a criticism of the view that the above characteristics in fact
distinguish professions from other occupations, see M. LARSON, supra note 109, at xi-xii.
112. See, e.g., W. MOORE, supra note 111, at 6; J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, supra note
111. Freidson writes that "Autonomy of technique is at the core of what is unique about the pro-
fession, and ... when that core is gained, at least segments of autonomy in the other zones will
follow after." E. FREIDSON, supra note 111, at 45. As Freidson also recognizes, the question
of whether professionals have autonomy is a complicated one. Professionals may exercise some
degree of judgment and control in their work, but they have limited autonomy in that they often
work for organizations in which someone else exercises the important powers of resource allo-
cation and control See E. FREIDSON, supra note 61, at 154-55. See also Gordon, The
Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U.L. REV. 1, 19 n.57 (1988) (distinguishing among autonomy
in organizational form, work conditions, and the larger political economy as distinct issues of
professional autonomy). One significant aspect of a professional's claimed autonomy, of
course, is her insistence that a client trust her and follow her advice; traditionally, the profes-
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twentieth-century scholars presented an essentially favorable picture of the
professional." 3 While the writings of post-World War II sociologists reflected
some awareness that professionals did not always live up to the high standards
they set for themselves, especially when economic self-interest was involved,
they also presented an undeniably positive view of the mainstream
professional.114 He (and it was inevitably he, not she) was someone, who by
virtue of his specialized knowledge and commitment to service, performed an
important social function and was entitled to virtually unquestioned respect. 1 5
This functionalist school of sociology gave way in the 1960's to more critical
approaches." 6 Sociologists from different traditions challenged the view that
professionalism inevitably benefitted laypeople. Some sociologists were critical
of the power that professionals exercised over laypersons."t 7 Others stressed
the economic self-interest of professionals and attempted to link the rise of
professionalism with the exercise of market control and the problems of
capitalism.118 These expert criticisms resonated with popular criticisms of the
sional asserted that lay people were not in a position to judge the quality of the services that the
professional provided. See Hughes, Professions, 92 DAEDALUS 655, 656-57 (1963).
113. See generally E. FREIDSON, supra note 61, at 27-28.
114. Id. at 28 (citing authors).
115. The most influential sociologist of the professions during this period was Talcott
Parsons. See, e.g., Parsons, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in T. PARSONS,
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 370-385 (rev. ed. 1954). Parsons was associated with the
functionalist model of sociology, which emphasized that the expertise professionals develop is
of crucial importance to society, and, as a result, "[i]ndividually and, in association, collectively,
the professions 'strike a bargain with society' in which they exchange competence and integrity
against the trust of client and community, relative freedom from lay supervision and interference,
protection against unqualified competition as well as substantial remuneration and higher social
status. As guarantees of this self-control they point to careful recruitment and training, formal
organisation and informal relations among colleagues, codes of ethics, and professional courts
or committees enforcing these codes." Rueschemeyer, Professional Autonomy and the Social
Control of Expertise, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS: LAWYERS, DOCTORS AND
OTHERS 41 (R. Dingwall & P. Lewis eds. 1983) [hereinafter THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE
PROFESSIONS]. Parsons was well aware of the ways in which professionals, and especially
lawyers, served as agents of social control. Lawyers, wrote Parsons, functioned not merely as
advocates for their clients' desires but also as filters of improper or unrealistic desires. "The
lawyer stands as a kind of buffer between the illegitimate desires of his clients and the social
interest." Parsons, supra, at 384. Lawyers shape their clients' goals not only instrumentally
"but through the impact on the client of the attitude of the lawyer, his expressed or implied
approval of this as so legitimate that a lawyer is willing to help him get it, whereas other ele-
ments of the client's goals are disapproved and help in getting them is refused." Id. at 384-85(emphasis in original). Parsons saw this buffering function in a basically positive light view-
ing it as important to maintaining stability in an ever-changing society. Later critics of the pro-
fessions did not necessarily disagree with all aspects of the functionalist approach so much as
dispute the almost naively positive cast to the professions some of its proponents gave. See,
e.g., Rueschemeyer, supra, at 42-43.
116. See, e.g., Freidson, The Theory of the Professions: State of the Art, in THE
SOCIOLOGY OF THEPROFESSIONS, supra note 115, at 19-20 (noting critical approach of 1960's
sociological writing and shift from analysis of professional norms and work interaction to
economic and political analyses). See generally Haskell, Introduction, in THE AUTHORITY OF
EXPERTS xiii-xviii (T. Haskell ed. 1984) (societal skepticism about professions in the 1960's
and 1970's).
117. The most prominent sociological critic of the extent of professional power is Eliot
Freidson. See E. FREIDSON, supra note 111, Ch. 15; E. FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL
DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTUE OF MEDICAL CARE (1970) [hereinafter PROFESSIONAL
DOMINANCE]; E. FREIDSON, supra note 61, at 171-78.
118. See generally M. LARSON, supra note 109.
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professions 19 and with other social and political developments in the 1960's
and 1970's. 120
In its most extreme form, the critique of professionalism denies that
there is any societal value to having professionals.12 1 Most critics, however, do
not go so far. Rather, they argue that professional power must be analyzed
more closely and the area of legitimate professional expertise defined precisely.
Insofar as professionals must deal with technical issues, the role for
professional expertise is plain. But to the extent that moral, personal, or other
non-technical issues are involved in the professional/layperson relationship, the
legitimacy of professional expertise is considerably less clear.122
For the consulting professions like law and medicine that depend on
service to clients (or patients), the relationship between professional and
layperson is inevitably problematic.123 For Eliot Freidson,
[S]ince the only justification for a consulting profession's
very existence lies in the needs of its clientele, the clientele's own
conception of its needs should have a strong influence on its prac-
tice. Laymen, therefore, must be able to have something to say
about whether or when they wish a service and how that service is
to be presented. They must be able to have something to say about
119. See, e.g., I. ILLICH, DISABLING PROFESSIONS (1977); M. BLOOM, THE
TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS (1968). For a recent popular criticism of lawyers, see M.
MCCORMACK, THE TERRIBLE TRUTH ABOUT LAWYERS (1987). While not new, the number
and virulence of attacks on the professions increased substantially in the 1960's and 1970's.
See Haskell, supra note 116, at xiii.
120. See supra Part HIA.2. Argyris and Sch6n describe the dissatisfaction with pro-
fessional education and the professional role felt by students and young professionals in the
1960's and 1970's, a dissatisfaction that grew out of the student movement of the 1960's and a
concern with the problems of disadvantaged people. C. ARGYRIS & D. SCHON, THEORY IN
PRACTICE: INCREASING PROFESSIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 139-41 (1974). Nathan Glazer
linked the criticism of the professions to the rise of the consumer protection movement and what
he characterized as the revisionist history of social institutions. Glazer, The Attack on the
Professions, 66 COMMENTARY 34 (Nov. 1978). The deep involvement of lawyers in the
Watergate scandal not only highlighted the deficiencies in lawyers' ethical training but also led to
questioning of such critical components of the professional paradigm as selfless service, ethical
conduct, and the success of self-regulation. Cf. Wasserstrom, supra note 77. See generally
Rothman, The State as Parent: Social Policy in the Progressive Era, in W. GAYLIN, I.
GLASSER, S. MARCUS & D. ROTHMAN, DOING GOOD: THE LIMITS OF BENEVOLENCE 69-96
(1978) (modern re-thinking of Progressive Era assumptions about the role of the state); id. at 84
(in contemporary society there is "a pervasive distrust of all constituted authorities, a general
decline in the legitimacy of the authority of a whole series of persons and institutions.").
121. Cf., e.g., Simon, supra note 61, at 130-44 (urging non-professional advocacy).
In Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1084 n.1 (1988), Simon states
that he now does not believe that the professional role need be abandoned. For a critique of the
underlying assumptions of anti-professional rhetoric, and an argument that anti-professionalism
is actually an embodiment of professionalism, see Fish, Anti-Professionalism, 7 CARDOZO L.
REV. 656 (1986).
122. See E. FREIDSON, supra note 111, at 338. A crucial problem is to determine the
criteria for making these distinctions and who will apply them. If the professional does the
defining, her self-interest and tendency to transform moral issues into technical ones will work
to expand the realm of professional expertise. If the lay clientele or a surrogate does the defining
one might expect more issues to be reserved for the domain of the client.
123. E. FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE, supra note 117, at 105.
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what their own good is, and when something really is for their
own good.'24
Freidson's call for increased client participation and decreased autonomy for
professionals with respect to their clients strongly argues for client-centered
lawyering.
Freidson's analysis implies that professionals must become "de-profes-
sionalized." They must shed those trappings of their professional role based on
an unjustified expansion of their expertise. The writings of a number of
commentators on the legal profession support this position. 25 For example,
John Leubsdorf's Personal Responsibility model of lawyering
"deprofessionalizes the lawyer by requiring him to justify his behavior morally
and socially without relying on a code applicable only to lawyers;"126 it requires
the recognition that lawyers are just people helping people.127 The dominance
of some lawyers over some clients results from a combination of factors,
including, among other things, the differential social and economic status
between lawyers and clients; lawyers' use of mystifying technical language;
inadequate client information for making informed choices on who to hire as
lawyers; and the embattled emotional state of many clients who come to see
lawyers.128 Because these factors are not easily overcome, complete de-
professionalization is unlikely to be accomplished easily, and, in any event,
would not necessarily be the all-encompassing solution that some of its propo-
nents believe it would be.
The struggle for a less professionalized world, and the concomitant real-
location of power between professional and client, might nevertheless be worth
undertaking if it led to a professional practice characterized less by professional
self-interest and client dissatisfaction than the present one. Client-centered legal
counseling fits hand in hand with this rethinking of the professional's role in
society. Requiring lawyers to facilitate client decisionmaking and avoid
overreaching clients is consistent with limiting illegitimate professional
power.129
Much of the literature on the sociology of the professions has focused on
medicine. The informed consent doctrine has been the most significant
development in the relationship between doctor and patient in recent years. 130
Several legal commentators, drawing on the medical profession's rhetorical
124. E. FREIDSON, supra note 111, at 352.
125. In addition to William Simon's writings, see, e.g., Wasserstrom, supra note 77;
Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1021 (1982).
126. Leubsdorf, supra note 125, at 1045.
127. Id. at 1048.
128. See Ellmann, supra note 16, at 768.
129. The need to limit lawyers' professional power over clients applies more to the
"personal plight" segment of the legal profession than to the corporate sphere. See J. HEINZ &
E. LAUMANN, supra note 111. See also infra Part lV.A.1.
130. The informed consent doctrine is of relatively recent origin, dating from 1957. SeeJ. KATZ, supra note 18, at 60-65. For a history of the development of informed consent doc-
trine, see generally id. and R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 52.
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embrace of this practice, have urged the adoption of an "informed consent"
approach to lawyering.131
Applying the informed consent doctrine to lawyering first requires some
definitional clarity about the meaning of the term. According to one definition,
Informed consent is... the willing and uncoerced acceptance of a
medical intervention by a patient after adequate disclosure by the
physician of the nature of the intervention, its risks and benefits, as
well as of alternatives with their risks and benefits. 132
Other definitions emphasize the connection between informed consent and
patient autonomy. 33 For my purposes, the most interesting definitions of
informed consent focus on its supposed requirement of shared decisionmaking
between physician and patient 34 and the underlying assumption that informed
consent reflects society's felt need to limit the power of professionals over their
lay clients.135 This latter sense of informed consent has been termed the ethical
doctrine of informed consent, as compared to the legal doctrine typified by the
definition quoted above.136 To the extent that shared decisionmaking is critical
131. See, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 22; Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of
Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L REV. 307 (1980); Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority
Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 U. CALIF. DAVIS L. REV. 1049 (1984);
Strauss, supra note 55; Andersen, Informed Decisionmaking in an Office Practice, 28 B.C.L.
REV. 225 (1987). Berger opines that informed consent doctrine may have been attractive to
legal commentators because of the "surprising paucity of guidance" that lawyers' ethical codes
provided on the allocation of decisionmaking authority between lawyer and client. Berger, supra
note 73, at 35.
132. A. JONSEN, M. SIEGLER & W. WINSLADE, CLINICAL ETHICs: A PRACTICAL
APPROACH TO ETHICAL DECISIONS IN CLINICAL MEDICINE 69 (1982), quoted in R. FADEN &
T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 52, at 283. This definition of informed consent is a fairly standard
one. See, e.g., J. KATZ, supra note 18, at 2 (citing Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan.
1960) (similar components to above definition, adding requirement that physician disclosure to
patient must be in understandable language)). Faden and Beauchamp state the traditionally
accepted components of informed consent as follows:
Action X is an informed consent by person P to intervention I if and only if.
1. P receives a thorough disclosure regarding ,
2. P comprehends the disclosure,
3. P acts voluntarily in performing X,
4. P is competent to perform X, and
5. P consents to L
R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 52, at 275 (emphasis in original).
133. See, e.g., J. KATZ, supra note 18, at 104-55; P. APPELBAUM, C. LIDZ & A.
MEISEL, INFORMED CONSENT. LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 3 (1986) (one com-
ponent of informed consent definition is its status as an ethical doctrine based on patient auton-
omy and self-determination); R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 52, at 277-80 (one sense
of informed consent is as autonomous authorization by the patient for the physician's actions).
134. See J. KATZ supra note 18, at 86 (informed consent demands sharing of authority
and joint decision-making between physician and patient); 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS, supra note 52, Ch. 1, especially 36-39.
135. See Spiegel, supra note 22, at 42.
136. See C. LIDZ, A. MEISEL, E. ZERUBAVEL, M. CARTER, R. SESTAK & L. ROTH,
INFORMED CONSENT: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING IN PSYCHIATRY 4 (1984) [hereinafter
INFORMED CONSENT]. Lidz, et al., provide an especially instrumental definition of legal
informed consent:
Unless a doctor discloses to a patient certain types of information before undertak-
ing a diagnostic, therapeutic, or research procedure, the patient may collect dam-
ages from the doctor if he or she is injured by the procedure, even though the pro-
cedure itself was properly performed.
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to the concept of informed consent,137 the arguments on which ethical informed
consent is based buttress those for client-centered lawyering. For informed
consent as shared decisionmaking approaches, in theory at least, client
decisionmaking in the legal context.138
It is not my purpose here to assess how informed consent doctrine would
work in the context of the lawyer-client relationship; legal commentators have
essayed this task with varying degrees of success. 139 My concern is whether the
nature of the decisions to be made in medicine and law are sufficiently similar
to make informed consent a useful concept for those interested in analyzing the
lawyer-client relationship and increasing its client-centered focus.
A number of studies note that informed consent in practice is very dif-
ferent from the shared decisionmaking that some believe is at the heart of the
concept. The authors of one study of informed consent in a psychiatric setting
concluded that.there was little evidence of mutual participation in decisionmak-
ing even when mental health professionals explained to the patient the costs and
benefits of different treatment modalities.140 Other studies reflect additional
Id. Jay Katz, one of theprincipal proponents of ethical informed consent, has recognized that
few courts have pursued the full implications of the concept as he has articulated it. J. KATZ,
supra note 18, at 82-84. See also 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 52, at 29-
31 (noting both limitation of court decisions in informed consent and inherent difficulty of apply-
ing legal sanctions to the shared decisionmaking vision of informed consent); Handler,
Dependent People, supra note 99, at 1004.
137. Unlike Katz and the President's Commission, Faden and Beauchamp would not
require shared decision-making between doctor and patient for informed consent requirements(in their sense of informed consent as autonomous authorization by the patient) to be met so long
as the patient authorized the physician's actions in an autonomous fashion. They would view
the delegation of certain decisions from the patient to the physician, even the delegation of all
treatment decisions, as consistent with informed consent. R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra
note 52, at 279. The authors maintain that in a personal communication to them Katz indicated
that the patient's delegation of decision-making authority to the physician was consistent with his
model of shared decisionmaking. Id. at 295 n.14.
138. Mutual or shared decisionmaking only approaches client decisionmaking because
shared decisionmaking might still result in professional dominance in a way that client decision-
making would not. Shared decisionmaking could envision sharing each critical decision in the
relationship or alternatively that some decisions are for the doctor and some for the patient.
Under the latter interpretation, few changes might result in the nature of decisionmaking. Patient
or client participation in decisionmaking need not be equivalent to actually empowering the
patient or client to make the decision. Nevertheless, the arguments for shared decisinmaking 
or
mutual participation - e.g., that it enhances patient autonomy and that it results in a proper allo-
cation of power between doctor and patient- would certainly support ciient-centerednss in
law.
139. See sources cited supra note 131.
140. INFORMED CONSENT, supra note 136, at 8. The authors studied three settings in a
mental health institution: the evaluation and admission unit; the research ward (organized as a
therapeutic community); and an outpatient unit. Informed consent practices were followed least
on the admission unit. The authors concluded that, in general, therapists there did not disclose
the advantages of treatment; did not provide alternatives to the patients; seemed unconcerned
with whether patients understood the information presented; provided the most information to
the patients they perceived as most competent and as sharing their view of what caused the
problem (e.g., psychiatric rather than social or legal); and often provided information after the
patient made the decision thereby indicating that they did not perceive the information to be nec-
essary for the decision. Id. at 80-100. They observed few instances of mutually participatory
decisinmaking. Id. at 134. On the research ward, psychiatrists provided more information
about treatment modalities, especially such invasive procedures as electroconvulsive therapy, but
often manipulated patients to get them to follow their decisions by re-visiting patient decisions or
acting as if the patient had not made a decision. Id. at 210-12. Even on the outpatient unit,
1990] 531
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
problems with the implementation of the concept.141 These problems might
give client-centered advocates pause before seeking to adapt informed consent
to the legal counseling sphere.
Yet there are reasons why informed consent might be more difficult to
implement in medicine than in law. Differences in the professional orientations
of doctors and lawyers, 142 the nature of knowledge in the respective disci-
plines, 43 and the nature of the medical delivery system, 1" make informed
where relations between psychiatrists and patients were more natural, and where patients and
doctors frequently shared similar views about the nature of the patient's situation, staff deci-
sionmaking predominated. Id. at 287.
For an extended review and criticism of some of the Lidz study's conclusions, see
Shapiro, Is Autonomy Broke?, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 353 (1988). Shapiro, like Faden and
Beauchamp, see supra note 137, argues that patient delegation to doctors of decision-making
responsibilities may sometimes enhance, rather than detract from, patient autonomy. Shapiro,
supra, at 371 (discussion and advocacy of "fair assent" model of informed consent).
141. See A Review of Empirical Studies on Informed Consent and Decisionmaking, in 2
MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 52, at 1; Louis Harris & Associates, Views of
Informed Consent Decisionmaking: Parallel Surveys of Physicians and the Public, in 2 MAKING
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 52, at 17; Lidz & Meisel, Informed Consent and the
Structure of Medical Care, in 2 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 52, at 317,390,
399 (actual consent and information disclosure practices vary substantially from the
decisionmaking process contemplated by informed consent doctrine). See also Priluck,
Robertson & Buettner, What Patients Recall of the Preoperative Discussion After Retinal
Detachment Surgery, 87 AM. J. OPHTHALMOLOGY 620 (1979) (post-operative patients forget a
significant amount of the pre-operative information physicians give them, and lend to retain
information consistent with their decision to have surgery); Roter, Patient Participation in the
Patient-Provider Interaction: The Effects of Patient Question Asking on the Quality of
Interaction, Satisfaction and Compliance, 5 HEALTH EDUC. MONOGRAPHS 281 (1977)(physicians react negatively to persistent patient information requests); Nelson & McGough, The
Informed Client: A Case Study in the Illusion of Autonomy, 6 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 35, 43
(1983) (doctors allow childbirth patients to experience the illusion of autonomy while reserving
ultimate decisionmaking authority); Faden & Beauchamp, Decision-Making and Informed
Consent: A Study of the Impact of Disclosed Information, 7 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 313, 326-
27 (1980) (despite reported benefits of factual disclosures to patients, ninety-three percent of
patients in study decided about non-surgical contraceptive devices prior to receiving factual dis-
closures). Perhaps the most significant problem with implementing informed consent is doctors'
resistance to the concept. See J. KATZ, supra note 18, at 26 & passim. For a discussion of
studies reporting that terminal patients are much more likely to want to be told of their illnesses
than doctors are likely to tell them, see R. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING, AND THE BIOLOGICAL
REVOLUTION 229-41 (1976).
142. Doctors are trained to believe in the virtue of pursuing health, a pursuit that may
appear more important than respecting the patient's liberty or autonomy. It is not difficult to see
how a doctor committed to making his patient healthy, and believing that the treatment of choice
is plain, would attempt to persuade his patient quite vigorously to follow his recommendation.
See generally Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 420-429 (1988)
(discussing medical profession's focus on aggressive, action-oriented intervention in the fighting
of disease at the expense of other values). See also 3. KATZ, supra note 18, at 2 (physicians
have traditionally valued custody over liberty). Lawyers, in contrast, are trained to value
(overvalue?) and be sensitive to due process and liberty issues (whether or not their subsequentpractices reflect this). The r pr blem is that they are also trained to be persuasive and so whether
they could easily avoid persuasive behavior bordering on manipulation and coercion is at least
somewhat open to question.
143. Moder medicine is the most scientific of the traditional professions. See P.
STARR, supra note 105, at 4. Despite Christopher Columbus Langdell's best efforts, law is not
a science. As Spangler puts it:
[S]cientific knowledge is objective, replicable, intrinsically suprahistorical and
supracultural, while legal knowledge has none of these once-and-for-all qualities.
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consent potentially more problematic in the medical sphere. Indeed, even the
term informed consent implies that the patient must agree to the doctor's pro-
posed intervention rather than make the decision either him or herself or with
the doctor's guidance.145
Lawyers, of course, have attempted to stress the technical side of their
work in arguing for autonomy from clients. But the lawyer's technical knowl-
edge - predicting what an adversary will do or how a court or jury will
decide - is much less certain than the doctor's knowledge. One consequence
of this decreased certainty in legal prediction is the likelihood that clients will
challenge the lawyer's arguments more easily than the doctor's.146 Also
Rather, it is cultural knowledge: informed estimates about which arguments will
be persuasive in specific jurisdictions under particular circumstances.
E. SPANGLER, LAWYERS FOR HIRE: SALARIED PROFESSIONALS AT WORK 184-85 (1986)
(citations omitted). But see T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1970
ed.) (difference between assumptions and practices of normal science and revolutionary
science). Spangler's observation has clear implications for the differences between patient and
client counseling. In the medical context, a relatively clear technical diagnosis and technical
solution is more likely. The patient has a burst appendix; an appendectomy is the principal way
to deal with the problem. See Redmount, New Dimensions of Professional Responsibility, 3 J.
LEGAL PROF. 43, 48 (1978). That doctors have a tendency to overstate the technical aspects of
their practice does not deny the core truth of modem medicine's scientific grounding. The doc-
tor is likely to approach her meeting with the patient with a clear idea of her proposed treatment
for the patient's problem. That clear idea is not necessarily shaken by a full airing of the costs
and benefits of the treatments and a discussion of alternatives.
144. The medical delivery system is structured in part according to specialty and by
technical disease category. See J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, supra note 111, at 334. Eliot
Freidson has distinguished two types of medical practices: client-dependent (where the patient
comes to see the general practitioner because of a perceived medical problem or for a check-up)
and colleague-dependent (specialty practices that depend on referrals from general practitioners
or others for their patients). E. FREIDSON, supra note 111, at 107-08. Increasingly, medicine
has moved towards greater colleague-dependent practices. Id. at 352. The colleague-dependent
doctor or specialist is predisposed to apply his expertise (e.g., to perform surgery) to the patient;
since he is not dependent on the patient (client) for his business, he has a decreased need to
respond to the patient's wishes and desires. See also J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, supra note
111, at 333-42 (comparing legal and medical professions), especially at 339 (patients exercise
less control over doctors than clients do over lawyers because patients do not generally control
payment for services). For a discussion of the growth of medical specialization in the 1920's
and 1930's and its relationship to physicians' professional dominance, see P. STARR, supra
note 105, at 220-32.
145. James Childress observes that the term "consent" takes on different meanings for
doctors and patients depending on their choice of metaphor for the doctor-patient relationship. J.
CHILDRESS, supra note 51, at 7 (paternalists view consent as acceptance of their proposed action
and refusal as indicative of incompetence; those who view the relationship contractually interpret
consent as decision and see acceptance or refusal as equally valid and possible). See also supra
note 140 (even on outpatient ward, patients at most accede to physician decisions rather than
make them themselves).
146. We can perhaps only speculate about this point. Another factor to consider is the
mental state of the layperson when meeting with the professional. While there are certainly
many medical problems that are less serious than legal ones (e.g., plastic surgery versus whether
to go to trial in a murder case), health-related issues seem especially threatening. As Paul Starr
has put it:
Physicians offer a kind of individualized objectivity, a personal relationship as
well as authoritative counsel. The very circumstances of sickness promote accep-
tance of their judgment. Often in pain, fearful of death, the sick have a special
thirst for reassurance and vulnerability to belief. The therapeutic definition of the
profession's role also encourages its acceptance: Its power is avowedly enlisted
solely in the interests of health - a value of usually unambiguous importance to
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lawyers should, in theory, be more willing to approach decisions with their
client more openly and with a greater willingness to be convinced by the
client's reasoning. A lawyer, even a client-centered one, may have to reach a
tentative decision before counseling a client in order to understand better the
circumstances surrounding the decision. 147 But tentative deliberation about the
decision 48 is a far cry from making a decision and then becoming an advocate
for it with the layperson.
Somewhat paradoxically, then, while legal or doctrinal informed consent
may serve as only a partially useful analogy for client-centered advocates,
ethical informed consent may be easier to adopt in law than it is in medicine.149
5. The Ethical Argument: The Model Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Some legal commentators argue that either the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Model Code") or the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct ("Model Rules') or both solidly supports a client-centered approach to
lawyering. Upon close examination, these arguments are unpersuasive. At
best, the Model Code and Model Rules support client-centeredness at a level of
generality that is essentially meaningless. At worst, they are consistent with and
therefore perpetuate fairly traditional conceptions of the lawyer-client
relationship.
Model Code Ethical Consideration 7-7 provides support for client-cen-
tered lawyering insofar as it indicates that it is the client's exclusive right to
make decisions except "in certain areas of the representation not affecting the
merits of the cause or substantially prejudicing" the client's rights, in which
case the lawyer may make decisions on his own.'50 But the kinds of decisions
that EC 7-7 reserves to the client are basic to the representation;151 they hardly
clients and society. On this basis, physicians exercise authority over patients,
their fellow workers in health care, and even the public at large in matters within,
and sometimes without, their jurisdiction.
P. STARR, supra note 105, at 5. One can imagine situations (e.g., in the case of a serious
illness such as cancer) where the economically and socially powerful executive is quite
dependent on his physician in a way that he is not on his lawyer even if a substantial fine and jail
term are at stake.
147. See G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 3, at 998 n.12.
148. "Deliberation is 'an imaginative rehearsal of various courses of action."' J.
CHILDRESS, supra note 51, at 62 (quoting J. DEWEY, THEORY OF THE MORAL LIFE 135
(1960)). See also Kronman, supra note 5, at 39 (lawyer must deliberate on client's behalf about
choice client is to make).
149. In a recent talk, William Simon argued that an informed consent approach to
lawyering was "misleading or radically incomplete" because it ignored "lawyers' needs to make
and act on their own judgments of what clients' best interests are." W. Simon, Allocation of
Authority in the Client/Lawyer Relation (AALS Mini-Workshop on Teaching The Law and
Ethics of Lawyering Throughout the Law Curriculum, San Francisco, Calif., January 4, 1990)
(AALS Tapes 3 & 4). Simon's criticism relates closely to his concerns about the over-emphasis
on client autonomy and the impossibility of lawyers avoiding influencing their clients. These
criticisms are discussed infra in Part IVA.1.
150. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1980). See Spiegel,
supra note 22, at 65-67 (arguing that plain reading of EC 7-7 could support client control over
almost all case decisions, but finding no indication that drafters meant to go that far).
151. In relevantpart, EC 7-7 provides:
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extend to the full range of decisions that the client-centered lawyer would
consider to be the client's. EC 7-8's discussion of the role of the lawyer in
fostering the client's decisionmaking also emphasizes the client's primacy in
determining the objectives of the representation, even as it recognizes that the
lawyer has interests in the lawyer-client relationship worth protecting. 152 But
these Ethical Considerations are aspirational, not mandatory. The mandatory
Disciplinary Rules are considerably less clear on the issue of the relative
authority of lawyer and client.153
While most commentators who have addressed the issue criticize the
Model Code's equivocation on the appropriate allocation of decisionmaking
authority between lawyer and client,154 some suggest that the Model Rules
As typical examples in civil cases, it is for the client to decide whether he will
accept a settlement offer or whether he will waive his right to plead an affirmative
defense. A defense lawyer in a criminal case has the duty to advise his client fully
on whether a particular plea to a charge appears to be desirable and as to the
prospects of success on appeal, but it is for the client to decide what plea should
be entered and whether an appeal should be taken.
See also STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 5.2(a) (Approved Draft 1971)
(accused, after consultation with counsel, is to decide plea to enter, whether to waive jury trial,
and whether to testify).
152. Although EC 7-8 urges the lawyer, inter alia, to give advice to clients that is not
confined to narrow legal considerations and "to bring to bear upon this decisionmaking process
the fullness of his experience as well as his objective viewpoint," and authorizes the lawyer to
seek withdrawal from representation in a nonadjudicatory matter if the client fails to follow her
advice, it also states that "[i]n the final analysis, however, the lawyer should always remember
that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because of non-legal
factors is ultimately for the client and not for [the lawyer]." Stephen Ellmann notes that EC 7-
8's requirement that, if the client fails to do so, the lawyer should initiate a decisionmaking pro-
cess with the client that takes into account all relevant considerations puts the lawyer in a pater-
nalistic stance towards his client. Ellnann, supra note 16, at 731-32.
153. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A) (1980) provides
that "a lawyer shall not intentionally: (1) fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through
reasonably available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules, except as provided by
DR 7-101(B)." The latter provision states that "where permissible [a lawyer may] exercise his
professional judgment to waive or fail to assert a right or position of his client." The precise
interplay between these two provisions, let alone their relationship with the Ethical
Considerations, is unclear. On its face, the exception in DR 7-101(B) could easily swallow the
rule of DR 7-101(A). For a discussion of the ambiguity of these various provisions, see Maute,
supra note 131, at 1056-57.
154. See, e.g., Maute, supra note 131; Spiegel, supra note 22, at 65-67; MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2, notes: Legal Background at 15 (Proposed Final Draft
May 30, 1981) ('The distribution of decision-making authority has never been fully addressed in
the profession's standards of conduct."). Binder and Price's brief discussion of the Model Code
implies that ECs 7-7 and 7-8 provide support for their client-centered approach, although they
seem to recognize that applying client decisionmaking to auxiliary decisions is an implicit exten-
sion of ethical precepts. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8, at 147. Interestingly, Binder
and Price do not make explicit mention of the significance of EC 7-7's requirement that a crimi-
nal defense lawyer should advise his client fully on whether a particular plea to a charge appears
to be desirable. On its face, such advice would appear to be contrary to the authors' strong
stance against the lawyer's opinion-giving. Moreover, EC 7-8's admonition to the lawyer to
"bring the fullness of his experience" to counseling the client could easily justify a more persua-
sive and interventionist mode of counseling than Binder and Price advocate. It is perhaps these
divergences between the authors and the Model Code that John Morris refers to when he gently
criticizes Binder and Price for limiting the counseling options available to lawyers under the ethi-
cal rules. Morris, supra note 42, at 809. The Model Rules, of course, had not been promul-
gated at the time of the 1977 publication of the Binder and Price text.
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represent a fundamental reconceptualization of the lawyer-client relationship.155
As originally proposed, the text of Model Rule 1.3 could have been read as
reserving virtually all decisions to the client.1 But the inconsistency between
the text of Rule 1.3 and the comments on decisionmaking authority was
palpable. 157 In later drafts and the adopted version of Rule 1.2, the Model
Rules adopt the means/objectives distinction that was suggested in the comment
to draft rule 1.3 and that follows fairly naturally from EC 7-7.158 Although the
commentary to the Model Rules recognizes that this distinction may be difficult
to apply,159 the very perpetuation of the distinction confuses the locus of
decisionmaking responsibility.
Model Rule 2.1 is the natural successor to EC 7-8 in its language requir-
ing the lawyer in his representation to "exercise independent professional
judgment and render candid advice."160 As with EC 7-8, Rule 2.1 and the
comments following it stress the desirability of the lawyer providing broad and
not merely technical advice.'61 The Rule and comments do not recognize the
155. See, e.g., Maute, supra note 131, at 1052, 1057 (Model Rules represent new joint
venture model for attorney-client decisionmaking); Gifford, supra note 15, at 817 (Model Rules
solidly reject paternalistic approach). But see Morris, supra note 42, at 802 ("If anything the
Model Rules, in comparison to the Model Code, shift the locus of power toward the attorney.").
156. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3(a) (Discussion Draft 1980)
(Client Autonomy), provided in relevant part that "A lawyer shall accept a client's decisions con-
cerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be
pursued.. . ." (emphasis added). The exceptions to this broad injunction were that the lawyer
could not pursue a course of action that was illegal or violated ethical rules, MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3(b), and need not pursue objectives that she found to be
"repugnant or imprudent" if she disclosed to the client such a desire to limit her actions prior to
undertaking the representation, or, if such occasions presented themselves only after commenc-
ing representation, she obtained the client's consent. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.5(b) (incorporated by reference in Rule 1.3(c)). For an analysis of the 1980
Discussion Draft's provisions on lawyer-client decisionmaking, see Spiegel, The New Model
Rules of Professional Conduct: Lawyer-Client Decision Making and the Role of Rules in
Structuring the Lawyer-Client Dialogue, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1003.
157. See Speigel, supra note 156, at 1005. For example, the comment following Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3 stated that while the client had the ultimate authority to
determine the objectives of the legal representation, he only had "a right to consult" on the means
to be used, thus seemingly contradicting the plain language of the rule itself. MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 comment (Discussion Draft 1980). The remainder of the
Comment alternated confusingly between recognizing the pre-eminent right of the client to con-
trol the representation and acknowledging the permissibility of the lawyer exercising profes-
sional judgment and controlling what were said to be wholly technical matters.
158. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1983) (Scope of
Representation) provides in part that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning
the objectives of representation ... and shall consult with the client as to the means by which
they are to be pursued." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (date?) (Scope
of Representation). As with the Proposed Draft, there are exceptions to this allocation of deci-
sionmaking responsibility. One change from the Proposed Draft is that Rule 1.2(c) provides
simply that a lawyer may limit the objectives of representation if the client consents; the
"imprudent or repugnant" language of the Proposed Final Draft, see supra note 154, has been
placed in the comment section.
159. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 comment (1983) ("A
clear distinction between objectives and means sometimes cannot be drawn, and in many cases
the client-lawyer relationship partakes of a joint undertaking.'). See also Maute, supra note 131,
at 1061-62.
160. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1983).
161. Id. and comment.
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possibility that the lawyer will overreach her client in providing such advice. 162
Far from supporting client-centeredness, such provisions could contribute to
lawyer domination.
The only real difference between the Model Rules and the Model Code in
allocating decisionmaking authority is that the dismantling of the dichotomy
between ethical considerations and disciplinary rules resulted in an arguably
stronger commitment to the decisionmaking priorities formerly consigned to
the hortatory ECs.163 Surely, though, to describe the Model Rules as client-
centered164 deprives that term of any significant meaning.
Perhaps the most that can be said is that the Model Rules's vagueness will
force lawyers and clients to struggle towards accommodation of their different
interests in the lawyer-client relationship. 65 Yet it seems at least as likely that
162. Indeed, the comments suggest that lawyers should resist clients' efforts to confine
the lawyer's advice to technical matters when the client is inexperienced in legal matters.
Experienced clients, in contrast, are deemed able to opt out of non-technical advice from the
lawyer. This provision is not only paternalistic with respect to inexperienced clients, but limits
the lawyer's counseling role with respect to clients that might need moral and other non-technical
advice the most (and who could handle it without having their will overborne by the lawyer).
163. Although recognizing that the Model Rules adopt "in part" the provisions of the
aspirational Ethical Considerations in the Model Code, Maute, probably the strongest proponent
of the view that the Model Rules adopts a client-centered approach, argues nevertheless that
unlike previous professional codes the Model Rules do not purport to "vest primary decision-
making authority in either participant." See Maute, supra note 131, at 1057. It is difficult to
square this observation with the plain language of Model Rule 1.2 and Model Code EC 7-7, on
which it is obviously based. (Rule 1.2, however, does expand the number of situations in
which a criminal defense lawyer must abide by a client's decision, and excludes from the civil
context the lawyer's deference to the client's decision whether to waive an affirmative defense.)
Both EC 7-7 and Rule 1.2 attempt to draw the same distinction regarding decisionmaking
authority: the lawyer is the primary decisionmaker with respect to means or technical issues and
the client is the primary decisionmaker regarding objectives or goals. Arguably, the only signifi-
cant difference between these provisions is that EC 7-7 apparently did not require the lawyer to
consult with the client about the means to be employed while Rule 1.2 does require such consul-
tation. The right to be consulted, of course, is not the same as the right to decide. The Model
Rules are superior to the provisions of the Model Code in requiring lawyers to communicate
with their clients, see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 (1983), but the
nature of the required communication is exceedingly vague.
164. Robert Kutak, the Chairman of the American Bar Association Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards, which drafted the Model Rules, wrote in his Introductory
Note to the June 30, 1982 Final Draft of the Proposed Model Rules "that never before has there
been a more client-centered code." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1982)(Chairman's Introductory Note). Maute cites this language approvingly as part of her argument
that the Model Rules represents a fundamental break from previous professional codes in their
allocation of decisionmaking responsibility. See Maute, supra note 131, at 1052, 1057. This
broad use of the term cient-centeredness presents precisely the problem identified earlien client-
centeredness can simply mean that the Model Rules attempt to focus on protection of the client's
interests not on protection of his decisionmaking authority. See supra note 22. From the con-
text, it is clear that the Chairman was responding to critics of the Commission who had charged
that earlier drafts of the Model Rules sacrificed client service for professional policing functions.
See generally Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 605-17
(1985).
165. Both Maute and Spiegel argue that the absence of clear distinctions between lawyer
and client authority will inevitably result in a healthy increase in lawyer-client dialogue respecting
this and other issues. See Maute, supra note 131, at 1066 (to avoid risk of liability, lawyers will
perforce engage in dialogue with clients); Spiegel, supra note 156, at 1010-15 (questioning the
values of strict rules for allocation of decisionmaking authority and seeing Model Rules's ambi-
guity as fostering dialogue). This appeal to the open-textured nature of ethical rules has much in
common with William Simon's argument in Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, supra note 121,
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those traditional lawyers who retain benighted views of the appropriate division
of decisionmaking responsibility between them and their clients will interpret
the Model Rules as allowing them to proceed as they always have. The Model
Code and Model Rules may not provide much sustenance to critics of client-
centered approaches but they also provide scant support for its advocates.
6. The Psychological Argument
The consideration of client-centered legal counseling's development
inevitably must focus on its roots in humanistic psychology and Rogerian non-
directive or client-centered therapy. This section will discuss the systemic
influence of client-centered therapeutic approaches on the development of
client-centered legal counseling. Part 11I.B.1 examines some of the assumptions
that client-centered therapy makes about the counselor and client and assesses
their relevance for the lawyer-client relationship.
Psychologist Carl Rogers's explication of his theory of client-centered
therapy'6 not only provided legal commentators and theorists with a name for
the kind of legal counseling they advocate, 167 but, more importantly, supplied
much of the basic theoretical underpinning for that counseling. Though not a
static concept, 168 client-centered or nondirective therapy is solidly in the
tradition of humanistic psychotherapeutic counseling. 169 Starting with the
assumption that the individual is basically good,170 but that civilization has
alienated him, client-centered therapy seeks to unlock the person's potential for
solving the conditions of his own unhappiness. To assist the client in
accomplishing this task, the client-centered therapist must exhibit several
characteristics: she must express unconditional positive regard for the client;
she must demonstrate acceptance or empathic understanding; and she must be
congruent, that is, she must actually feel and believe the attitudes and feelings
that she expresses towards the client.17' The therapist's attitude towards the
and Robert Burt's argument in Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO.
LJ. 1015 (1981) (greater lawyer disclosure of client confidences - as proposed under the
original draft of the Model Rules - will force lawyers and clients to engage m dialogue and con-
front the pervasive mutual distrust that operates between them).
166. Rogers first attempted to describe client-centered therapy in 1940. C. ROGERS,
CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY: ITS CURRENT PRACTICE, IMPLICATIONS AND THEORY 9
(1951).
167. Rogers indicated that his use of the term "client" for the person being helped in the
relationship in lieu of more standard terms such as patient was meant to reflect the sense that the
person was seeking help voluntarily and actively, without surrendering his responsibility for
resolving his situation. Id. at7 n.l.
168. See id. at 5-6 (concepts in client-centered therapy are dynamic and subject to con-
stant revision based on research and clinical findings). See also Stone, Legal Education on the
Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392, 433-34 (1971) (Rogers's initial approach stressed the thera-
pist's creation of an accepting emotional climate for the client; only later did he emphasize the
deeply personal and intimate aspects of the counseling relationship).
169. See, e.g., Homans, Carl Rogers' Psychology and the Theory of Mass Society, in
INNOVATIONS IN CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY 319 (D. Wexler & L. Rice eds. 1974) (noting
that survey texts also often categorize Rogerian psychology with European existential therapies).
170. See, e.g., Appendix: Dialogue Between Martin Buber and Carl R. Rogers, in M.
BUBER, THE KNOWLEDGE OF MAN 166, 179-80 (1965) (Rogers's statement that human nature
is "something that is really to be trusted) (emphasis in original).
171. For a general description of Rogers's theory, see, e.g., C. ROGERS, supra note
166; Rogers, A Theory of Therapy, Personality, and Interpersonal Relationships, as Developed
in the Client-Centered Framework, in 3 PSYCHOLOGY: A STUDY OF A SCIENCE:
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client is non-directive but not passive; 172 her stance is that of objective
subjectivity.173
Rogers's client-centered therapy parallels the philosophical writings of
Martin Buber, whose articulation of the I-Thou relationship bears at least some
connection to the accepting therapeutic relationship that Rogers advocates. 174
The philosophical orientation of the counselor toward the client respects the
client's capacity to choose; his goal is to allow the client to make responsible
choices.175
In Rogers's view, the principles underlying client-centered therapy,
originally proposed as a form of psychotherapeutic treatment, also applied to
FORMULATIONS OF THE PERSON AND THE SOCIAL CONTEXT 185-256 (S. Koch ed. 1959)
[hereinafter A Theory of Therapy]; Homans, supra note 169; Rice, The Relationship in Client-
Centered Therapy, in A GUIDE To PSYCHOTHERAPY AND PATIENT RELATIONSHIPS 36-60 (M.
Lambert ed. 1983) (cited in Morris, supra note 42).
172. See C. ROGERS, supra note 166, at 27.
173. Cf. A. WATSON, supra note 4, at 10. Client-centered therapy grew out of psycho-
analysis although it differs from it in a number of respects. See, e.g., Homans, supra note 169,
at 323-25. Both schools bemoan the alienation of the individual from society, but draw quite
different conclusions from the existence of this phenomenon. As Homans puts it, with respect
to alienation, psychoanalysis seeks to have the person accommodate to it, while client-centered
therapy seeks to obliterate it. Id. at 327. Psychoanalytic therapy seems more likely to explore
emotions historically, while client-centered therapy is oriented towards the present. See Simon,
supra note 84, at 515-16, 519. Client-centered therapists and psychoanalysts view human
nature very differently. See Rogers, A Theory of Therapy, supra note 171, at 248 (Rogers
describing psychoanalysts as believing that the individual is inherently destructive in contrast to
his own view of individual's goodness). Moreover, the respective roles of the psychoanalyst
and client-centered therapist differ. The former is often perceived as dominant and controlling;
the latter attempts to convey an attitude of participation with the client. See D. ROSENTHAL,
supra note 19, at 10-11 (psychoanalysts see patients as needing direction and control, while
Rogerians stress that patient should make all choices themselves). For Freudians, the concept of
transference is critical, while the Rogerian downplays its significance. See generally C.
ROGERS, supra note 166, Ch. 5. Transference refers to the strong feelings of attachment and
anger that the patient develops for the helper, based not on the immediate relationship between
them but on the patient's past relationships with others and the psychological attributes of those
relationships. See T. SHAFFER & J. ELKINS, supra note 1, at 106-07. In each form of therapy,
however, theorists stress that the therapist's recognition of his or her own feelings and attitudes
is a prerequisite for effective counseling. See C. ROGERS, supra note 166, Ch.2; Ferreira &
Rosen, Therapeutic Relations in Psychotherapy-Psychoanalytic Modality, in A GUIDE TO
PSYCHOTHERAPY AND PATIENT RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 171, Ch. 3, esp. 72-77
(discussion of counter-transference).
174. M. BUBER, I AND THOU (1970 ed.). I-Thou relationships, according to Buber, are
"characterized by genuine mutuality, directness, presentness, intensity, and ineffability." See
Friedman, Introductory Essay, in THE KNOWLEDGE OF MAN, supra note 170, at 11, 12. They
are distinguished from I-It relationships, the primary means by which people experience the
world and in which the person treats the other as an object. Id. Buber is the primary philoso-
pher of dialogue; for him, an individual becomes essentially him or herself only through a
mutual dialogue with another. Id. at 27. Relationships are rarely completely I-Thou or I-It, but
often alternate between the two modes. Id. at 26. For the explicit connection between Rogerian
psychology and Buber's philosophy, see, e.g., id. at 166 app.; Bastress, Client Centered
Counseling and Moral Accountability for Lawyers, 10 J. LEGAL PROF. 97, 125 (1985).
Significantly, Buber concluded that relationships between professionals and lay people could
never truly be I-Thou in nature because the participants lack reciprocity of interest; both the
patient-client and therapist are interested in the patient-client's situation, not the therapist's. See
M. BUBER, THE KNOWLEDGE OF MAN, supra note 170, at 170-73 app.
175. See C. ROGERS, supra note 166, at 20, 51.
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many different types of relationships. 176 Nevertheless, the goals of therapeutic
relationships and relationships such as that between a lawyer and client are far
from identical.'7" Those differences are critical to understanding the usefulness
of client-centered psychotherapy as a means to analyze the lawyer-client
relationship.
In psychotherapy, the therapist seeks to induce therapeutic change in the
individual. The individual comes to the therapist presumably because, at some
level, she desires to undergo such change. While psychotherapeutic schools'
views of the therapist's role in causing psychotherapeutic change differ, it is not
implausible to believe, as the Rogerians do, that the focus of change resides
within the individual. Furthermore, it is conceivable that the therapist can truly
adopt an attitude of following the client's lead at the client's pace, because the
pressure for change will relate in large measure to the needs that the client
perceives. 178 As one commentator put it succinctly, "the client-centered
therapist doesn't challenge defenses, doesn't typically make interpretations, and
doesn't serve as an educator or an information-giver." 79
In the lawyer-client relationship, however, an undeniable external reality
constrains the degree to which the lawyer and client can afford to engage in the
sometimes languorous exploration of self that client-centered therapy
contemplates. Clients must deal with the activities and demands of actual or
potential adversaries, associates, judges and interested others. The pressures of
this external reality necessarily lead the lawyer to adopt a different attitude
from that of the client-centered therapist. The lawyer becomes the mediator
between the client and the external world.180 Her approach to her client and
her willingness to contribute to the client's ability to make her own decisions
may be client-centered, but she must assure that a decision is made. 81 At some
point in the counseling session, the lawyer must become somewhat directive in
suggesting strategies for the client and encouraging the client to make a
conscious choice about how to proceed. 82 Because the lawyer often must
176. See id. at 12 & Part II, and C. ROGERS, ON BECOMING A PERSON: A
THERAPIST'S VIEW OFPSYCHOTHERAPY 52 and especially Part VI (1961).
177. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 42, at 803 n.93.
178. Cf. C. ROGERS, supra note 166, at 69, 71 (indicating that client-centered coun-
selors have concluded that it is inappropriate for them to attempt to structure the therapeutic ses-
sion), 276 (in child therapy, "the therapist does not try to affect the pace or the direction of ther-
apy; he follows rather than leads the child.").
179. Rice, supra note 171, at 37.
180. See Elkins, A Counseling Model for Layering in Divorce Cases, 53 NOTRE
DAME L REV. 229, 234 n.26 (1977).
181. In many circumstances, the failure to make a decision would itself be a decision.
This would certainly be true in the simulation described in Part V of this article, where the
client's failure to decide on a course of action would result in his loss of the land on which he
held the option contract.
182. Rogers recognized the differences between therapeutic applications of his theory
and its applications in other settings, and believed that in the latter situations the professional
would very likely need to provide more information to the client than in the former. See, e.g.,
C. ROGERS, supra note 166, at 398 (educational setting). One researcher suggests that because
of the differences in time frame and problem definition between Rogerian psychotherapeutic
counseling and short-term counseling in such settings as a weight-loss clinic or a stop-smoking
clinic, the counselor in the latter setting must use a counseling model that operates between the
poles of non-directive and directive styles. See Janis, Problems of Short-term Counseling, in
COUNSELING ON PERSONAL DECISIONS: THEORY AND RESEARCH ON SHORT-TERM HELPING
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engage in such activities as interviewing potential witnesses and examining
documents, she is in a position to verify or disprove independently many of the
client's claims. If the lawyer concludes that the client is lying, it may be
considerably harder to feel (and communicate) the attitude of unconditional
positive regard that Rogers proposes.183
Unlike the client-centered therapist, who seeks to demonstrate to the
client that other individuals should not be permitted to establish "conditions of
worth" on his value,184 the lawyer must apprise the client of the opinions others
(witnesses, adversaries, potential judges and jurors) hold on his actions. Those
opinions become not simply impediments to the person's achievement of a
healthy self-image; they help to establish part of the texture of reality that the
client must confront. Whether or not such considerations are objective in
nature,185 they cannot be discarded lightly.18 6
Despite these differences between the therapist-client and lawyer-client
relationships, Rogerian theory served as a powerful influence on advocates for
client-centered legal counseling, especially early advocates.187 At a minimum,
RELATIONSHIPS 6 (1. Janis ed. 1982) [hereinafter COUNSELING ON PERSONAL DECISIONS];
Janis, Helping Relationships: A Preliminary Theoretical Analysis, in COUNSELING ON
PERSONAL DECISIONS, supra, at 31-32 (unconditional positive regard, a staple of Rogerian
counseling, may hinder patient motivation for change in short-term counseling situation).
183. For differences between therapeutic and legal counseling, see T. SHAFFER & J.
ELKINS, supra note 1, at 286-87.
184. See C. ROGERS, supra note 166, at 149-57.
185. Consider the following description by Redmount, one of the "legal psychologists"
Simon criticizes in Homo Psychologicus, supra note 84, at 508 nn.68, 72, 73 and accompany-
ing text, of the differences between psychological and legal counseling:
[Theories of personal and interpersonal counseling] have in common a parochial
quality that gears them almost exclusively to the internal states of individuals, and
to the subjective meanings of such sensing behavior as feeling and seeing or
awareness. They seek to probe the unconscious and its effect on external percep-
tion and activity. They imply that to deal effectively with the 'world of reality'
one must properly position oneself subjectively so as to receive and respond to the
elements au dehors with a minimum sense of disturbance. In legal counseling,
this is useful, but hardly enough. Interpretations of perception and feeling are an
essential to life, and clearly they should be highly developed in counselors. But,
there is bias in the psychological view in the serious underestimation of the com-
plexity of client needs, problems and capabilities, which the lawyer need not
adopt. The importance of seeing and understanding may be exaggerated. There
may be more pessimism than necessary about a client's capacities and decisions,
and the elements of doing and attending to objective experience may be neglected.
The lawyer, being brought in, as he is, at the point of an external event has a point
of reference, an obligation and an opportunity that a psychologist or psychiatrist
asked to analyze the subjective does not have.
Redmount, Who Is The Counselor? What Does He Do? How Does He Do It?, in H. FREEMAN
& H. WEIHOFFEN, CLINICAL LAW TRAINING 158, 162 (1972). In the same textbook, David
Riesman observes that the lawyer typically possesses more practical wisdom and common sense
than the therapist, possibly because of the nature of the concerns dealt with by each professional.
Riesman, Beyond the Call of Obvious Duty, in CLINICAL LAW TRAINING, supra, at 149, 150,
153-54.
186. Nor, of course, must they be accepted uncritically. The lawyer may often seek to
change the perceptions of these other actors. To do so, she must know what they are.
187. See, e.g., T. SHAFFER, DEATH, PROPERTY AND LAWYERS 94-100 (1970); H.
FREEMAN, COUNSELING IN THE UNITED STATES 102 (1967); Elkins, supra note 180, at 234
n.26; Redmount, The Nature of Client Counselling and the Code of Professional Conduct, 47
SASK. L. REV. 186, 190 (1982/1983). The Binder and Price and Bellow and Moulton texts
also rely heavily on the concepts of client-centered therapy in their interviewing and counseling
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these writers adopted the Rogerian emphasis on client participation and choice,
professional acceptance of the client, and the importance of professional self-
knowledge and congruence. 88 But it would be erroneous to conclude that they
failed to recognize the limitations of Rogerian theory or believed there were no
differences between therapy and lawyering.18 9 By the time the lawyer is
counseling the client, 190 she is taking an active role that is not limited to active
participation in the client's world, as it would be in therapy. It includes active
models. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8, at 15 n.12; G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON,
supra note 3, at 977. For a useful summary of the relationship between client-centered therapy
and client-centered legal counseling, see Gifford, supra note 15, at 818 n.38. See also Simon,
supra note 84, at 511 n. 93.
188. See, e.g., T. SHAFFER & J. ELKINS, supra note 1, Ch. 6 (emphasizing compan-
ionship model of lawyer counseling with its view of the client as a valuable resource); Bastress,
supra note 174, at 100 (client-centeredness facilitates meaningful human relationships, including
the lawyer-client relationship); id. at 119 (client-centered lawyer must be true to and know her-
self); Rednount, supra note 187, at 188-90 (distinction between counseling to, for, and with the
client; latter view is based on Rogerian and Buberian concepts); id. at 192-93 (client-centered
lawyer consults closely with and even defers to the client on decisions); Redmount, Attorney
Personalities and Some Psychological Aspects of Legal Consultation, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 972,
985 (1961) (lawyers cannot avoid biases but should be conscious of what they are) [hereinafter
Attorney Personalities]; Freeman, The Role of Lawyers as Counselors, 7 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 203,211 (1966) (definition of counseling with heavy emphasis on professional acceptance
of the client); H. FREEMAN, supra note 187, at 35-37 (importance of lawyer acceptance of client
and helping client help himself); H. FREEMAN & H. WEIHOFFEN, supra note 185, at 101
(psychological maturity of the helper); T. SHAFFER, THE PLANNING AND DRAFTING OF WILLS
& TRUSTS 10 (2d ed. 1979) (importance of Rogers and concepts of congruence, empathy and
unconditional positive regard); T. SHAFFER, supra note 187, at 98-100 (need for lawyer open-
ness and candor and lawyer's participation in experimental mode of inquiry).
189. William Simon, the sharpest critic of the legal psychologists, seems to miss some
of the qualifications and nuances of what he describes as the Psychological Vision. See, e.g.,
Simon, supra note 84. For example, he reads the phrase "feelings are facts", a phrase popular-
ized by Thomas Shaffer, as meaning only feelings are facts rather than as feelings are facts also.
Perhaps Rogers would argue the former proposition, but the legal psychologists certainly would
not. Descriptions of the counseling models that such legal psychologists as Shaffer, Elkins, and
Redmount advocate reveal a definite role for the lawyer in providing some reality-testing for the
client. Indeed, the degree to which commentators like Shaffer and Redmount would counte-
nance lawyer persuasion of clients on moral and religious as well as psychological grounds in
fact places them much closer to Simon's approach than, perhaps, he would be comfortable with.
See infra Part IV.A.l. Simon also fails to recognize sufficiently the eclectic quality of these
commentators' adoption of psychological theories. See, e.g., T. SHAFFER & J. ELKINS, supra
note 1, at 161-62 (discussing different psychological theories, including Freudian, Rogerian and
Jungian, that lawyers should c6nsider examining). Simon's focus on particular works to the
exclusion of other writings results in a distortion of these authors' views. Thus, Simon can be
highly critical of the heavy psychologizing in Shaffer's The Planning and Drafting of Wills and
Trusts, supra note 188, while not attending to other of his voluminous writings that emphasize
very different aspects of the lawyer-client relationship. See T. SHAFFER & J. ELKINS, supra
note 1, at 6 (agreeing with Simon that an approach to legal counseling based solely on psycho-
logical considerations would be problematic, but arguing that such concerns cannot be under-
stood as discontinuous from social and political concerns). James Elkins especially criticizes
Simon's treatment of Shaffer's work. See Elkins, "All My Friends are Becoming Strangers":
The Psychological Perspective in Legal Education, 84 W. VA. L. REV. 161 (1981).
190. Any tendency for these commentators to "psychologize" the lawyer-client relation-
ship is much more likely to arise in interviewing than in counseling because of the need for a
decision in the latter setting. In the early portion of the interview, the client-centered lawyer is
likely to adopt a stance that allows the client to tell his story relatively uninhibited by the lawyer'sjudgments and observations. But even in the interview, as the lawyer listens to the client's
story, she must attempt to elicit facts relevant to some articulable legal theory. See, e.g., D.
BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8, at 85 et seq. (description of theory-verification stage of
interviewing process).
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participation in the decisionmaking process, and necessarily includes both
external and internal aspects. The legal counselor structures reality to enable
the client to make a decision that is true to her own frame of reference. The
very nature of lawyer's work substantially abates the danger that the client-
centered lawyer will focus exclusively on the client as the locus of all reality.191
Client-centered therapy's emphasis on the individual's ability to solve his
own problems justifies the attitude of the client-centered lawyer who wishes to
convince her client, if necessary, that the client is fully capable of making his
own decisions. As two authors stated.
An individual is more likely to feel committed to a freely made
decision.... Free, informed choices and internal commitment in-
creases the likelihood of psychological success, which tends in turn
to increase the area of experience in which free choice is
possible. 92
A client-centered lawyer's commitment to understanding the client's frame of
reference facilitates the client's decisionmaking process by making explicit the
relationship between client values and available choices.193 Within the context
of lawyers' tendencies to act paternalistically towards clients and to take their
stated goals at face value, 194 a psychological theory that empowers the
individual client as against the all-powerful professional helper has much to
recommend it.
Client-centered therapy has significantly influenced client-centered
lawyering. If lawyers truly operated as therapists, the concerns about the
appropriateness of Rogerian therapy in legal counseling would be well-taken. 95
191. See Sherr, Lawyers and Clients: The First Meeting, 49 MOD. L. REV. 323, 353
(1986) (counseling, described along lines of Binder and Price model, need not necessarily be
based excessively on psychotherapeutic concepts) (citing A. WATSON, supra note 4).
192. C. ARGYRIS & D. SCHON, supra note 120, at 89.
193. See Appel & Van Atta, The Attorney-Client Dyad: An Outsider's View, 22 OKLA.
L. REV. 243, 251-53 (1969). But see Ellmann, supra note 16, at 760-61 (client-centered coun-
seling does not allow for client re-examination of values).
194. See Baernstein, Functional Relations Between Law and Psychiatry -A Study of
Characteristics Inherent in Professional Interaction, 23 J. LEG. EDUC. 399 (1971) (psychiatric
residents more probing than law students in interviewing clients about their legal problems).
195. This is not to say that there are no concerns about lawyers' use of concepts that fit
more easily within the psychotherapeutic milieu. Part IV.A.2., infra, discusses these concerns,
but one may be mentioned here. One of the Binder and Price model's critical aspects is the
lawyer's use of enpathic understanding, with active listening as one technique for its accom-
plishment See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8, Ch. 3. Clearly, Rogers believes that the
therapist must not only use techniques that indicate his feeling of empathy toward the client but
also that he actuallyfeel such empathy; the attitudes he expresses toward the client must reflect
accurately what he really feels. See also Bastess, supra note 174, at 118-19. Given the differ-
ent purposes of the legal and psychological counseling sessions, is it legitimate for the lawyer to
use the technique of showing empathy without really feelin~g it? The issue is sharpened by the
observation, which my own supervision of student lawyers in real and simulated cases supports,
that "feigned" empathy or disconnected active listening responses by the lawyer may in fact suc-
ceed in building superficial rapport between lawyer and client and helping the lawyer elicit nec-
essary facts from the client. Stephen Ellmann especially criticizes this manipulative use of tech-
nique. See Ellmann, supra note 16, at 735-39; Ellmann, Manipulation By Client and Context: A
Response to Professor Morris, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1003, 1006-08 (1987). Binder and Price
equivocate on the use of the technique without the underlying feeling. See id. at 1006 n.18
(discussing Binder and Price's treatment of this issue). In his response to Ellmann, John Morris
expresses his conviction that a client would see through the lawyer's use of a technique that was
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But, whether for pragmatic reasons or mere lack of consistency, I sense that
legal commentators - and, more importantly, lawyers who aspire to a client-
centered practice - tend to adopt Rogerian techniques judiciously.
7. Does Client-Centeredness Lead To Better Client Results?
It would be convenient if client-centered lawyering advocates couldjustify that approach on the basis that clients got better results than with more
traditional or other possible lawyering approaches. A pragmatic rationale pre-
sumably would appeal to many, especially practicing lawyers, who might
otherwise be skeptical of, or relatively uninterested in, the philosophical, socio-
logical, political and psychological arguments described above. In fact,
numerous legal commentators present the "better results" 196 argument.
Strikingly, however, this argument is based almost solely on the results of one
study,197 Douglas Rosenthal's 1974 study of a group of New York personal
injury clients. 198 As intriguing as the better results argument is, it must be
considered as yet unproven and, at best, tentative support for client-centered
lawyering.
Rosenthal studied the relationship between certain indicia of client par-
ticipation and case outcome in sixty relatively serious personal injury cases in
which the client recovered at least $2,000.199 The plaintiffs all resided in New
York City and were of relatively high socioeconomic status. The recoveries all
occurred in 1968. Rosenthal defined client participation as comprising the
following factors: seeking quality medical attention; expressing a special
concern or want to the lawyer, making follow-up demands for the attorney's
attention; and seeking a second legal opinion. To determine case outcome,
Rosenthal submitted the cases (stripped of certain identifying data) to an eval-
uation panel of three experienced negligence lawyers (plaintiff and defendant
representatives) and two non-attorney insurance claims adjusters.
not heartfelt. See Morris, supra note 42, at 803-05. But I think that Morris is insufficiently
sensitive to some clients' need for their lawyers' approval, the frequently short duration of the
lawyer-client relationship, and the overall dynamics between lawyers and clients that could result
in clients failing to see through the lawyer's technique. While Morris clearly recognizes the sig-
nificant differences between lawyering and therapy, he sees these differences as relating primar-
ily to the effectiveness of Rogerian therapeutic techniques rather than their appropriateness. See
id. at 803-04 n.93. Yet attempting therapeutic techniques that are almost certain to fail is not
without cost (in time if nothing else), and, as noted supra note 182, techniques such as express-
ing unconditional positive regard may be inappropriate in short-term counseling relationships, of
which legal counseling is certainly a prime example. For a fuller discussion of this issue, see
infra Part IV A.2.
196. The phrase "better results" is from Spiegel, supra note 22, at 85. The argument in
this section is a narrow one: that there is weak support for the proposition that client-centered-
ness produces "objectively" better case results (such as higher financial awards for plaintiffs).
As I argue infra in notes 226-28 and accompanying text, client-centeredness should lead to better
results in another, different sense: because a client's individual values are implicated in so many
decisions, legal counseling that gives greatest play to such values, by enabling clients to make
their own decisions, produces "better results" (i.e., more consonant with the client's values) al-
most by definition.
197. See Berger, supra note 73, at 35 n.143 (noting that one commentator, Martyn,
attempted to analogize supposedly positive results from the practice of informed consent in
medicine to such a practice in law).
198. D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 19.
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Rosenthal concluded that, contrary to the expectations of the traditional
lawyering model, active clients not only did no worse than passive clients but
actually did better.20 0 The above four factors correlated, with different degrees
of strength, to case outcome measures. According to Rosenthal, seventy-five
per cent of the active clients received good results in their cases, as measured
by the evaluation panel; only forty-one per cent of the passive clients obtained
good results.201 Stated most broadly, "clients who participate actively in the
conduct of their claim get significantly better results than clients who passively
delegate decision responsibility to their lawyer."202
As noted, numerous advocates of client-centered lawyering cite Rosenthal
for the proposition that client-centeredness leads to better case results.20 3 But
the Rosenthal study is a slender reed on which to make the case for the
superiority of client-centeredness. In addition to being dated, dealing with a
relatively small sample of geographically homogeneous individuals, and
addressing only one kind of case, the study at best demonstrates the virtues of
client participation and not client decisionmaking.2 "4 Rosenthal's criteria for
participation may be inconsistent with client passivity but do not necessarily
reflect client responsibility for decisionmaking. 20 5 Indeed, the theory that the
squeaky wheel gets the grease may most readily explain the data. Given the
alarming tendency of some lawyers in the study to ignore their cases, the active
199. The description in this paragraph of the design of Rosenthal's study is from id. at
5, 29, 33-38.
200. Id. at 3, 38-39, 60-61.
201. Id. at 56-57.
202. Id. at 3.
203. See, e.g., Martyn, supra note 131, at 314-15 (recognizing possible limitations of
the study but arguing that the participatory model has universal application); Bastress, supra note
174, at 100 (citing Rosenthal study for the proposition that "there is empirical evidence showing
that the 'helping' lawyer achieves more favorable settlements for his clients"); Spiegel, supra
note 22, at 97 n.233, 104 n.266, 105 n.268; T. SHAFFER & J. ELKINS, supra note 1, at 283-86(citing Rosenthal study for the proposition that "research on this point establishes that the
domineering model of lawyering, the model suggested here as least human, harms the client" );
A. WATSON, supra note 4, at 143 (discussing Rosenthal study and data from psychotherapeutic
studies); cf. Andersen, supra note 131, at 228 n.14 (making no explicit reference to Rosenthal
but citing secondary sources, such as Martyn and Spiegel, that rely on Rosenthal). This uncriti-
cal reliance and bootstrapping on the Rosenthal study is similar to the tendency of commentators
to write reflexively about the litigation explosion. See Galanter, Reading the Landscape of
Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 63-66 (1983).
204. Mark Spiegel has consistently noted the difference between client participation and
client decisionmaking. His description of the results of the Rosenthal study shows considerably
more restraint than most. Compare Spiegel, supra note 22, at 105 n.268, with Gifford, supra
note 15, at 818-19 (describing Rosenthal as arguing that clients were financially better off when
they made settlement decisions), and D. LUBAN, supra note 63, at 345 n.10 (Rosenthal study
makes powerful case for client control). See also Martyn, supra note 131, at 315 (Rosenthal's
findings may be limited to "comparatively straightforward personal injury practice").
205. Cf. Sammons' definition of meaningful client participation, which comes closer to
participation as decisionmaking:
[H]ow the dispute is resolved matters to the people who go to lawyers. It is
something they would like to have some control over. They would like to have a
'say' in it. I call that 'say' participation. Not any 'say' will do. My 'say' must
reflect me and that reflection is what I mean by meaningful participation.
Sammons, supra note 73, at 73 (footnote omitted).
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client might get better results in part because he forces the lawyer to pay at
least minimal attention to his case.? 6
The heterogeneous nature of the legal profession, and its division into
corporate and personal hemispheres, 20 7 cautions against broad applicability of
the study to other kinds of practice208 Measuring successful case outcome can
also be problematic; the personal injury cases examined in the study are more
susceptible to monetary evaluation than many other kinds of cases.209 Strict
monetary outcome measures may, in fact, reinforce the traditional lawyering
model in such areas as divorce practice. Ultimately, the absence of agreed-
upon measures of successful case resolution makes it difficult to assess the
connection between client participation and case success. 210
Even if these problems did not exist, one study, no matter how well done
and well-conceived, plainly is insufficient to establish the proposition that
client-centeredness leads to better case results. 211 Perhaps the most one can
argue, as does Spiegel, is that the case for better results from the traditional
model is also not proven.212
B. Micro-Argwnents for Client-Centeredness
The above arguments for client-centered counseling looked at the issue
from the top down. This section examines arguments for client-centeredness as
seen from the bottom up - from the perspective of the lawyer-client rela-
tionship itself.213
206. See, e.g., D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 19, at 47 (original and referral lawyer vastly
underestimated case worth and neglected to meet with client until morning of trial), 54 (lawyer
ignored client's case and then farmed it out to another lawyer who convinced client to take set-
tlement substantially below value of case as determined by outside evaluation panel); Spiegel,
supra note 22, at 97.
207. See infra note 295 and accompanying text.
208. Rosenthal recognized the differences between corporate and what he called "lower-
class or middle-class law practice." Although he noted instances of high client participation in
the corporate area, he suggested the need for further study of the corporate lawyer-client rela-
tionship. D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 19, at 147-48.
209. While establishing a monetary value for the kinds of injuries suffered in personal
injury cases is not necessarily easy, statistics on jury verdicts involving some multiple of special
damages are readily available and provide some measure of "objective" evaluation.
210. See Spiegel, supra note 22, at 91 n.195.
211. But see T. SHAFFER & J. ELKINS, supra note 1, at 283 (research establishes that
traditional model of lawyering harms the client).
212. See Spiegel, supra note 22, at 85-110. It appears that Rosenthal also began his
inquiry from the perspective of testing the hypothesis that traditional lawyering led to better
results. See D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 19, at 29.
213. This section considers three perspectives: that of the lawyer, client, and the lawyer-
client relationship. It might also be possible to base an argument for dient-centeredness on its
contribution to the general good of society and its recognition of the interests of identifiable third
parties. Arguments that client-centeredness benefits society generally tend to be overbroad, or
are subsumed within the discussion in Part IIIA. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 55, at 338-39
(utilitarian arguments for informed consent in law, including argument that society benefits when
individual autonomy is maximized). For an argument that the public's interest in efficient opera-
tion of the court system is not necessarily negatively affected by adopting an informed consent
approach to lawyering, see Spiegel, supra note 22, at 120-23. In my judgment, arguments that
cient-centeredness would necessarily benefit identifiable third parties are either misconceived,
overbroad or circular in nature. They are misconceived in that the essence of client-centeredness
is the client's empowerment to make her own decision. Only when the client chooses to con-
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Certainly there is no one kind of lawyer-client relationship.214 The
relationship between the solo practitioner and the first-time individual client
with a personal injury claim bears only the most tangential connection to that
between the lawyer from the large law firm and her long-time corporate client.
Any effort to sort out the supposed advantages of client-centeredness for the
lawyer or client or both must be careful to clarify whether those advantages
apply only to certain kinds (and stages) of lawyer-client relationships or appear
to operate across-the-board.215 We should be especially skeptical of the latter
kinds of arguments.
1. Possible Advantages from the Client's Perspective
Client-centered lawyering's emphasis on client decisionmaking presents a
number of advantages to clients.2 16 Clients who actually make decisions in their
sider the interests of third parties (perhaps in response to the importuning of the lawyer) may
client-centeredness aid those interests; there is nothing inherent in the client-centered approach
that confers these benefits. Cf. the discussion in Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, supra
note 121, at 1083 (lawyer should consider the relative merits of the client's goals and claims
against claims of others). The arguments are overbroad in that even if a client-centered approach
might lead the lawyer and client to consider the interests of third parties it would not uniquely do
so. Other very different approaches to decisionmaking might equally, or more effectively, pro-
tect the interests of third parties. For example, the traditional lawyer might simply decide that the
interests of third parties dictate that the client take a particular approach. William Simon's critical
lawyer would clearly have a more substantial warrant to protect the legitimate interests of others
than would the client-centered lawyer. See id. and Simon, supra note 95. Although the means
used by the traditional and critical lawyer would differ from those used by the client-centered
lawyer, the results would be the same. The arguments are circular in that they imply that client-
centeredness benefits third parties when the client deems their interests worth protecting. Under
some circumstances, a client-centered lawyer could raise with the client the possible third-party
interests to consider, but if she is serious about her commitment to client decisionmaking she
must bepreparedto live with the client's assessment of those interests' legitimacy.
The argument that cientcs benefits third parties seems more than trivial in one
respect. If the client-centered lawyer and his client engage in a thorough dialogue concerning the
goals and process of the legal representation, the lawyer might be less likely to assume that the
client wishes to harm third parties, and the client might be forced to consider, in a concrete way,
what those possible interests are. This argument for client-centeredness becomes one of the
positive results of a dialogic approach to lawyering, discussed infra in Part m.B.3. Of course,
whether the lawyer and client will consider or reject the legitimate interests of third parties will
depend on a number of factors.
214. Cf. Lopez, Training Future Lawyers to Work With The Politically and Socially
Subordinated: Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 343 et seq. (1989)(criticizing legal education for treating law practice as if all people are the same).
215. It is not possible here to categorize all forms of lawyer-client relationships. It is
extraordinarily unlikely that any one model of lawyering could accommodate all of the differ-
ences between legal services lawyers and corporate lawyers, solo practitioners and large law
firm lawyers, personal injury lawyers and tax lawyers, and so on. Most commentators on the
lawyering process, therefore, limit their observations to particular kinds of lawyer-client rela-
tionships, whether between lawyers and unskilled and relatively disadvantaged clients, see, e.g.,
Ellmann, supra note 16, at 719 n.4, or to lawyers in particular subject-matter areas, see, e.g.,
Spiegel, supra note 22, at 43 n.10 (civil matters only), and Simon, Ethical Discretion in
Lawyering, supra note 121, at 1084 (same). My approach will be somewhat more eclectic,
noting relevant differences between kinds of law practices and lawyer-client relationships.
For a discussion of the different dimensions of lawyer-client relationships, see Kritzer,
The Dimensions of Lawyer-Client Relations: Notes Toward a Theory and a Field Study, 1984
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 409 (suggesting that lawyer-client relationships operate on profes-
sionalism, business, and social dimensions).
216. See generally Redmount, supra note 143 (advantages and limitations of a client-
centered approach).
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cases may feel better about those decisions precisely because they made them 17
Those clients may also follow through on necessary steps in their cases because
of greater participation in the decisionmaking process: if clients weigh the
advantages and disadvantages of a particular course of action and make a
decision based on that analysis, their greater understanding of the background
for the decision facilitates their "compliance" with it.218 Client decisionmaking
aids clients by allowing them to exercise control over their lives and to decrease
the anxiety that otherwise results from their passive involvement in the legal
process. 219
Many legal disputes arise because one party believes that another has
ignored or sacrificed his or her perspective. When traditional lawyers promote
a decisionmaking process that in effect says to the client "tell me what you want
but leave it to me to decide how we get there; you'll thank me in the end," the
lawyer risks simply perpetuating the sense of powerlessness that brought the
client to see him in the first place. If the lawyer ultimately succeeds in the legal
representation, the client may forgive him in the end but is not likely to view
the experience as ennobling.220 If the lawyer fails, the client is likely to feel
twice abused.221 The different perspectives of lawyer and client22 2 only
exacerbate the situation. The lawyer may see whether to "play tough" in a child
custody battle as only a question of means. The client may see such a decision
as inextricably bound up with the ends she is seeking to achieve. The client-
centered lawyer is less likely to perpetuate and act upon a false means/ends
217. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8, at 153. See also text accompanying
supra note 191.
218. Cf. Handler, Dependent People, supra note 99, at 100-07 (discussing informed
consent study where doctors engaged renal dialysis patients in more active decisionmaking
because of their view that patients needed to understand rationale for treatment in order to com-
ply with its terms). As a related normative matter, we might also say that clients should make
their own decisions because they ultimately must live with the consequences of those decisions.
219. See D. ROSENMAL, supra note 19, at 168-69 (discussing the advantages to clients
of a client-participatory model of decisionmaking).
220. I am assuming here that the client is not a sophisticated client who has explicitly
told the lawyer that she wants the lawyer to take over and get her a particular result by whatever
method he chooses.
221. For example, in the recent movie The Good Mother, based on S. MILLER, THE
GOOD MOnIER (1986), the mother's lawyer in a custody dispute persuades her that she must
blame her boyfriend for allowing her daughter to touch his penis. The lawyer's theory seems to
be that this approach is much more likely to succeed than one based on the mother saying that
she now has more liberated views about sex. The lawyer does not consult with the client about
this approach, but tells her that is how he will represent her. The client is troubled by this choice
of tactics (as is the boyfriend) but is essentially passive in her reaction to the lawyer. In the end,
the mother loses custody of her child. The pain of the loss is magnified by her sense of power-
lessness over how she allowed herself and her boyfriend to be portrayed in the court proceeding.
Her relationship with her boyfriend breaks down, in part because of the discontinuity between
their actual experience and the court proceeding's depiction of it. The point here is not that the
lawyer's choice was irrational or wrong but that the client played a minimal role in deciding how
to tell her story. At the very least, she should have been permitted to choose how to present that
story after being provided with all the relevant information, including the lawyer's assessment of
the likelihood of success of the different theories of the case. Cf. Spiegel, supra note 22, at 123
n.346 (while clients might wish to trade control over the presentation of their stories for a favor-
able case outcome, those clients who could not prevail would likely find it important to control
the manner of presentation of their disputes).
222. See Elkins, supra note 180, at 240 (world views of lawyers and clients may be
mutually exclusive).
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distinction2 3 than his traditional counterpart, and is therefore less likely to run
roughshod over the client's individual perspective. The client-centered lawyer
may not be able to assure her client that the judge or adversary will listen to
him, but she can at least assure that she will do so.
A number of studies report that clients value the perceived fairness of the
process through which their claims are adjudicated as well as the outcomes they
receive.22 4 Decisionmaking clients are likely to be more involved in the
procedural handling of their cases than those who cede such authority. It would
seem, therefore, that dlient-centeredness increases the chances of a client having
a positive view of his representation if not of enhancing the objective results
obtained.225
Client-centeredness furthers the goal of legal representation by increasing
the likelihood of client satisfaction. 6 Because legal decisions implicate a
client's unique values, client-centered counseling's focus on the client as
decisionmaker enhances the possibilities that his decisions will be consistent
with both the expressed and implicit values that guide his life.227 Client-
223. See Strauss, supra note 55, at 324-26 (means/ends distinction in lawyers' ethical
codes a false dichotomy).
224. See, e.g., the "procedural justice" studies in which several authors concluded that
clients in criminal and traffic cases valued procedural fairness at least as much as case outcome in
evaluating the quality of their treatment in the legal system. Casper, Having Their Day in Court:
Defendant Evaluations of the Fairness of Their Treatment, 12 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 237 (1978);
Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants' Evaluations of Their Courtroom
Experience, 18 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 51 (1984); Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria
Used By Citizens To Assess The Fairness Of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 103(1988); Casper, Tyler & Fisher, Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAw & Soc'Y REV.
483 (1988) (dealing with felonies).
225. See, e.g., Hillary & Johnson, Social Power and Interactional Style in the Divorce
Attorney/Client Dyad, 12 J. DIVORCE 89 (1989) (divorce lawyers' "client orientation," roughly
equivalent to cdient-centeredness, positively correlated with client perceptions of lawyer compe-
tence and client satisfaction with lawyer's representation).
226. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. Cf. L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE
REVOLUTION 287-89 (1985) (women divorce clients distressed that their lawyers appear unin-
terested in pursuing support awards against their ex-spouses despite the importance clients place
on such awards).
227. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 55, at 338 n.106 and sources cited therein; Spiegel,
supra note 22, at 102-03.
A concrete example of how the different values of lawyer and client might affect choices
in a case appeared in LA. Law (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 3, 1987). Lawyer Victor
Sifuentes represented a couple who sued a security agency that had promised a quick response to
crime. Plaintiffs alleged that because the company's security guards failed to enter the premises
on one occasion, the plaintiffs' house was burglarized and the wife raped and assaulted. The
plaintiffs sued for negligence and breach of contract. After the case was submitted to the jury
but before a verdict was returned, the defendants proffered a settlement to Sifuentes of $1 mil-
lion, conditioned upon no admission of liability and no publication of the agreement or its
amount. Sifuentes presented this offer to his clients and recommended that they take it, saying
that it was a good offer and that there was no assurance that the jury would give them any more
money. The husband was inclined to accept the offer, but the wife was adamant about not doing
so. She indicated that it was unacceptable to her to keep the settlement under wraps. She
needed to feel that she was doing something to counteract what she saw as the shady and dan-
gerous practices of the defendant company. The wife said that every time she went by a house
with a sign stating that it was protected by the defendants she wanted to stop the car and warn
the people that they were not safe. She directed Sifuentes to reject the settlement offer, which he
did. When the jury returned, it found for the defendants on the negligence claim but for the
plaintiffs on the contract claim. It awarded damages of $2.5 million. The client stuck to her
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centeredness increases the likelihood that the client can tell his story from his
own perspective2
Although there may be no necessary connection between client-centered
counseling and the lawyer's increased sensitivity to the client's emotional
concerns,22 9 the client-centered lawyer is more likely to consider and attend to
the client's psychological motivations than is his traditional colleague. He is less
likely to treat the client as an abstract entity with predetermined wants and
principles and obtained the larger monetary settlement to boot. (This was a television show,
after all.)
This was a classic case where a good lawyer (and dedicated watchers of the show should
have no difficulty in agreeing that Sifuentes is a good lawyer) tried to impose his values on his
client. Although the ultimate result was in keeping with the client's goals - Sifuentes followed
her choice and rejected the settlement - the client's concerns might have been ill-served had she
been less passionate and articulate or had this been a decision that, unlike the decision whether to
accept a settlement offer, was not one considered as clearly the client's to make. Sifuentes
needlessly sacrificed rapport with his client by failing even to inquire about her goals and needs.
Apparently, he simply assumed that she considered the size of the settlement offer most impor-
tant, or, alternatively, that the settlement amount was so great it dwarfed her other concerns.
Perhaps Sifuentes wanted her to accept the settlement because of his own risk-aversiveness, or
because he believed that he had made tactical errors in the trial that would be submerged if a set-
tlement were accepted. In any event, the conflict was a familiar one: the lawyer predictably
valued the monetary settlement to a greater degree while the client sought to uphold the principle.
Although it might not have entered into Sifuentes's thinking, there was also the matter of the fee:
if Sifuentes handled the case on a contingency basis, he probably stood to get one-third of the
settlement figure, and to the extent that the client's choice risked yielding less or no money he
had a strong interest in urging that she accept the $1 million offer. At the least, Sifuentes should
have disclosed his monetary interest in the choice his client made. What many viewers probably
saw only as a dramatic instance of a client expressing her belief in a principle exemplified(perhaps unwittingly) the importance of a client s values and the need for the lawyer to discuss
them with the client.
For all its faults, L. A. Law at least addresses interesting issues arising in the lawyer-
client relationship even if the resolution of those issues is often problematic, legally if not dra-
matically. See also Gillers, Taking LA. Law More Seriously, 98 YALE LJ. 1607, 1612-15(1989) (praising treatment in early episode of client autonomy issue in divorce case).
228. Spiegel, supra note 22, at 123. An increasing number of legal commentators em-
phasize the importance of lawyers facilitating their clients' story-telling in the legal context and
the barriers that lawyers and the legal system create to impede such client story-telling. See,
e.g., Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law As Language, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2459 (1989); White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes
on the Hearing ofMrs. G., 38 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1990). For the importance of listening to
lay stories in the medical context, see R. COLES, TEACHING AND THE MORAL IMAGINATION:
THE CALL OF STORIES Ch. 1 (1989). For many clients, the need to present their cases through
lawyers can be quite frustrating. As one litigant put it:
Of the coming arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court, Joe Cruzan is reported
as saying, "I wish to God we could go stand before those nine judges and say,
'Here we are. You ask'the questions.' I wish we could present the case. I wish
it didn't have to be through an attorney. I feel kind of cheated."
Nankivell, Does an Incompetent Patient Have an Exercisable Right to Refuse Artificially
AdministeredNutrition and Hydration?, 5 PREVIEW SUP. CT. CASES 155, 159 (Dec. 15,1989)(discussion of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990)).
That a client's values cannot be communicated to her lawyer (and, indeed, may not be
known to the client herself), does not necessarily imply that client-centeredness is the only pos-
sible response. See infra Part WV.B.
229. But see Bastress, supra note 174, at 100 (client-centeredness facilitates meaningful
human relationships and supports the intrinsic value of the relationship for lawyer and client).
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needs,3 or to infantilize the client.2 31 The client-centered lawyer's attention to
his client's goals also can translate into increased empathy for the client. 32
To be sure, some clients will want a more traditional relationship with
their lawyer in which the latter controls both the decisionmaking process and
the decisions made. Other clients will want their lawyers to provide more
explicit advice about which possible course of action to select. Corporate
executives, for example, may tend to stress the lawyer's involvement in deci-
sionmaking rather than her deferral to the client.2 33 Still other clients will opt
for the contentious, challenging relationship with the lawyer that is the focus of
critical lawyering234 in lieu of the "warm and fuzzy" lawyering that seems to
characterize client-centeredness. Yet one must be careful not to assume that
230. See Redmount, supra note 187, at 186, 188-90 (noting that client's real problem
may not be the one that she comes in to see the lawyer about, and suggesting that client-centered
lawyer's approach of counseling with the client, as opposed to counseling to or for the client,
decreases lawyer misperceptions). Cf. Schisgall, Counselfor the Divorce Lawyer: A Client's
View, 10 LEGAL ECON. 32 (July/Aug. 1984) (divorce client indicating that lawyers should notjump to conclusions about client goals).
231. See Schisgall, supra note 230, at 33 (most important thing client's lawyer did in
representing her was to emphasize client's role in re-establishing control over her life); H.
FREEMAN, supra note 187, at 36-37 (goal for the client-centered counselor is to help the client
help him or herself); cf. H. FREEMAN & H. WEIHOFFEN, supra note 185, at 94 (lawyers who
use directive model of counseling foster client dependence and encourage client to shift to the
lawyer decisions that the client should make himself; such lawyers also miss the emotional
complexities surrounding client choices). The import of these observations is that client-
centeredness can enhance the client's sense of psychological autonomy. See A. WATSON, supra
note 4, at 8 (lawyer's insistence that the client must make decisions "paradoxically" increases
client autonomy). See also J. KA'TZ, supra note 18, at 104-29 (discussing psychological auton-
omy). But see Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and
Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 YALE LJ. 1126, 1164-66 (1978) (discussing cir-
cumstances in which it would be inappropriate for the lawyer to insist on the child client's partic-
ipation in the child custody decision).
232. See, e.g., Smith & Nester, Lawyers, Clients and Communication Skill, 1977
B.Y.U. L. REV. 275, 296-300 (discussion of practices of lawyers sensitive to communicative
aspects of lawyer-client relationships).
233. See, e.g., Nickele, General Counsel Offers Perspective From Both Sides of the
Line, in CORPORATE CLIENTS & THEIR LAWYERS: A COLLOQUY 23 (J. Henning & J. Hamby
eds. 1986) (corporations want outside corporate lawyers more involved in business decision-
making); Rast, What the Chief Executive Looks for in His Corporate Law Department, 33 BUS.
LAW. 811,814-15 (1978) (corporate executive wants lawyer to toll him what is mandatory and
what is advisable); deButts, The Client's View of the Lawyer's Proper Role, 33 Bus. LAW.
1177, 1181 (1978) (corporate executive looks for lawyer to advise about changing conditions).
See also Gordon, supra note 112, at 25 & n.78. Cf. J. DONNELL, THE CORPORATE COUNSEL:
A ROLE STUDY 82 (1970) (corporate counsel sought joint decisionmaking responsibilities with
clients). The active involvement of the lawyer in the client's decisionmaking process, however,
is not necessarily inconsistent with a client-centered approach. The client-centered lawyer is not
simply a passive observer. She actively participates with the client but never loses sight of the
fact that the client is the ultimate decisionmaker.
234. See infra Part IV.B. On the other hand, a client-centered approach such as the
Binder and Price model can serve to put clients at ease because of the high degree of decision-
making structure that it provides. There is a substantial difference between the lawyer who
throws up his hands and says "I don't know, client, you decide" and the client-centered lawyer
who fully participates in structuring the decisionmaking process. In the latter situation, the client
is freed up to make his own decision. Given the highly emotional nature of many legal prob-
lems, that structured freedom might be especially attractive to clients.
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entire categories of clients do not wish to make their own decisions,235 are
unable to do so, 236 or can resist the lawyer's forceful articulation of her point
of view in attempting to fashion their own decisions. 237 Compared to other
possible visions of the lawyer-client relationship, the client-centered approach's
presumption of client decisionmaking is least likely to lead to the denial of the
client's individuality. That is an advantage not to be lightly discarded.
2. Possible Advantages from the Lawyer's Perspective
Lawyers have several interests that are potentially implicated in the
lawyer-client relationship. At a minimum, they have interests in performing
their work in an autonomous manner, acting consistently with an acceptable
definition of the lawyer's role, performing their craft well, and acting ethi-
cally.2-8 Client-centeredness may not always promote these interests but it does
not necessarily compromise them either.239
At first blush, client-centered lawyering seems to offer few advantages to
the lawyer. The client-centered lawyer has less freedom than his traditional
colleague to define his client's interests and determine the course of the
representation. If serious about allowing his client to make decisions in the
case, the lawyer implicitly accepts that the client may make some choices that
the lawyer would not. The lawyer could take this lightly ("it's your decision )
but in some cases the lawyer may see the client's decision as rejecting his
professional judgment. 240 Client-centered decisionmaking is also likely to be
more time-consuming.24 1
235. Cf. H. FREEMAN, supra note 187, at 161 (lawyers establish good rapport with
poor clients, although the lawyer is very directive in the relationship, in part because clients
expect the relationship to be so defined).
236. See generally Tremblay, supra note 16, for a discussion of the possibility of an
expanded role for clients with mental disabilities in a client-centered decisionmaking approach.
237. See R. JACK & D. JACK, supra note 107, at 93 (danger of "morally responsive
lawyering" is that it can increase lawyer power over clients and lead to their hegemony and arro-
gance).
238. See Spiegel, supra note 22, at 113-20. In addition to recognizing the lawyer's craft
interest, John Morris identifies the lawyer's "interest in controlling the personal impacts of role-
differentiated behavior and [her] interest in assessing her responsibility for the external con-
sequences of the attorney-client interaction." Morris, supra note 42, at 786 (footnote omitted).
239. Spiegel asserts that an informed consent approach to lawyering does not seriously
compromise lawyer autonomy because the lawyer retains autonomy in defining the steps in the
tasks to be performed, which is more important than determining whether to undertake the task
in the first place. Spiegel, supra note 22, at 114-15. The lawyer's interests in acting ethically
and consistently with his definition of the appropriate role for the lawyer are protected, Spiegel
argues, because of the lawyer-client dialogue that inevitably occurs within the informed consent
relationship. Id. at 115-20. He also observes, correctly in my view, that definitions of role and
ethical conduct are in an important sese circular: if it is appropriate for the lawyer to allow the
client to make certain decisions then itis consistent with the lawyer's role and ethical obligations
to do so. There is certainly nothing inherent in client-centeredness that requires the lawyer to act
unethically or in a manner inconsistent with an a priori definition of the lawyer's role.
240. Subsumed within the lawyer interests identified in the text is the lawyer's profes-
sional interest in giving advice to clients. As noted earlier, Binder and Price limit advice-giving
except in unusual circumstances, though other advocates of client-centered counseling are more
willing to recognize its appropriateness. See infra Part IVA. Concern about the Binder and
Price lawyer's decreased ability to give advice depends on whether advice-giving is considered
an important component of the professional role. It is not at all clear that advice-giving is impor-
tant if the client does not wish to receive it, because the client activates the lawyer-client relation-
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But such a view of the lawyer's interests is too narrow. The client-
centered lawyer is likely to experience his client as a more fully-realized human
being than the stick figure with a predetermined set of ends that is the province
of the traditional lawyer. The lawyer's relationship with such a person is thus
apt to be more satisfying in the long-run, even if less efficient and more time-
consuming. Client-centered counseling's egalitarian thrust allows more
consistency between the lawyer's professional behavior and the behavior she
chooses to exhibit in other parts of her life.2 2 Client-centered lawyers are also
likely to be more sensitive to the inevitable effect that their personalities have
on the lawyer-client relationship7A3 Collaborative decisionmaking also allows
the lawyer to share with the client some of the weighty and often isolating
responsibility that comes with the professional role.2" Shared responsibility
may be particularly attractive to young lawyers,24 S though it would be healthy
ship in the first place. For clients who choose to receive advice, the lawyer's interest in provid-
ing advice could be worth protecting. The lawyer's interest in giving advice can be sufficiently
protected by a counseling approach that, without banning advice in all circumstances, requires
the lawyer to self-consciously judge the likely effect of that advice on the client before blithely
dispensing it. See infra Part IVA.
241. See infra Part WV.B.
242. See Wasserstrom, supra note 77, at 15 ('In important respects, one's professional
role becomes and is one's dominant role, so that for many persons at least they become their
professional being."). See also D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 19, at 152 ("A participatory model
which looks to the professional and the lay client more nearly as equals capable of joint collabo-
ration takes a more properly balanced view of human nature.").
243. Again, there may be nothing inherent in a client-centered approach that causes the
lawyer to be more aware of his biases, but it seems plausible that a lawyer who focuses on the
relationship factors and is self-conscious about his role will at least be more likely than the tradi-
tional lawyer to examine such factors. See Redmount, Attorney Personalities, supra note 188, at
984-85.
244. See D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 19, at 170 (advantages to the lawyer include
sharing responsibility with clients and avoiding having to meet impossible standards of practice).
According to Shaffer and Elkins:
There is good authority - professional and empirical - for the point that it is
better to be a companion than a domineering parent in our relationships with
clients. The client benefits, materially and psychologically. We argue that the
lawyer benefits as well. The final pay-off is both social and personal:
Collaborative decisions are less likely than lawyer dominated ones to lead to liti-
gation.
T. SHAFFER & J. ELKINS, supra note 1, at 286. Of course, even if decreased lawyer domina-
tion led to less litigation, the result would not necessarily be positive. For example, some have
argued that alternative dispute resolution mechanisms may deny poor people access to the one
system that is at least sometimes available to vindicate their rights. See Handier, Dependent
People, supra note 99, at 1109. If Shaffer and Elkins mean that collaborative decisionmaking
decreases unnecessary litigation (however defined), or litigation that is designed primarily to
serve the lawyer's interests, I agree with their conclusion.
245. In my experience as a clinical teacher, students initially have great difficulty with
some of the key precepts of client decisionmaking. Although at first many of them feel ill-
equipped to make decisions for their clients, once they conduct legal and factual research and
develop a tentative approach to the case they become strongly invested in having the clients adopt
their decision. Perhaps they are especially vulnerable to viewing a client's different choice as
rejecting their still nascent professional judgment. Nevertheless, I have suggested to students
that, in fact, client decisionmaking can be quite liberating for the new lawyer (or lawyer-to-be).
If the student sets out the client's choices fully and fairly and gives the client his best predictions
of possible outcomes, the student need not feel fully responsible for the client's decision. It may
also be useful for students to experience client decisions that do not necessarily conform to the
lawyer's perception of relevant factors. A client choice different from the lawyer's may be cause
for re-examination of the decisionmaking process but need not create self-doubt.
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for more experienced ones to adopt it as well.2" At some level, client-centered
lawyering allows the lawyer to believe, with some justification, that the
positions taken in the course of the legal representation are truly the client's and
not of some convenient construct created by the lawyer.
Nor need client-centered counseling cause lawyers to act inconsistently
with their best professional judgment. Assuming that the dialogue between
lawyer and client does not produce a consensus decision, the lawyer does not
abdicate his professional responsibility to the client. He retains the right to
refuse to represent a client or, under some circumstances, to seek to withdraw
from representing her, if he believes that his professional judgment is being
compromised. The ethical provisions that address this issue may, in fact, be
problematic, but they are not made more so by a client-centered approach.
In describing his client-participatory model, Rosenthal aptly captures the
advantages to the lawyer of a client-centered model:
The participatory model serves to protect the integrity of
professionals by liberating them from many of the strains and in-
consistencies of their traditional ideal. The participatory model
reduces the burdens imposed upon the professional by the paternal
role. It increases the potential for clients to receive effective
service. It removes inconsistencies in the law of professional
responsibility.... It brings professional-client relationships into
closer congruence with deeply rooted economic values in our
society - the economic norms which prize freedom of contract
between supplier and consumer, and free enterprise in a competi-
tive market rather than contracts of adhesion and mercantilist
market restrictions. It also brings professional-client relationships
into congruence with this society's abiding commitment to demo-
cratic values which values are necessarily challenged by the exis-
tence within our society of paternalistic institutions.247
3. Possible Advantages for the Lawyer-Client Relationship Itself
Assessing the effect of client-centered lawyering and its promotion of
client decisionmaking solely from the separate perspectives of lawyer and client
may not convey an important dimension of this approach to lawyering. The
Client-centered lawyering, at least of the Binder and Price variety, may affect students
negatively in another way. Because the Binder and Price student-lawyer is rarely supposed to
communicate his choice to the client, the student-lawyer may try to get the client to reconsider the
decision to meet the student's own needs to have the client decide his way. Don Gifford reports
on one unpublished study that supports the view that students resist (or at least find it difficult to
apply) the Binder and Price counseling approach. Gifford, supra note 15, at 839 n.127. After
law students received training in Binder and Price interviewing and counseling techniques, they
were observed on videotape conducting interviews and counseling sessions. While students
made significant gains in adopting Binder and Price interviewing techniques, they failed to show
any significant reduction in giving advice to clients.
246. The experienced lawyer may have a great deal more invested in having his client
follow his recommendation than does the new lawyer. Moreover, the lawyer, experienced or
not, may wish to act paternalistically and make decisions for his client. This last interest,
though, is insignificant when compared to the client's interest in being treated as an autonomous
human being.
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lawyer-client relationship that emerges from a client-centered approach looks
very different from the one depicted in the world of traditional lawyers and
passive clients. In particular, client-centeredness offers greater opportunities
for meaningful lawyer-client dialogue than does the traditional approach.28
The traditional model's assumptions about the lawyer-client relationship
have already been described.249 In contrast to the silence or serial monologues
of the traditional relationship, lawyers and clients in a client-centered
relationship have the potential to conduct a true dialogue in which each person
contributes to the discussion and is genuinely interested in the other's per-
spective.mo The insightful client-centered lawyer attempts not merely to make
a bare presentation of alternatives to the client but tries to engage in the
imaginative understanding of the client's situation. Clients and lawyers must
talk to each other in a kind of structured conversation in which the lawyer's
role is to assure that certain concerns are addressed and the client's role is to
assess her situation as honestly and fully as possible.
The client-centered lawyer also is less likely than the traditional lawyer
to treat his client in a paternalistic and patronizing fashion. The resultant
lawyer/client relationship raises fewer moral objections because of its anti-
paternalistic cast.251  It approaches the outlines of an ideal lawyer-client
relationship as defined by John Donnell:
The ideal counsel-client relationship is based upon the mutual trust
of each party as individuals and upon respect for each other as a
person competent in his own field. It is a relationship in which
neither party seeks to dominate or permits himself to be
dominated; yet each is open to influence from the other. It is a
personal, helping relationship that goes beyond providing special-
ized knowledge and offering legal opinions on fact situations
defined by the client. ... It is a relationship that can only develop
247. D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 19, at 169. Rosenthal adds that, in his view, the par-
ticipatory model increases public knowledge about and respect for the professions. Id. at 170.
248. I wish to be careful here, however, not to fall into the trap that I believe has
ensnared some other advocates for client-centered lawyering. That trap, in essence, proposes
that client-centered lawyer-client relationships inherently are superior to traditional ones because
there is greater rapport, understanding and candor between lawyer and client in the former. See,
e.g., Bastress, supra note 174, at 119; Doyel, The National College-Mercer Criminal Defense
Survey: Preliminary Observations About Interviewing, Counseling and Plea Negotiations, 37
MEtcER L. REV. 1019, 1024-25 (1986). It is not obvious why this is necessarily so. An inept
client-centered lawyer could harm rapport and candor in any number of ways while still allowing
the client to make the key decisions in the case. Conversely, a sensitive, perceptive lawyer who
followed the traditional path could have a terrific rapport with her client even while taking steps
that seemed to compromise client autonomy. Even if client-centered lawyers develop a better
rapport with their clients, moreover, it is still necessary to show that other important values in
the lawyer-client relationship are maintained. A lawyer with poor legal skills, or one who
neglects her cases because of overwork, might in the short-run establish good rapport with her
client but ultimately not serve her client's interests well. Cf. Feldman & Wilson, supra note 2(simulated clients rated lawyers with high relational skills and low legal competence higher than
lawyers with low relational skills and high legal competence).
249. See supra Part H.A.
250. For a criticism of the quality of the client-centered dialogue, see infra Part IV.B.3.
251. See Wasserstrom, supra note 77, at 20-22 (traditional lawyers predisposed to treat
clients in morally objectionable way by acting in paternalistic and impersonal manner towards
them).
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through numerous interactions between counsel and client and,
therefore, it must be cultivated over a period of time.z2
Client-centered relationships entail shared decisionmaking responsibility and
mutual participation by lawyer and client. By avoiding the trap of either
lawyer- or client-dominance, these relationships provide greater opportunities
for facilitating wise client decisions in a supportive atmosphere.253
IV. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST CLIENT-CENTEREDNESS
From the highly esoteric to the intensely practical, the arguments for
client-centered counseling cover impressive ground. Even when some tradi-
tional arguments are stripped away or significantly limited, the remaining
arguments for client-centeredness are substantial. Yet we should be especially
skeptical of ideas that seem to come to us so uncritically. Upon examination,
there are indeed criticisms of client-centered counseling as it has evolved.
Some of these criticisms are not easily dismissed. Although in my judgment
they are ultimately unpersuasive, they are essential for understanding both the
appropriate reach of client-centeredness and the limitations on its applicability.
Once again, the arguments may be divided broadly into systemic and individual
categories.
A. Systemic Arguments Agalrst Client-Centeredness
1. The Problem of Autonomy
The most basic criticism of client-centered lawyering questions its
underlying premise, that it is the primary duty of lawyers to foster client
autonomy. William Simon is the most articulate spokesperson for the auton-
omy critique of client-centeredness 4 In his most recent article, Ethical
Discretion in Lawyering,255 he argues that in civil cases lawyers should have
discretion to refrain from pursuing a client's legitimate, legal goals if to do so
252. J. DONNELL, supra note 233, at 173-74 (footnote omitted).
253. See, e.g., R. BURT, supra note 107; Basten, supra note 68, at 23-24; E.
DVORKIN, J. HIMMELsTEIN & H. LESNICK, BECOMING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC
PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM 202 (1981) (comment of
Howard Lesnick) (whether lawyer or client makes decisions matters less than that lawyer treats
client as independent person capable of assuming responsibility for decisions).
254. Simon never uses the term client-centeredness explicitly in his critique. The closest
he comes is in Homo Psychologicus, supra note 84, where he takes lengthy and substantial
issue with the "legal psychologists," a group of legal educators (e.g., Shaffer, Goodpaster,
Watson, Redmount, Bellow and Moulton) that to varying degrees is associated with advocacy
for client-centered counseling. More recently Simon's criticism of informed consent in lawyer-
ing, see supra note 149, is consistent with a critique of client-centeredness. It is apparent that
Simon criticizes, at least in certain contexts, some of the basic premises of dlient-centeredness
and in fact presents an alternative vision of the ideal lawyer-client relationship.
Ironically, Thomas Shaffer, whom Simon criticizes sharply in Homo Psychologics,
supra note 84, is also critical of lawyers over-emphasizing client autonomy. See Shaffer, Legal
Ethics and the Good Client, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 319 (1987). Shaffer's views on client-
centeredness are not easily categorized. In Legal Ethics and the Good Client, supra, he objects
to the undiluted pursuit of client autonomy insofar as it assumes that clients exist independently
of societal context and history. Shaffer's emphasis on the individual's connection to the com-
munity (and the lawyer's membership in that community) reflects the theological approach that
informs a number of his writings on legal ethics and professional responsibility.
255. See supra note 121.
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would frustrate underlying goals of justice or fairness. Criticizing the tradi-
tional views of lawyers' ethical responsibilities (which he labels the libertarian
and regulatory approaches) as excessively categorical, Simon instead argues that
lawyers should have discretion to relate to clients and others in such a manner
as to "seek justice."256 Of particular relevance for the client-centeredness
debate, Simon asserts that lawyers should consider what he calls the internal
merits of the client's goals in deciding how to represent him and what kinds of
arguments to make on his behalf.5 7 For example, the lawyer who believes that
technical adherence to regulatory language frustrates the underlying purposes
of a statute is disabled from framing the legal issue technically (or formally) in
making his legal argument but must look to the underlying purpose of the
statutory provision.25 As the lawyer examines that statutory purpose, Simon
clearly allows for the possibility that he will choose a course of action
inconsistent with the client's interests as the client defines them.259 Under
Simon's scheme of representation, lawyers continually subject their clients'
goals to a searching inquiry both before and after agreeing to represent
them.260
256. Simon writes:
The basic maxim of the approach I propose is this: The lawyer should take
those actions that, considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case,
seem most likely to promote justice. This 'seek justice' maxim suggests a kind of
noncategoricaljudgment that might be called pragmatist, ad hoc, or dialectical, but
that I will call discretionary. 'Discretionary' is not an entirely satisfactory term; I
do not mean to invoke its connotations of arbitrariness or nonaccountability, but
rather its connotatiohs of flexibility and complexity.... I use the term in what
Ronald Dworkin calls 'a weak sense' to indicate that the relevant norms 'cannot
be applied mechanically but demand the use of judgment.'
Id. at 1090 (citations omitted).
257. See id. at 1096-1113. In addition to having the lawyer assess the internal merits of
the client's claims, Simon also would have the lawyer consider the relative merit of the client's
claims. Id. at 1092-96. That is, in deciding whether to represent a client, the lawyer ought to
consider the merit of the client's legal claim (the extent to which successful pursuit of the client's
claim would bejust) compared to the claims of others that he might represent.
258. Simon considers three antinomies: substance vs. procedure, purpose vs. form, and
broad vs. narrow framing of issues. See id. at 1097-1113. With respect to the purpose vs.
form choice, for example, he gives the example of a lawyer considering whether to argue that a
client's acceptance of lodging from his employer in lieu of part of his salary should be consid-
ered tax-exempt. After making a series of assumptions about how the issue gets raised and the
Internal Revenue Service's enforcement difficulties, Simon concludes that the lawyer should not
argue that the lodging ought to be tax-exempt. Id. at 1104-05.
259. This does not necessarily mean that, e.g., the lawyer actually makes arguments in
court that harm the client's interests. But it surely means that the lawyer explains to some clients
that he cannot make certain arguments on their behalf because such arguments violate the
lawyer's sense of justice. Presumably the client then must choose whether to abide by the
lawyer's wishes and eschew the argument, seek to persuade the lawyer to make the technical
argument (or a variation of it) anyway, or get another lawyer. Were this discussion part of a
broader lawyer-client dialogue, my concerns with Simon's approach might be manageable,
though I would still question the persuasive effects of the lawyer's advice on the client's free
choice. Of greater concern, however, is that Simon would permit and perhaps even encourage
the lawyer to forego mentioning to the client the possibility of the technical argument because of
his view of its inconsistency with the underlying statutory purpose. See Simon, Ethical
Discretion in Lauyering, supra note 121, at 1104-05 (lawyer should not pursue tax avoidance
plan she deems inconsistent with statutory purpose "especially if the lawyer came up with the
idea herself and has not yet communicated it to the client').
260. See Simon, supra note 61, at 133 (client and advocate must constantly justify
themselves to each other).
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Simon recognizes that his approach potentially compromises client
autonomy, but argues that:
[T]he appeal to individual autonomy or right is not a sufficient
basis for client loyalty because it begs the question of why the
client's autonomy or right should be preferred to that of the person
whose autonomy or right is frustrated by the client's activities.261
But whatever the force of his critique with respect to powerful clients bent on
pursuing immoral purposes, 62 Simon fails to explain adequately how lawyers
can responsibly limit the autonomy of all but the most powerful clients without
imposing their values on them and denying them the opportunity at least to seek
vindication of hypothetically legal interests. 2
The virtue of Simon's approachdepends on the degree to which the
lawyer's exercise of power over his client is legitimate. Simon addresses the
criticism that his discretionary approach gives lawyers too much power over
clients by responding:
[T]he discretionary approach does not increase lawyer power
because any increase in the lawyer's power to frustrate client goals
is exactly balanced by a reduction in the lawyer's capacity to
frustrate goals of third parties and the public. Lawyers serve
client goals by using power against others. The discretionary
approach puts the lawyer in opposition to clients by reducing her
power to injure others for the sake of the client.264
This response is clearly unsatisfactory. Even if the lawyer's exercise of greater
power over one person (the client) is exactly balanced by the decreased use of
power over another (the client's opponent), 65 Simon analyzes lawyer power as
261. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lavyering, supra note 121, at 1125.
262. Although much of the argument and many of the examples in Ethical Discretion in
Lawyering, supra note 121, seem directed at lawyers representing powerful clients, see, e.g.,
id. at 1094-96 (South African Airways), 1104-05 (highly paid hotel manager), 1109-13(wealthy private university), but see id. at 1105-07 (welfare client), Simon does not purport to
limit his argument to such clients. See id. at 1130 ("A lawyer should be careful not to exercise
such influence over [unsophisticated or poor] clients irresponsibly, but when it is clear that a
claim or course of action lacks merit, a client's vulnerability is no reason to go ahead with it.").
263. Simon comes closest to articulating how lawyers and clients would resolve their
potentially competing interests in an earlier article, Visions of Practice, where he writes:
The precept that the lawyer further the client's interests, as she understands them,
is qualified by the precept that she also try to enhance the client's capacity to
express her own interests. The authoritative test of the lawyer's judgment is that
the client come to share it under conditions in which the lawyer believes that the
client's understanding is not affected by conditions of hierarchy.
Simon, supra note 95, at 486, (citation omitted). Significantly, Simon does not indicate how to
establish such non-hierarchical conditions nor how the lawyer knows that the client's adoption
of the lawyer's views (or vice versa) was accomplished under non-hierarchical conditions. The
opportunities for lawyer self-deception appear numerous.
264. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, supra note 121, at 1127.
265. It is not obvious why the total amount of power that the lawyer exercises always
and necessarily remains constant. In Simon's examples of the hotel manager versus the IRS and
the welfare client versus the welfare bureaucracy, sec id. at 1104-07, it appears that the lawyer's
capacity to exercise power over his clients is considerably greater than his capacity to exercise
power over the opposing agencies. With respect to his clients, the lawyer has the power to pre-
vent the client from seeking a particular benefit. For example, if it is impractical for the client to
secure the services of another lawyer, or if the client is unaware that he has foregone a choice
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if it exists solely as an independent, disconnected concept. But the lawyer's
exercise of power is problematic because she is exercising power over her
client. While Simon at least addressed this issue in other writings, he thus far
has failed to provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of lawyer power.2"
Simon's approach offers a great deal to those lawyers seeking justification for a
more political and morally rich practice; it offers considerably less solace to the
many lawyers engaged in more mundane concerns.267 As for clients, they
that the lawyer kept from him, see supra note 259, the lawyer's power over the client in the
relationship may be virtually complete. Contrarily, the IRS and welfare bureaucracies are so
huge and powerful in their own right that the capacity of any one individual and his lawyer to
affect their operations, let alone exercise power over them, is considerably vitiated. In Simon's
IRS example, if the lawyer advises the client to seek on-site lodging, thereby reducing his tax
liability, the IRS at most loses the tax on the displaced income, a trivial amount compared to the
amount of tax revenues it collects. If the IRS learns of the arrangement, or if it conducts a ran-
dom audit, it can challenge the taxpayer's actions. Finally, even if the IRS were concerned that
the taxpayer's choice creates a dangerous precedent, the agency can seek to promulgate regula-
tions or seek statutory clarification of the arrangement to prevent taxpayers from availing them-
selves of the lodging exemption.
266. Cf. Simon, supra note 84, at 494-96 (criticizing "Psychological Vision's" failure to
confront issues of power). Additionally, in Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 61, at 139,
Simon argues that
[Ihe non-professional advocate can give his client advice which will enhance,
rather than subvert, the client's autonomy.... [Tihe non-professional advocate
is less likely to dominate his client because he presents himself as an ordinary
individual rather than as a manifestation of disembodied expertise. Thus, the
client is aware of the contingency of the lawyer's definition of the situation. He
does not see the lawyer as a component in a system of autonomous procedural
institutions. He need not forget either that there is a broad range of choices open
to him or that the actions which the lawyer takes on his behalf represent choices
he (the client) has made and for which he is responsible.
At least two points are noteworthy here. First, the mere de-professionalization of the lawyer's
role would not necessarily diminish the lawyer's (or advocate's) capacity to exercise power over
her clients. Based on their social, economic and political power, and their specialized expertise,
elite advocates would still be in a position to dominate less powerful clients. Simon recognizes
that the client's dependence on an advocate may compromise the former's autonomy; his not
very practical solution is to suggest that advocates avoid developing a vested interest in their own
power, e.g., by functioning as advocates on a part-time basis only. Id. at 141-42. Second,
Simon's vision of an advocate-client relationship in which an empowered client is able to recog-
nize the limits of the advocate's expertise in assisting him to make his choices, while the advo-
cate is sensitive to and works to diminish her dominance over her client, see id. at 139, appears
to embrace the goals, if not the means, of a client-centered relationship. An important compo-
nent of the various cient-centered approaches is to increase client involvement and responsibil-
ity, while limiting lawyer dominance. This is. especially so in the variation to the Binder and
Price model advocated infra in Part V. Nevertheless, the models are far from identical, as the
discussion in the text reflects.
267. Cf. Sarat & Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce
Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE LJ. 1663, 1668 (1989) (criticizing Critical Legal Studies scholarship
about the legitimating role of lawyers as being insufficiently attentive to the actual behavior of
practicing lawyers). For the different requirements of political lawyering, see D. LU13AN, supra
note 63, Ch. 14. Virginia Held observes that Simon's call for non-professional advocacy in
Simon, supra note 61 (and although, as noted previously, Simon has now changed his view that
advocates must be nonprofessionals, his views on the role of the advocate do not appear signifi-
cantly changed), could easily lead to increasing power for the political elite if the advocates'
values were not egalitarian and redistributionist. Held, The Division of Moral Labor and the
Lawyer, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 61, at 60,76-77.
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appear virtually non-existent in this latest formulation of Simon's lawyering
model. 8
Simon is not the only critic of unbridled client autonomy.2 69 Although
framed more as a criticism of the adversary ethic than of client-centeredness,
an increasing number of commentators, writing from a variety of perspectives,
challenge the notion that the lawyer has no place exercising moral control over
or judging the moral quality of the actions of his client 270 At least with respect
to clients in non-criminal cases,271 these critics attack the role-morality of
lawyers who refuse to take moral responsibility for their client's actions out of
a sense that to do so would improperly impose their will on clients and
therefore compromise their autonomy.272 Not surprisingly, many of these
critiques relate to the practice of elite lawyers representing powerful corporate
clients.273
It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze in depth the complex
arguments that underlie the adversary system critique and the lack of justifi-
cation for lawyers' role morality.274 But several observations may be offered
268. One of Simon's significant contributions to the literature on lawyering is his obser-
vation that lawyers improperly tend to impute ends to clients without sufficiently engaging them
in an examination of their true needs and interests. Simon, supra note 61, at 53-59. But in
Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, the concrete interests of clients appear to play almost no role in
the lawyer's consideration of her ethical responsibilities. See Ethical Discretion in Lawyering,
supra note 121, at 1109-13 (discussion of role of attorneys in hypothetical dispute over union
representation). Moreover, Simon seems unconcerned with the client's right, within limits, to
define the scope of her legal representation and to participate in, if not control, the tactics used.
These rights derive in part from the recognition that the lawyer-client relationship exists primarily
to serve the client's needs, interests, and goals and not the lawyer's. For a criticism of the
degree of client manipulation countenanced by Simon's model of lawyering, see Ellmann, supra
note 16, at 771-73.
269. Autonomy is clearly an important value to both advocates and critics of client-
centeredness. For an argument that people in relationships are neither wholly autonomous nor
non-autonomous, see R, BURT, supra note 107, at 99-100, 118-19.
270. For criticisms of the adversary ethic, see, e.g., Luban, The Adversary System
Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 61, at 83-122; D. LUBAN, supra note 63, at 154,
160 (adversary ethic only justified in the context of criminal defense work; in other contexts,
lawyers should practice moral activism); Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary
Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REV. 697 (1988); Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of
Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669 (1978) (criticizing adversary ethic in non-advocacy contexts);
Gordon, supra note 112. See also Morris, supra note 42, at 789 n.40 (collecting sources).
271. See, e.g., D. LUBAN, supra note 63, at 202-05. Commentators recognize that the
specific constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments may limit the degree to which lawyers can override client choices. Such limitations
may also lead, e.g., to formulation of different rules regarding disclosure of client communica-
tions to counsel. See Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351,357 nn.26-
27 and accompanying text (1989).
272. There is a distinction here between arguing that the lawyer's moral counseling is an
acceptable intrusion on client autonomy and that such counseling is in fact consistent with and
maybe even required by respect for client autonomy. Thomas Shaffer takes the latter position.
See Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 231, 246 (1979)
("autonomy allows for, and may even require" openness to moral persuasion; openness to
others' influence essential to living a moral life).
273. See sources cited supra note 270, especially Luban and Gordon.
274. One criticism of the adversary ethic that implicates arguments for client-
centeredness is that the unswerving loyalty to the client that is at the heart of the ethic discour-
ages the client's consideration of the legitimate interests of non-client third parties. Several
commentators argue for ethical attitudes or rules that would encourage if not require lawyers to
raise third-party interests with clients. See, e.g., Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, supra
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concerning the significance of the critique for client-centered approaches to
lawyering. First, it is not by chance that these criticisms focus on issues of
morality. The client's desire to undertake immoral though not illegal actions
provides the toughest test for the lawyer who posits that it is not her place to
judge her client's ends or goals. This is so primarily because we normally
believe that individuals are responsible for the moral consequences of their acts
(or failures to act); the adversary ethic asks that lawyers be exempted from
what would otherwise be their clear responsibility.275 We also care greatly
about moral issues, at least at the rhetorical level. Such issues help define the
kind of society in which we aspire to live.276 It is impossible to view the
lawyer's morality independently of both society at large and the legal system in
which the lawyer operates.277
Second, while the commentators' concern about lawyer morality is
understandable, the solutions they offer are far from unproblematic. Many
commentators urge the lawyer to engage the client in a moral conversation.278
This can range from simply raising moral concerns with the client, while
agreeing to be bound by the client's resolution of the issue,279 to actively
seeking to persuade the client of the virtues of the lawyer's own moral vision,
refusing to participate in the client's pursuit of immoral conduct and, possibly,
disclosing such conduct to a court or third party.=o It is not at all clear what
these conversations would actually sound like. If one's paradigm lawyer-client
note 121; D. LUBAN, supra note 63; Margulies, 'Who Are You to Tell Me That?": Attorney-
Client Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C.L REV.
213 (1990). See also i. at 214 n.5 (collecting sources). Raising the concerns of third parties
is, in fact, quite consistent with client-centered approaches; such concerns often form part of the
relevant context in which the client must make her decision. There is no reason to think that
clients will systematically ignore third parties' legitimate interests. See infra notes 289-91 and
accompanying text. More problematic, however, is the degree to which some of these and other
commentators apparently countenance manipulation and betrayal of clients whose unwillingness
to accommodate such third-party interests does not accord with the lawyer's views of appropri-
ate client behavior. See infra note 280 and accompanying text. But see Margulies, supra, at
250-52 (arguing that requiring lawyers to counsel clients on nonlegal mattews and the inteasts of
nondients, while increasing lawyer influence over clients, actually decreases manipulation by
encouraging open discussion and dialogue).
275. See Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, supra note 270, at 87.
276. See A. BENJAMIN, THE HELPING INTERVIEW 139 (2d ed. 1974) (describing moral
issues as "those sacred, social norms no one in his right senses could possibly oppose or even
question.").
277. It is not by chance that Richard Wasserstrom's influential attack on lawyer's role-
differentiated behavior followed the disclosure of the Watergate scandal and lawyers' appalling
role in it. See Wasserstrom, supra note 77.
278. See, e.p., D. LUBAN, supra note 63, at 163; Shaffer, supra note 272; Lehman, The
Pursuit of a Client s Interest, 77 MICH. L REV. 1078 (1979). Cf. Pepper, supra note 60, at
630 (though Pepper is a strong advocate for client autonomy, he calls for moral dialogue
between lawyer and client).
279. This is the position that Monroe Freedman, a well-known proponent of client
autonomy, takes. See Freedman, Legal Ethics and the Suffering Client, 36 CATH. U.L. REV.
331, 332, 335 (1987).
280. See D. LUBAN, supra note 63, at 160-74. David Luban and William Simon seem
drawn to this view, though in Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, supra note 121, at 1083-84,
Simon analyzes the lawyer's moral concerns as part and parcel of her legal obligations. Thomas
Shaffer goes so far as to argue that lawyers should attempt to convert clients to their moral
vision. Shaffer, supra note 272, at 247. Given the strong religious and theological flavor of
this and much of Shaffer's writing, it appears that he means conversion in both a literal and figu-
rative sense.
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relationship is of powerful lawyers and powerful clients, one can imagine a far-
ranging moral conversation in which both lawyer and client give as good as
they get. We would have relatively few concerns that the lawyer could
overbear the client's will in a manner that denied the client's autonomy. The
difficulty with this scenario is that lawyers for such powerful clients may not
even recognize that moral issues are involved or may very well share their
clients' moral visions.281 The moral conversation will likely end before it
begins. 282 With powerful lawyers and powerless clients, however, the danger
that the client will take the lawyer's moral suggestion as a diktat is quite real
and, for the most part, unexamined by the critics.2 = 3 One can argue that the
client is free to reject the lawyer's moral advice and continue with the goals the
client establishes (if the lawyer agrees) or find another lawyer (if the lawyer
does not). But such a response to the problem is insufficient. It fails to take
account of some lawyers' tendency to dominate their clients.2 While some
might claim that clients would see the lawyer's moral advice as occupying a less
secure footing than her legal advice,2 5 the very resonance of moral issues calls
such an observation into question. And that is the point: the critics do not want
the client to ignore the lawyer's moral advice, they want him to follow it. The
trick is to accomplish that result without undermining the client's autonomous
choice. It is a trick not yet mastered.m
281. See Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and
Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L REV. 503, 536 (1985) (large law firm
lawyers report rarely turning down assignments on moral grounds). For a criticism of Mome of
Nelson's conclusions, see Spiegel, Lawyers and Professional Autonomy: Reflections on
Corporate Lawyering and the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 139,
143-44 (1987).
282. Partly this may be due to the lawyer's tendency to transform moral and other broad
issues into technical ones. Even when lawyers talk to corporate clients about moral issues, the
moral and technical aspects are likely to be intermixed. See G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE
PRACICE OF LAW 137, 147-49 (1978).
283. But see Ellmarn, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy (Book Review),
90 COLUM. L. REV. 116, 141 n.50, 147-50 (1990) (reviewing D. LUBAN, smpra note 63)(critiquing Luban's approach to moral activism).
284. See, e.g., Basten, supra note 68, at 15 ("greater moral accountability on the part of
lawyers... will result in a further diminution of the degree of control exercised by clients,
especially by clients from disadvantaged groups").
285. See, e.g., Ellimann, supra note 16, at 774-75 (suggesting that clients can evaluate
the lawyer's moral and political advice at least as well as if not better than her legal advice).
286. That moral counseling is a difficult enterprise does not deny the virtues of its pur-
suit The critics do a great service in calling attention to the vacuity and self-erving quality of
lawyers' denial of moral responsibility for their actions. Cf. Lehman, supra note 278, at 1082(suggesting that lawyers adopt instrumental view of counseling because of the difficulty of rais-
ing moral issues with clients). But in addressing an undeniable problem, they are guilty of fail-
ing to see the dangers of their approach. See, e.g., id., where the author asks plaintively "How
do I say to an alcoholic client that he ought to suffer the penalty for a drunk driving charge,
rather than be gotten off, or tell a sey offender that he ought to be committed for treatment?"
Whether it is legitimate for the lawyer to raise these concerns with his client depends on a num-
ber of factors, including: the kind of relationship they have; the relative power of lawyer and
client; the likely consequences for the client of "suffering the penalty" or being "committed for
treatment," including, in the latter case, whether treatment is a meaningful possibility and
whether the client can ever effectuate his release once committed; and the appropriateness of the
lawyer proposing a solution generated by the legal system (such as prison or civil commitment)
for what may be better characterized as a social, political or psychological problem.
The prolific Thomas Shaffer struggles with a number of the issues discussed in the pro-
ceeding paragraph in The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, supra note 272. Shaffer is a
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The notion that adversary lawyers are all too willing to assist rapacious
clients in harming others is critical to the moral critics' perception of the need
for a new ethic of professional responsibility. But the perception, even if accu-
harsh critic of lawyers' role-morality, which he calls the "Ethics of Role," id. at 234 t seq., for
its false assumption that the only choices available to lawyers are to do what the client wants (the
hired-gun approach) or what the client needs (the paternalistic or best interests approach). He
criticizes the latter conception primarily because it requires the lawyer to believe in the virtue of
the present system of justice, which for Shaffer is equivalent to a belief in power. Power is not
necessarily good; it is not part of a moral dialogue. Id. at 239. Shaffer's discussion of the
Ethics of Isolation, id. at 239 et seq., identifies a number of the problems of moral counseling
suggested in the above discussion. While the lawyer functioning under this ethic at least places
moral issues before her client (and so is to be preferred to the role-based lawyer who rules such
considerations out of bounds), she does so in a formal, unconvincing way. The lawyer asserts a
moral position and invites the client to accept or reject it. But there is no moral dialogue, only a
series of lawyer and possibly client monologues. As Shaffer puts it, 'The client does not come
to understand the lawyer's moral assertion and is therefore not persuaded by it. He is not con-
vinced; he is overruled." Id. at 241.
So far so good. But in discussing his preferred solution to the problem of moral coun-
seling, the "Ethics of Care," id. at244 et seq., Shaffer fails to come to grips with his criticisms
of the other modes of moral discourse. Shaffer argues that the Ethics of Care require that lawyer
and client risk openness with each other and accept the possibility that each participant's moral
beliefs will be changed by the influence of the other. Shaffer sees the Ethics of Care operating
on a continuum from autonomy to conversion; as noted previously, supra note 272, he sees the
client's willingness to receive moral advice as supportive of autonomy rather than an intrusion
upon it. Shaffer recognizes that relationships between professionals and laypeople can never
truly be equal, but nevertheless argues that the Ethics of Care are superior to the other concep-
tions because they at least treat the client as an end and not a means. Shaffer, however, ignores
the problem of power that is one basis for his criticism of the Ethics of Role. He does not
expainhowa cien int eEthcs f Cre vois te vry indof apiultion to lawyer moraliz-
ingtha caraterze th Etic ofIsoaton.Theprncial iferecebetween the two ethics
appears to be whether the lawyer considers heself to be susceptible to the client's moral influ-
ence. But it is not clear how the lawyer's susceptibility to the client necessarily limits the
former's influence over the latter. For example, a parent can demonstrate to a child that she is
prepared to change her mind about things based on what the child says, and yet still be seen by
the child as exercising substantial power over him. In many conversations, the lawyer's sus-
ceptibility to the client's moral views may never come out; the lawyer's mere statement that he is
susceptible will not necessarily be believed.
Furthermore, Shaffer's model may implicitly assume that lawyers and clients will both
adopt or apply a Judeo-Christian morality. Under such an assumption, the Ethics of Care
lawyer exposes himself to some moral risks, but those risks are limited because the ultimate
moral reference points are agreed upon. Where such an assumption is inaccurate, Shaffer does
not explain how the lawyer and client can have a true moral dialogue.
The Jack and Jack study of lawyers' moral reasoning unwittingly demonstrates one of
the problems caused when lawyers representing clients express greater moral sensitivity
unchecked by concern about what their clients want. See R. JACK & DJACK, supra note 107.
In describing what they call Position 3 on the moral reasoning continuum, Recognition of Moral
Cost, the authors praise the "contextual caring for the wholeness of a human situation" that char-
acterizes the position, and see it as one that "preserves the virtues of institutional ethics while
infusing the critical concerns of care morality." Id. at 120. But in the same section, the authors
quote as examples of those who occupy this moral position one lawyer who discusses his will-
ingness to "use... leverage against my client" in a hypothetical child custody case in which the
lawyer questions the client's fitness as a parent, id. at 118, and another who states, "I have a
responsibility to my clients to assist them in doing what is good for them" rather than what they
say they want. Id. at 119. Lawyers' greater recourse to moral reasoning is not inherently
inconsistent with the respect for client autonomy that is the essence of client-centeredness. But
the moral context clearly must include respect for the client's capacity to make choices informed,
but not overwhelmed, by moral considerations that the lawyer brings to bear on the situation.
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rate,28 7 need not require that lawyers engage in peremptory moral conver-
sations with their clients. 8 8 There may be greater common ground between
client-centeredness advocates and the moral critics than first meets the eye.2 89
For if the client-centered lawyer does her job well, she raises moral concerns
with the client, if for no other reason than that society treats such concerns as
important and we should not assume that clients do not wish to consider
287. This is the problem, once again, of imputing immoral ends to clients. See Simon,
supra note 61, at 59; Fried, supra note 61, at 1088.
288. See G. HAZARD, supra note 282, at 147-49 (peremptory moral advice); cf.
Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception o/Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L. REV.
1529, 1563-64 (the lawyer's refusal, on moral grounds, to mplement the client's wishes with-
out a full discussion of the issue amounts to arrogance; refusal following client justification ofdifferent moral position reflects intolerance). Stephen Ellmann recognizes, at least, the need for
lawyers who choose to engage in moral and political counseling of clients to do so in a non-
manipulative manner and with the goal of preserving the client's choice-making capacity. SeeEllmann, supra note 16, at 776. Ellmann does not indicate precisely how such non-manipulative
counseling would occur, except to suggest that lawyers should start with the assumption that
clients are competent, by which he means that they are able to receive and evaluate the lawyer's
advice. Id. at 778. Interestingly, he argues that lawyers who adopt a more distant attitude
towards their clients will be in a better position to offer moral advice to their clients without
overwhelming them than would lawyers who offered their clients therapeutic support. Id. at
777-78. Even assuming that Ellmann accurately identifies the Binder and Price lawyer's goals
as therapeutic in nature, the correctness of his argument is not intuitively obvious. It seems just
as likely that lawyers and clients who know each other well, and have a relationship approaching
friendship (of the pure variety, not the kind Charles Fried advocates), can talk to each other more
easily about a number of matters, including moral and political issues, with fewer concerns
about overbearing the other's will. While the accuracy of this last proposition is less clear when
the lawyer does not really have a close relationship with the client but uses psychological tech-
niques to suggest that he does, it is nevertheless plausible that a person's willingness to grapple
with professional advice increases if that advice flows from a more interactive interpersonal
relationship than the traditional cold professional one.
289. Bastress argues that cient-centeredness and the lawyer's moral accountability are
not mutually exclusive. Bastress, supra note 174, at 119. Drawing on Rogerian notions that
client-centered counselors must be congruent, Bastress argues that true client-centered lawyers
must act consistently with their moral understandings. He fails to consider, however, what the
client-centered lawyer should do if the client does not come to share her moral understanding, or
the effect of the lawyer's statement of moral position on the client. Warren Lehman falls into a
similar trap when he observes in connection with advice a lawyer might give to a client who was
contemplating a gift now, which, if deferred, would have favorable tax consequences:
It is impossible so to organize my behavior that it is not manipulative. It is
impossible to act so as to make another man free.... The only thing the lawyer
can do for his client is be free himself, which means free to be honest in saying
exactly what he thinks and feels, to confront himself. It is transcendence for a
lawyer to say to a client: 'I am fearful of influencing you unduly in this matter.
The tax saving is there. It may be important to you to save the money. If so, by
all means defer the gift. But money saving is not everything. One should hardly
organize one's life around a revenue code. I will think none the less of you
whether you choose to defer or not. Some people, I suspect, may be embarrassed
- odd as it may sound - to ignore an apparent financial advantage, for to do so
sounds irrational. Let me assure you, I would respect most highly a man who
will do now what seems right to him now. What sounds rational is not always
humanly reasonable....' The important thing about any such message is not that
it is calculated to neutralize the legal-rational bias, the legal influence, but that it be
honest and not intended to manipulate. Sometimes a side benefit of the speaker's
honesty is a shock in the listener that shakes him loose and helps him be free.
Lehman, supra note 278, at 1091 (emphasis added). Lehman may not intend to manipulate his
client, but the above statement makes it quite clear which choice the lawyer sees as the moral
one.
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them.290 The difference between this approach and that of the moral critics
may be one of degree and not kind, but I believe that it goes to the heart of
what makes both client-centeredness an attractive concept and moral activism a
potentially dangerous one.291
Third, it is important not to overstate the importance or prevalence of
the moral issues that arise in the day-to-day practice of law. Even if one
somehow concludes that client-centered approaches should not be used with
290. See Saminons, supra note 73, at 78-79.
291. The difference in approaches may be suggested by the following hypothetical
statements by the morally activist and client-centered lawyer. As I read the former, he is likely to
say to his client, "I cannot assist you in doing x [where, e.g., x is polluting a stream or interpos-
ing the statute of limitations] because I find it to be immoral and my own moral precepts will not
allow me to participate in your actions. If you refuse to forego doing x I will certainly no longer
represent you and I may even have to blow the whistle on you." (A slightly weaker version of
this approach, suggested by one of the participants in the UCLA-Warwick Second International
Clinical Scholarship Conference (Sept. 18-19, 1989), has the lawyer saying "I am troubled
[morally] by the position you wish to take." I do not see this approach as significantly less
problematic than the first statement, in part because it is likely to lead to the earlier statement,
although its arguably more tentative formulation is at least less moralistic.) The client-centered
lawyer might say to his client, "Have you considered the moral consequences of doing x? Do
you see any moral reasons to do x? Do you see any moral reasons to forego doing x?" If the
client in the latter setting persists in her moral obtuseness ("As a matter of fact, I don't see any
moral problems in pleading the statute of limitations even though I know that I owe the money'),
the client-centered lawyer might go so far as to say, "Well, one possible response to your doing
x is that one might have the following moral objections to it. Have you considered that?"
Unlike the morally activist lawyer, the client-centered lawyer is unlikely to issue his advice
peremptorily (if he gives any advice at all) and is presumably prepared to assist the client in some
morally questionable actions of which the lawyer does not approve.
The downside of each approach may be considered by imagining how a client might
respond to each lawyer. Assuming that the client of the morally activist lawyer agrees to forego
the morally questionable action, it is certainly possible that the client does so not because of any
new appreciation of the moral consequences of his actions but because his lawyer states the
matter so baldly and persuasively. See Ellmann, supra note 16, at 776. The positive aspect of
the client's response, if the lawyer's moral judgment is one we accept as valid, is that immoral
conduct is prevented or diminished. It is not clear that the client will lead a more moral life,
however, nor that the client will come back to the lawyer (or, if he does, that he will raise moral
problems with him to the extent he can avoid doing so). The client of the client-centered lawyer
may be more likely than his counterpart to persist in his immoral conduct. He may also become
frustrated by the lawyer's refusal to state his own moral position, although it is not unlikely that
he will interpret the lawyer's raising of moral consequences as indicative of the lawyer's position
on the matter, especially if the lawyer goes on to make the supplemental observation indicated
above. But if he does stop to consider the moral consequences of his actions, it is likely to be
more clearly of his own doing and hence more integrated into his approach to life. He will have
made a moral choice, rather than capitulated to his lawyer's moral posturing.
I recognize that ths statements and responses can be manipulated and analyzed end-
lessly to prove one's point. Morally activist lawyers need not state their moral concerns in
peremptory fashion. In fact, they may be open to being persuaded by the client that the client's
moral perceptions are superior. See, e.g., D. LUBAN, supra note 63 at 173-74 (morally activist
lawyer should discuss moral issues with client in "unmoralistic manner" and be capable of
adopting the client's moral position rather than vice versa). Client-centered lawyers cannot hope
to bemorally neutral and at some level their moral views are likely to come out. My point is that
if the moral activists are to be congratulated for putting lawyers' morality on the agenda, they are
to be criticized for their failure to consider how their moral conversations might actually work
out in practice.
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moral issues,292 there are more than ample opportunities for client-centered
lawyers to ply their trade.293
Another challenge to dlient-centeredness that relates to the interplay
between lawyers and their clients' autonomy is based on the corporate control
thesis. Simply stated, the thesis holds that while personal plight lawyers exer-
cise power over and control their clients, corporate lawyers, despite occupying
the highest status position within the profession, are controlled by their
corporate clients.294 To the extent it is accurate, the thesis calls into question
the desirability of client-centeredness with respect to this subset of lawyers and
clients. Client-centeredness might at best be unnecessary and at worst be a
handmaiden to excessive client power 95
Spiegel is one of the few commentators to attempt to reconcile client-
centeredness with the corporate control thesis. He identifies two principal ways
in which the informed-consent lawyer can avoid complicity in his client's
exercise of illegitimate power: by engaging in dialogue with clients concerning
moral issues and by using the deprofessionalization intrinsic in informed con-
sent to question the lawyer's role-based morality. These responses may rep-
resent wishful thinking;, recognizing as much, Spiegel concludes that informed
consent will not cure the problems of excessive corporate power and that
292. I do not advocate this argument, however. For one thing, it is unlikely that client
concerns can be neatly divided into moral and non-moral issues. Indeed, a related problem of
the morality critique may be its implicit assumption that moral issues can always be clearly iden-
tified, let alone resolved.
293. See D. LUBAN, supra note 63, at 326 ('everyday legal business is not often overtly
political and its moral dimension is usually uncomplicated; and so even a moral activist will gen-
erally act straightforwardly as her client's agent") (citation omitted). Cf. Nelson, supra note
281, at 532-33 (seventy-six percent of law firm lawyers in sample believe it is appropriate to act
as moral conscience of client on occasion, but only 2.4 percent report ever having given clients
"public relations" advice, which author describes as the closest analogue to moral advice in
sample).
294. J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, supra note 111. See also Spiegel, supra note 281, at
143-45 (criticizing Heinz and Laumann thesis to the extent their definition of autonomy focuses
exclusively on ends and not means).
Heinz and Laumann observe that it is misleading to talk about one legal profession.
They conclude that the profession is divided into two broad groups: those lawyers who serve
corporations and those who serve individuals (personal plight lawyers). Social status is client-
dependent; corporate lawyers have greater prestige than personal lawyers because their clients
are more prestigious. Yet, according to the authors, corporate lawyers have significantly less
autonomy from their clients than do personal lawyers. The reasons are several, including the
ability of the corporation, through its general counsel's office, to monitor the work of the
lawyers more closely and understand the outside lawyer's language more easily, and the corpo-
ration's tendency to use legal services on a repeat basis rather than the one-shot nature of much
lawyering in the personal hemisphere.
On the other hand, John Donnell's study of corporate counsel and their clients reveals
that not just poor clients or personal plight clients are concerned about their lawyer's domination
of them:
Fear that the corporate counsel will dominate his clients and perhaps usurp their
decision-making responsibilities appears to be fairly common among clients, and
counsel appears to be very much aware of this feeling.
J. DONNELL, supra note 233, at 61 (emphasis in original).
295. See Spiegel, supra note 281, at 147 (referring to informed consent lawyering,
essentially equivalent to cient-centeredness).
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perhaps there ought to be different ethical rules for different segments of the
legal profession.2 96
But the dialogue Spiegel talks about is worth focusing on for a moment,
for it suggests one way in which the client-centered counseling model is supe-
rior to the traditional counseling model in addressing the corporate control
thesis. The traditional lawyer's view that most legal problems are susceptible to
technical solutions, when combined with the ability of corporate clients,
through their in-house counsel, to monitor closely the work of their outside
lawyers, most likely results in traditional corporate lawyers exercising rather
little restraint on their clients. 297 The client-centered lawyer, in contrast, is
committed not just to the result of a client-centered decision but to a process
that facilitates that decision.298 Through such a process, it is conceivable that
some clients will come to believe that certain actions that they are capable of
taking should not be taken.299
The above commentators criticize lawyers for glorifying client auton-
omy.300 But Stephen Ellmann argues that client-centeredness, at least of the
Binder and Price variety, undercuts client autonomy. He asserts that the Binder
and Price lawyer's unwillingness to give his client advice compromises her
autonomy by denying her access to what might be an extremely important
source of information, the lawyer's views.301 While Ellmann agrees with
296. Id. at 147-52.
297. See Nelson, supra note 281, at 526 (criticizing thesis of Erwin Smigel in E.
SMIGEL, TE WALL STREET LAWYER (1964) that corporate lawyers function as restraining
influence on their clients). But see Gordon, supra note 112, at 56-57.
298. See supra note 22.
299. William Simon's critical lawyer might be more direct than the client-centered
lawyer in seeking to deter corporate depredations, but it is unlikely he would ever get through
the corporation's front door.
300. One ground of William Simon's critique of the Ideology of Advocacy is its pur-
ported denial of client autonomy. See Simon, supra note 61. But as the above discussion of his
latest article demonstrates, Simon's latest formulation of his thesis in fact represents a significant
challenge to client autonomy. In any event, client-centeredness differs substantially from the
ideology of advocacy as Simon defines it, so that not all aspects of Simon's critique of the latter
concept apply to the former.
In his recent critique of informed-consent lawyering, see supra note 151, Simon con-
tends that lawyers need to communicate to their clients their own judgments about the clients'
needs because (1) clients want them to do so and because (2) there is no way to avoid influenc-
ing them. Determining what clients want is notoriously tricky business. Legal commentators
tend to assume that certain types of clients (often poor people) want to know what their lawyer
thinks, see e.g., infra note 331, an assumption that is surely overbroad if not plain wrong. As
for Simon's second point, he maintains that the impossibility of eradicating the lawyer's influ-
ence over the client implies the impossibility of significantly enhancing the client's capacity for
autonomous decisionmaking. Therefore, there can be no strong distinction between paternalism
and autonomy. While Simon may be correct that lawyer influence is inevitable and paternalism
cannot be avoided entirely, it does not at all follow that the solution to the problem is for the
lawyer to tell the client what he believes should be done. At a minimum, such an approach fails
to see important distinctions among the possible degrees of lawyer influence and paternalism.
See infra notes 305-06,361-62 and accompanying text.
301. Ellmann, supra note 16, at 767. See also Gifford, supra note 15, at 822 (criticizing
Binder and Price for denying clients the benefits of lawyer's opinion and the intuitive and
unarticulated judgments that inform it). Ellmann criticizes the Binder and Price counseling
model for its unnecessary manipulation of clients. Such manipulation is reflected in the follow-
ing ways: the lawyer's refusal to give her client her opinion; the lawyer's inevitable choices in
framing alternatives for the client to consider, the lawyer's failure to counsel the client on politi-
cal and moral issues; and the assumption that the client must adopt Binder and Price's rationalis-
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Binder and Price on the desirability of the goal of fostering client autonomy, he
differs with them over the optimal means to accomplish that goal. As he rec-
ognizes, almost any choice that the lawyer makes concerning her counseling
method is likely to compromise some aspect of the client's autonomy.3O But
while Binder and Price are most concerned about the lawyer who overpowers
her client, Ellmann is most troubled by the lawyer's failure to treat the client as
the kind of competent individual able to hear professional advice without
capitulating to it.3
tic counseling model. Ellmann, supra note 16, at 744-52. In my judgment, the first of these
situations presents the most difficult autonomy issue. The lawyer's failure to counsel about
moral and political concerns is an objection to the Binder and Price model that is easily met by
including such considerations in the non-legal consequences on which Binder and Price require
the lawyer to counsel the client. To the extent that Ellmann argues for the lawyer to provide
moral and political advice rather than simply raising moral and political concerns, his concern is
subsumed within his overall concern with the lawyer's failure to give advice.
I believe that the brainstorming called for in my variation of the Binder and Price model,
see infra Part IV, answers to some extent Ellmann's concerns about limiting the alternatives for
the client. As for the lawyer's choice of a rationalistic counseling model, such a choice is hardly
inevitable, though it does find some support in EC 7-8 of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, and some model may well be preferable to none at all. In any event, I am less
troubled by this than Ellmann is, in part because I assume that many clients coming to see a
lawyer expect her to structure the interview or counseling session in a manner that the lawyer
finds useful.
302. Ellmann, supra note 16, at 779. See also Nedelsky, supra note 54, at 21(collectivity simultaneously source of and threat to individual autonomy), 21 n.31 (parents
source of and threat to children's autonomy; "It is probably the case that all relationships neces-
sary for autonomy can easily be perverted to undermine it").
303. Ellmann also criticizes Binder and Price's counseling model for failing to urge
lawyers to encourage clients to subject their wants and values, which underlie the choices that
they make and the consequences that they envision, to critical re-examination. Ellmann, supra
note 16, at 760-61. But in my experience the model actually allows this critical reconsideration,
especially in the stage in which the lawyer assists the client in weighing the pros and cons of dif-
ferent possible choices and consequences. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8, at 183-
87. In a recent simulation in our clinic, for example, a student-lawyer (attempting to follow the
Binder and Price model) was interviewing a potential client whose children had been seized by
the local social services agency because of the parent's alleged neglect. One of the issues in the
case was whether the client had sufficient financial resources to care adequately for the children.
The client and his spouse were both out of work. When the lawyer asked the client whether he
had thought of applying for welfare benefits, the client reacted in a strongly negative manner,
stating that he was too proud to seek assistance. The student left the matter there, until later in
the interview when she elicited the client's view that getting his children back was the most
important thing in the world to him. At that point, she brought up the welfare issue again, and
when the client re-stated his resistance to applying for benefits, she asked him whether he had
considered re-examining his resistance in light of the stated importance of getting his children
back. The client did not immediately change his views on the receipt of welfare benefits, but did
stop to consider whether one strongly held principle might have to give way in light of a more
important one. At that moment, and presumably thereafter if this had been an actual case, the
client had the opportunity to reconsider his values; the lawyer's relatively neutral statement of
choices contributed to the client's reconsideration. Of course, the student might have brain-
stormed with the client about whether there were other options (such as getting a job or obtaining
a form of assistance that did not compromise the client's need to feel independent) that allowed
the client to remain true to both principles, or explored with the client why he felt welfare assis-
tance was illegitimate and provided him with rationales for receiving the benefits that did not
compromise his image of self-worth. My point is not that this was a perfect interview, or that
Binder and Price lawyers necessarily engage clients in the process of values re-examination, but
that the model is not inconsistent with such engagement and does not necessarily require the
lawyer to accept uncritically client statements of wants and values. Cf. Kronman, supra note 5,
at 866 ("clients often come to lawyers with confused or conflicting ends and... it is frequently
[VOL. 32
CLIENT-CENTERED COUNSELING
Significantly, not all client-centered commentators take such a strong
stance against advice-giving as do Binder and Price.30 But while a lawyer
cannot help but influence a client, 3o5 it may be helpful to consider advice as
being on a continuum that ranges from the lawyer saying nothing to the client
to the lawyer telling the client what to do. On such a continuum, advice is
more interventionist than suggestion but less so than persuasion.3o6
Giving advice presents numerous problems for the counselor committed
to assuring his client's autonomy. The lawyer's advice may prevent clients
capable of doing so from making decisions.307 What the lawyer sees as the
client's need to receive advice may be more the lawyer's need to give it. The
lawyer's premature dispensation of advice may prevent the client from making
her own choice in her own way: once the lawyer gives her advice, it becomes
difficult to know if the client's subsequent choice (assuming it is consistent with
the lawyer's advice) is a freely made one. 30 9  Clearly, under some
circumstances, the lawyer's advice shades into persuasion, and persuasion risks
compromising the client's autonomy.
part of a lawyer's job to help the client see what it is that he wishes to do and to decide whether,
on reflection, he really wants to do it.").
304. In addition to Thomas Shaffer, see, e.g., Shaffer, supra note 254, at 328
(discussion of Aquinas's fraternal correction and Barth's conditional advice); Shaffer, supra note
272, at 246 (same). See also Redmount, Humanistic Law Through Legal Counseling, 2 CONN.
L. REV. 98, 105 (1969) (value of persuasion in second stage of legal counseling, which he
describes as moving from intelligence to decision) and H. FREEMAN & H. WEIHOFFEN, supra
note 185, at 103-05 (criticizing lawyers for often giving peremptory advice too soon, but
implicitly accepting lawyers' use of advice, suggestion and, where necessary, pressure with
clients). I use the term advice in a very specific sense: the lawyer telling the client what he rec-
ommends the client should do. Some writers construe advice more broadly to mean the process
of identifying alternatives for the client and exploring possible consequences. See J.
HARBAUGH & B. BR1TZKE, supra note 11, at 15 (defining advising as "reporting factual devel-
opments, the results of investigation, and interpreting those facts in the legal context").
Harbaugh and Britzke distinguish advising from guiding ("the process of assisting the client in
making decisions with respect to what action ought to be taken based on the lawyer's advice"),
id. at 16, and deciding, which is the process by which the client makes a choice. Deciding is for
the client to do. Despite their different use of the term advising, the authors ultimately adopt a
version of the Binder and Price model on this point. Id. at 17-18, 28-30.
305. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 112, at 30.
306. Benjamin defines suggestion as a mild form of advice stated in tentative terms. A.
BENJAMIN, supra note 276, at 128. He adds:
Suggestion does not demand compliance nor threaten the interviewee with rejec-
tion should he not follow it through.... Suggestion provides the interviewee
with the interviewer's considered opinions but leaves him leeway to accept,
refuse, or propose ideas of his own. Indeed its purpose may be to stimulate the
interviewee to think and plan for himself.
Id. In contrast, "[a]dvice, essentially, is telling someone else how to behave, what to do or not
do." Id. at 129. Beyond advice is urging, which the author equates with persuasion and cajol-
ing, and which he defines as "a lead or response the purpose of which is to prod the interviewee,
to not let him escape what, in our opinion, he should not evade." Id. at 135.
307. See id. at 129-31.
308. See id. (easiest way for counselor to relieve pressure on himself is to give
"disinterested" advice to interviewee); Lehman, supra note 278, at 1089 ("I expect a lawyer's
inclination to press the merits of his money-saving advice reflects, among other things, a desire
to feel that his expertise is really useful. We may know no other way to judge our own useful-
ness.").
309. See A. BENJAMIN, supra note 276, at 129-31.
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These problems with advice-giving are well-nigh intractable. When
combined with the lawyer's paternalistic tendency towards his client and his
training in the persuasive arts, these concerns lead me to advocate reversing
Stephen Ellmann's presumption that the lawyer should give advice to the
competent client. I would have the lawyer start with the premise that the client
does not need the lawyer's advice, at least at the beginning of the lawyer-client
relationship.310 I take a less unequivocal stand against the lawyer's use of
suggestion, although it is important for the client-centered lawyer to recognize
that depending on how it is presented, the lawyer's suggestion can easily be
meant and interpreted as advice or persuasion.3t1 But under carefully
considered circumstances I deviate from Binder and Price and permit some
lawyers, consistent with client-centered practice, to offer advice to some clients
without having to wait for the client to ask for it.312
2. The Psychological Critique
From the psychological perspective, client-centered counseling raises a
series of concerns. First, even if client-centeredness is desirable in a thera-
peutic context, it might be unsuitable to the legal counseling milieu, either
because it generates an inappropriate amount of client self-revelation or because
it fosters excessive client dependence (and thus at a minimum undercuts one of
the presumed goals of client-centered counseling in the first place). Second,
client-centeredness might make unreasonable demands on the lawyer, by
310. Even the most non-interventionist client-centered lawyer is likely to feel the strong
pull of wanting to give advice to his client. That pull may well lead him to manipulate his client
to make the decision that he, the lawyer, wants him to make while seeming to insist that it
remains the client's decision. One way that this manipulation could occur - and in my experi-
ence as both a lawyer and teacher does occur - is for the lawyer to revisit continually the
client's decision and the basis for it until the client comes around to the lawyer's point of view.
If such manipulation can be shown empirically to occur regularly it would certainly raise serious
questions about both the legitimacy and practicality of client-centered counseling.
On the other hand, if one conceives of client-centeredness as a process rather than solely
as an end-product, and as reflecting the lawyer's attitude toward her client rather than solely as a
mechanical allocation of decisionmaking responsibility, the conversational back-and-forth
between lawyer and client can be productive instead of frustrating and manipulative. If the
lawyer truly struggles with enabling the client to make her own decision, she may eventually
find an effective method of communication that clarifies the considerations for her.
311. See A. BENJAMIN, supra note 276, at 128.
312. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text. If the lawyer in the exercise of herjudgment concludes that the client is, in Binder and Price's terms, an independent decision-
maker, there seems little reason to restrict the giving of advice to situations in which the client
asks for it. If the client is an independent decisionmaker, the need for a request is superfluous; if
the client is not such a person, the request is insufficient. Under any circumstances, though, the
lawyer should not give advice immediately because even independent decisionmakers might ben-
efit from first trying to resolve the problem without the lawyer's advice on which choice to
make. Also, the lawyer should be careful to recognize when a client who he might otherwise
consider to be an independent decisionmaker (for example, based on the lawyer's past dealings
with the client) is not one under the particular circumstances presented.
No model of lawyering can sensibly take account of all possible situations and so a rule
that the lawyer should never give advice would be unworkable as well as unwise. Even the
more interventionist technique of urging or persuasion may be appropriate in some circum-
stances if it supports a client's resolve to take an action previously decided upon. See A.
BENJAMIN, supra note 276, at 135-36. But as Benjamin warns, the very success of such a
technique should give us pause to examine our own motives in using it and the possible effects
on the client Id. at 135. What is needed is for the lawyer to adopt a self-conscious, reflective
approach to the lawyering techniques that he uses and the attitudes that he adopts.
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causing her to question legitimate role limitations and by demanding a level of
psychological expertise that lawyers do not possess. Third, client-centeredness
might overemphasize the importance of the lawyer-client relationship for its
own sake to the exclusion of political and other societal concerns. Each of these
objections is discussed briefly in turn. 313
Client-centered counseling stresses the lawyer's active involvement in
understanding the client's problem, including, at least to some extent, the emo-
tional context. That involvement may offer important advantages to the lawyer
in his effort to build rapport with his client, but it presents risks as well. While
a person who seeks out a psychotherapist implicitly consents to the therapist's
probing of her psyche, few legal clients could be deemed to give comparable
consent to their lawyers.314 Moreover, while therapists are trained to conduct
such probing, lawyers are not, and they potentially could do substantial harm to
their clients by playing therapist. Clients subjected to the techniques of the
client-centered lawyer may become dependent on him for emotional support.
This dependence is not only troublesome on its own terms, but it would
interfere with the client-centered lawyer's efforts to facilitate his client's
unconstrained choice of goals for the representation. As one commentator has
put it,
Indeed, the view of the lawyer as quasi-therapist that some suggest
might create a new, albeit concealed, dominance of the lawyer over
her client by encouraging her to become involved in the client's
decisions.315
The lawyer's use of the therapeutic techniques of client-centered therapy
for a nontherapeutic purpose may also be problematic. These techniques can
have quite a powerful effect on the client; if the lawyer uses them without
actually feeling the empathy that underlies them, he is arguably engaging in
psychological manipulation of his client. For the lawyer who feigns empathy
313. Furthermore, insofar as it is based on Rogerian client-centered therapy, client-
centered legal counseling is vulnerable to criticisms of Rogers's theories. See Simon, supra note
84, at 511-20 (criticism of assumptions of Rogerian therapy). See also supra note 173 for a
discussion of the differences between client-centered and Freudian therapeutic approaches. For
an overview of different psychological theories and their relationship to legal counseling, see T.
SHAFFER & J. ELKINS, supra note 1, Ch. 6. Shaffer and Elkins note that:
The principal criticisms of non-directive counseling are that it does not
avoid, but rather encourages, client dependence, because it fosters and comes to
depend on a strong empathic relationship between counselor and client; and that it
does not quickly enough lead to results (choices, decisions, plans of action).
Id. at 159. According to two psychologists,
mhe greatest danger in the practice of client-centered therapy is sterility. If the
therapist's only tool is bare reflection, how often is it that nothing new is added to
bring life to the process? How often is it that nothing new opens up for the client?
The client's likelihood of moving beyond where he is limited by lack of new
input. The client's experience is likely to be that he is right where he started, and
that although he has not lost his bearings, he has in fact gotten nowhere. The
client's complaint to the therapist would then appropriately be, 'Can't you do
anything?'
Cochrane & Holloway, Client-Centered Therapy and Gestalt Therapy: In Search of a Merger, in
INNOVATIoNS IN CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY, supra note 169, at 259, 280 (emphasis in
original).
314. See Ellmann, supra note 16, at 769.
315. Leubsdorf, supra note 125, at 1050.
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for his client, client-centeredness may contribute to his feelings of inauthentic-
ity and falseness in his professional role. Client-centeredness also presents
other psychological risks to the lawyer. Whatever its faults, the traditional
model sets out clear boundaries between lawyer and client that can allow the
lawyer to maintain needed professional distance. To the extent that client-
centeredness encourages the lawyer to become deeply engaged in her client's
problems, especially in their psychological dimension, it may cause her to
identify too greatly with the client. Such over-identification could lead the
lawyer to lose sight of the appropriate limits of legal assistance and cause her to
delve into areas well beyond her competence. Students just becoming
comfortable with the role of the lawyer might be particularly vulnerable to this
role confusion.316
If one virtue of cient-centeredness is its keen focus on the relational
aspect of lawyer-client interactions, a vice may be its purported tendency to
glorify the lawyer-client relationship as an end in and of itself.317 William
Simon argues that client-centered lawyering's focus on the "community-of-two"
of lawyer and client denies the role of external social and political factors in the
calculus of client concerns and interests. He also asserts that client-
centeredness' focus on the acceptance of feelings makes the technique an in-
herently conservative one.318
These criticisms of client-centered counseling, and its grounding in the
techniques and attitudes of client-centered therapy, are not so much wrong as
overstated and simplistic. It is not at all clear that a lawyer's use of techniques
drawn from humanistic psychology are any more problematic than her use of
techniques derived from other disciplines, such as moral philosophy.319 In each
case, the use of technique could be manipulative and lead the lawyer to interfere
316. See Stone, supra note 168, at 435-36 (describing destructive relationship between
clinical law student and psychologically dependent client).
317. Simon, supra note 84, at 502.
318. See id. at 523 and supra note 98. But see Rogers, Client-Centered and Symbolic
Perspectives on Social Change: A Schematic Model, in INNOVATIONS IN CLIENT-CENTERED
THERAPY, supra note 169, at 465,467 ("client-centered therapy has ... a variety of suggestive
values and approaches that could substantially deepen our understanding of social phenomena
and of optimal modes of involvement for those interested in facilitating social change" (footnote
omitted); 475-95 (application of client-centered perspective to case study of community organi-
zation involvement in urban renewal project). But see also Cihlar, Client Self-Determination:
Intervention or Interference?, 14 ST. LOUIS U.LJ. 604, 605, 610 (1970) (criticizing client-
centeredness, which he calls client self-determination, as reflecting a "radical view of individual
freedom" and presenting "a radical exaltation of the normative capacity of the individual which
incessantly borders on the anarchic").
319. Because there is a distinction between the lawyer functioning on the one hand as a
psychologist and on the other as a person attentive to psychological factors and willing to use
some basic psychological techniques in his lawyering, the criticism that lawyers do not have
sufficient expertise to use the psychological techniques of client-centered lawyering is specious.
First, the techniques of the client-centered lawyer (as opposed to the underlying theories of
human motivation and behavior) are simply not that difficult to understand, as a reading of the
second chapter of the Binder and Price text confirms. In my experience, while students may
resist some of the psychological jargon of the book, they quickly understand its meaning.
Second, good lawyers constantly draw from many disciplines to develop their professional
expertise. One of the attractions of practicing law for many people is the opportunity to develop
usable knowledge if not mastery in a number of different areas. Usable knowledge in psychol-
ogy is hardly less accessible in general than it is in economics, history, philosophy, or sociol-
ogy.
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inappropriately with the client's autonomy. But almost any technique, no
matter how neutral in theory, can be misused in this fashion.320 Unless there is
something especially powerful about psychological techniques (and we are not
talking here about sophisticated techniques of psychological torture or
brainwashing), the psychological critique calls into question the lawyer's use of
almost any technique to structure reality for the client.32 '
It is true that clients often come to lawyers in a state of emotional disar-
ray and vulnerability, and that leads some critics to be especially concerned
about the client-centered lawyer's use of psychological techniques. 322 This
concern is real, but it will not be dissipated by the lawyer's eschewal of
empathic listening techniques. The traditional lawyer's paternalistic or judg-
mental stance towards his client can be manipulative as well, as can the critical
lawyer's efforts to reach a non-hierarchical understanding with his client.323
Nor would the lawyer's substantial power over his client disappear if all of a
sudden the lawyer stopped being "psychological;" the sources of the lawyer's
power are considerably more deeply ingrained than that.
The possibility that client-centeredness will lead the lawyer to identify
inappropriately with the client and become over-involved in the client's life is
really a straw man.3u A student's tendency to identify with some clients may
be more a function of his own need to establish competence and to believe in
the justness of his client's cause than of his use of any particular counseling
approach. More fundamentally, a major element of the critique of the
traditional counseling model is to question the traditional assumptions that
lawyers (and law students) make about the lawyer's role. The traditional
lawyer may take fewer risks with his client by maintaining more professional
distance, but as the earlier discussion demonstrated, the results of that approach
are questionable for both client and lawyer.
This article previously addressed William Simon's critique of the focus
of client-centered lawyering on the lawyer-client relationship to the exclusion
of political and other factors.325 If Simon is right to caution against a view of
lawyering that only responds to the human relationship between lawyers and
clients, however, his critique fails in its implication that the client's personal
320. Cf. Simon, supra note 84, at 54849 (importance of analyzing specific context and
purpose of technique).
321. For example, a lawyer's use of leading questions in an interview may be justifiable
to confirm specific data relevant to developing a workable theory of the case. Yet under some
circumstances, the lawyer's leading questions can raise serious ethical problems by suggesting
to the client how to structure his answers falsely so as to maximize his legal position. See G.
BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 3, at 976 (quoting from "'he Lecture" scene in Robert
Traver's ANATOMY OF A MURDER (1958)). We would hardly ban the use of leading questions
in interviews because they are capable of being misused. We simply recognize that under some
circumstances their use may be inappropriate and unethical. The same standard ought to suffice
when assessing the lawyer's use of psychological techniques in a client counseling session.
322. See, e.g., Ellmann, supra note 16, at 768-70.
323. See id. at 770-73 (critical lawyer's manipulation of clients).
324. Alan Stone's rendering of this criticism in Legal Education on the Couch, supra
note 168, is almost apocalyptic in tone. He comes close to blaming a client's suicide attempt on
a clinical law student's use of a client-centered lawyering approach. Stone, a psychiatrist who
teaches at the Harvard Law School, presumably would not urge psychiatrists to abandon psy-
chotherapy because the patients of some psychiatrists attempt similar acts.
325. See supra note 103.
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experiencing of external factors does not matter at all.326 Ultimately, his cri-
tique fails to challenge successfully the underpinnings of all but the most cari-
catured versions of client-centered practice.3 27
Because the goals of the lawyer are very different from those of the
therapist, the lawyer's use of psychological techniques is considerably less
problematic than if the lawyer holds himself out as a psychotherapist. 32
Lawyers who use techniques of client-centered therapy to assist their legal
clients remain truer to the original Rogerian understanding of client-centered
therapy as the creation of a supportive environment than to its later incarnation
as a "deeply personal, unique, and even intimate experience." 329 This might
result in a less complete defense of the psychological underpinnings of client-
centered practice than some advocates mount, but it at least retains what in my
judgment is essential in that practice.
B. Micro-Argwnenfs Against Client-Centeredness
As we have seen, client-centered approaches to lawyering make certain
assumptions about the client, lawyer and lawyer-client relationship. These
assumptions are not indisputable. Both traditional and Critical Legal Studies
critics question some of the underlying premises of client-centered practice.
These criticisms are both practical and conceptual in nature.
1. The Client's Perspective
To be successful, any model of lawyering must appeal to the primary
constituency of lawyers' services: clients. While clients might find the psycho-
logically supportive atmosphere of the client-centered lawyer's office attractive,
other aspects of the practice less clearly serve clients' interests.
For the client who goes to the professional expecting her guidance and
advic6 on the legal matter he has brought to her, the lawyer's emphasis on
client autonomy may seem to provide insufficient assistance in the resolution of
the problem.330 Client-centeredness may be inconsistent with clients' role
326. For a criticism of Simon's thesis, and in particular his failure to come to terms with
the importance of the individual's internalization of political and social concerns, see Elkins,
supra note 189, at 193-212.
327. See id. See also Neustadter, When Lawyer and Client Meet: Observations of
Interviewing and Counseling Behavior in the Consumer Bankruptcy Law Office, 35 BUFFALO
L. REv. 177, 235 n.121 (1986).
328. See supra notes 177-95 and accompanying text.
329. Stone, supra note 168, at 433. It would be interesting to conduct empirical
research with clinical teachers to determine whether, given the extensive adoption of the Binder
and Price text, their use of the authors' suggested psychological techniques (and hence, deriva-
tively at least, Rogerian techniques) is along the instrumental lines that I suggest in the text or for
the purposes of teaching students to establish an intimate, caring relationship with the client. My
own goals are decidedly instrumental in nature, a choice possibly influenced though not totally
determined by the fact that I supervise students in a criminal defense clinic. Client mistrust of
criminal lawyers is extensively documented. See infra note 331. James Elkins has suggested
that even the lawyer's use of psychology for solely instrumental purposes can cause the lawyer
to adopt a more psychologically oriented vision of the world. See Elkins, supra note 189, at
173-76.
330. In her study of the practices of different kinds of salaried lawyers, Spangler notes
that legal services lawyers often deal with clients facing emergencies. She quotes one such
lawyer as saying "and they're crying during the whole tire that you talk to them and they just
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expectations.331 Conceivably, clients might suspect lawyers who emphasize
client decisionmaking of choosing this approach primarily as a way to avoid
malpractice liability3 32 Clients'might also be concerned that the lawyer has a
financial interest in lengthening the counseling process. If, as some have
maintained, the lawyer-client relationship is characterized by pervasive
mistrust, 333 clients could be forgiven for being suspicious of an approach that
seems to remove the professional from the advice-giving picture.
Even if one believes that the case is not yet made for significant client
mistrust of lawyers, it is undeniable that lawyers and clients have very different
interests in the lawyer-client relationship. Clients may see the goal of
contemplated legal action as emotional vindication or receiving justice; lawyers
are likely to discount such goals and stress the maximization of the client's
financial situation. 3 4 Lawyers and clients have conflicting autonomy, dignity,
say, 'Will you please do what you think is best? You're the lawyer. I don't want to have to do
this. You do it.' So you take your cue from them.'" E. SPANGLER, supra note 143, at 168.
331. A client may psychologically need the lawyer to make the decision for him. Cf. D.
BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8, at 11-12 (discussing role expectation of client that causes
him to see lawyer as either completely dominant or subordinate towards the client rather than as
involved in a power-sharing relationship), 197-200 (discussing ways for client-centered lawyers
to deal with clients who insist that lawyers give clients their opinion on what to do). Poor clients
may, in particular, expect their lawyers to give advice or tell them *hat to do, in part because
many other people may deal with them in that fashion. See H. FREEMAN, supra note 187, at
161 (arguing that lawyers for poor clients establish good rapport with them, despite the directive
quality of their counseling, because directiveness fits clients' expectations). Sophisticated
clients, or simply clients whose utilitarian calculus leads them to conclude that it is more efficient
to delegate matters to tha lawyer, may also expect lawyers to "handle the matter" without
demanding the client's full participation.
332. Cf. Spiegel, supra note 281, at 147 (suggesting one consequence of applying
informed consent principles to corporate lawyering might be to increase client power as lawyers
would be concerned about malpractice liability if they opposed their clients).
333. See, e.g., Burt, supra note 165, at 1019-20 (mistrust inherent in lawyer-client rela-
tionship, though it often is submerged and goes unrecognized); Simon, supra note 61, at 133-35(ideal lawyer-client relationship will often involve conflict, risk and possible betrayal); Kidder,
Formal Litigation and Professional Insecurity: Legal Entrepreneurship in South India, 9 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 11, 22 (1974) (Indian client-lawyer relationship marked by "deep mutual
mistrust"). Clients' mistrust of their lawyers appears to exist especially in criminal defense
work. See Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a
Profession, 1 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 15, 26 (1966) (client attitude toward lawyer in criminal
setting "a precarious admixture of hostility, mistrust, dependence and sycophancy"); Alschuler,
The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.. 1179 (1975); Skolnick, Social
Control in the Adversary System. 11 3. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 52, 65 (1967) (relationship
between client and criminal defense counsel "mixed-motive game" in which interests partially
coincide and partially conflict); 1. CAsPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICFm THE DEFENDANT'S
PERsPECTIVE 105-15 (1972) (defendants' distrust of their public defenders). One extensive
study of client attitudes towards lawyers found that such attitudes varied depending on the
socioeconomic status of the client and the natre of the legal matter, among other factors. See B.
CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY
206-07,212-14 (1977).
334. See Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 12, at 107-08, 121. The authors note that the
differing emphases between lawyer and client result in continual battles between them over what
to talk about:
Thus there is a conflict between the client's desire for vindication on what thelawyer perceives to be a peripheral issue and the lawyer's interest in reaching a
satisfactory disposition on what for him is a much more important issue. Time
and again in our study we observed lawyers attempting to focus their client's
attention on the issues the lawyers thought to be major while the clients often con-
centrated on matters that the lawyers considered secondary.
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economic and societal interests. 33s Indeed, the world views of lawyers and
clients may be mutually exclusive.336 These differences could well make clients
skeptical of client-centered lawyers insofar as client-centeredness did not
comport with clients' own pre-conceptions about the lawyer-client relationship.
If clients mistrust their lawyers, the fundamental underpinnings of client-
centered practice may be open to question. The development of a relationship
of trust and rapport between lawyer and client would seem to be difficult if not
impossible under these circumstances. Of course, the client-centered lawyer,
recognizing the background hostility of her client, might be in a better position
to break down this mistrust either by confronting it directly or by taking steps
designed to make the client's continued mistrust of her less tenable.3 37
Client-centered counseling, and the client decisionmaking that underlies
it, potentially makes great demands on clients to participate fully in their legal
representation. Its advocates may improperly assume that clients are rational
decisionmakers who can make correct decisions so long as they are provided
with sufficient information. 338 To the extent that assumption is inaccurate,
client-centeredness may be inapposite. 339 This concern about hyper-rationality
can be exaggerated, however. We should be extremely suspicious of
categorical judgments about client irrationality and impaired decisionmaking
capacity. The tendency to assume that certain groups of clients are unable to
make rational decisions is overinclusive and denies these people their individ-
uality.
Id. at 112. See also Sarat & Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Motive in
Lav.yerlClient Interaction, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 737 (1988) (lawyers in divorce cases focus
on problem-solving in present and future; clients seek emotional release and self-justification).
335. See Maute, supra note 131, at 1070-80.
336. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
337. Casper's study of the attitudes of criminal defendants in Connecticut in the early
1970's indicates that one of the clients' primary criticisms was that their public defenders told
them what to do rather than give them advice, provide information, and offer suggestions as pri-
vate lawyers did. J. CASPER, supra note 333, at 109. This finding supports a client-centered
approach. The author speculates that public defenders may not actually tell their clients what to
do any more than the private lawyers do, but that the clients simply perceive them to act in this
fashion. Id. at 117-18. This perception may be more important than the reality, however, and,
if anything, reinforces the desirability of public defenders acting in a client-centered manner.
Interestingly, Casper concludes that one possible source of conflict between lawyer and client,
the lawyer's fee, actually cements a positive relationship by establishing a mechanism of ex-
change. Id. at 118.
Some commentators argue that cient-centeredness is particularly appropriate in a criminal
context. See Morris, supra note 42, at 795-96; Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer in Representing the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer of the
Court?, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 65,71 n.19; cf. Ogletree & Hertz, The Ethical Dilemmas of Public
Defenders in Impact Litigation, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 23, 38-39 (1986)
(rejecting view that criminal defendants are not sophisticated enough to understand conflict of
interest issues). On the other hand, the nature of the lawyer-client relationship in many non-
serious and some serious criminal cases - where lawyer and client may meet for the first time
on the day of trial and have little time to consult with each other - may argue against applicabil-
ity of a fully client-centered approach. But see infra note 378.
338. This assumption is consistent with the assumptions about patients that obtain in
medical informed consent as well as those about consumers in the truth-in-lending context. See
INFORMED CONSENT, supra note 136, at7.
339. See Ellmann, supra note 16, at 752-53 (Binder and Price lawyer's use of rational-
istic decisionmaking model could undercut autonomy of clients who would otherwise choose to
make decisions in non-rational manner).
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Conversely, client-centeredness may be seen as condescending towards
clients. Why should not poor clients, the original subjects of client-centered
practice, be able to receive advice from their lawyers without immediately
acceding to it? Given the harsh treatment many poor people suffer at the hands
of governmental and other bureaucracies, would not the lawyer's greater
involvement in the client's decisionmaking serve to even the sides somewhat?
Despite the many faults of the traditional paradigm, the traditional lawyer who
urges his client to take a particular course of action and follows through on it340
may function more as the client's champion than the client-centered lawyer
whose posture of decisional detachment extends to less than zealous
implementation of the client's decision.34 ' The deeply involved critical lawyer
- assuming she overcame any serious conflicts with her client - would
probably be a more committed advocate still.
2. The Lawyer's Perspective
The disadvantages of client-centered approaches from the perspective of
the lawyer 342 embrace both practical and conceptual difficulties. These
constraints suggest both the need for definitional clarity of the concept and
close attention to the context in which client-centered approaches are assessed.
Client-centered counseling is time-consuming. For a lawyer to explore
the various legal and non-legal alternatives with the client and engage her in the
process of identifying and weighing consequences takes considerably more time
340. But see supra note 206 and accompanying text.
341. As should be obvious, this and many of the observations in this section are some-
what speculative, and difficult to prove in the absence of empirical data on client attitudes (and
even then "proof" of such propositions is likely to be extremely subjective and unstable).
Abstract discussions of what clients want frequently ring false. Definitive answers are hard to
come by. It is my hope, however, that these speculations are useful in causing us to challenge,
or at least make explicit, some of the underlying premises of client-centered practice.
342. The question of the applicability of the client-centeredness model to practicing
lawyers is a complex one. One problem is the relative paucity of data on how lawyers actually
practice such law-office skills as interviewing and counseling. In recent years a growing num-
ber of studies in the legal and sociological literature purporting to describe what lawyers actually
do in practice. See, e.g., D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 19; Neustadter, supra note 327, especially
194-98 (discussing studies); Hosticka, We Don't Care About What Happened We Only Care
About What Is Going To Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations Of Reality, 26 SOC. PROBS. 599
(1979); E. SPANGLER, supra note 143; Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 12; K. MANN, DEFENDING
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK (1985); R. NELSON,
PARTNERS W1IH POWER (1988); Cain, The General Practice Lawyer and the Client: Towards a
Radical Conception, in THE SOCIOLOGY OFTHEPROFESSIONS, supra note 115. For additional
studies, see Morris, supra note 42, at 785 n.23. But the extent of this literature is still relatively
limited. Even this relatively specialized research domain must be limited still further if the goal is
to examine contemporaneous observations of practicing lawyers rather than retrospective
reconstructions of practices and attitudes. As one group of researchers noted, observations of
actual lawyer-client interchanges are limited by the profession's commitment to preserving
confidentiality. See Danet, Hoffman & Kermish, Obstacles to the Study of Lawyer-Client
Interaction: The Biography of a Failure, 14 LAW & SOC'YREV. 905 (1980). Clinical teachers
have a ready source of data on how student lawyers function, in both real and simulated
counseling sessions, but there are great dangers in translating these observations into the world
of more experienced practitioners. Moreover, to the extent that clinical teachers first teach client-
centered practices before their students engage in actual or simulated lawyering, the students can
hardly provide a basis for testing whether the model would otherwise be used.
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than simply recommending to the client what she should do.3 43 Lawyers in
private practice are engaged in a business. If the counseling session is
lengthened because of a fuller discussion of alternatives, either the client must
pay or the lawyer must absorb the costs of the longer sessions. Many clients
will be unwilling or unable to do the former;3 " few lawyers would be so
committed to client-centered lawyering that they would do the latter.34 5 Surely
it is not by chance that the strongest proponents of client-centered lawyering
are clinical teachers who, whatever the significant constraints on their time,
typically do not have to worry about the profitability of their law practice.
The practicing lawyer's self-image presents another practical constraint
on the adoption of a client-centered lawyering approach. Professional resis-
tance to client-centered approaches is likely to be even stronger than law stu-
dent resistance to the concept.346 The traditional model of lawyering can be
attractive to the lawyer imbued with a view of the professional as an
autonomous expert. Such lawyers have a strong tendency to objectify the
client 347 and would have great difficulty conceiving of the client as having a
useful perspective to contribute to the counseling process. 348 Lawyers as a
professional group are biased towards converting most problems into technical
ones that require the exercise of the lawyer's professional judgment.349 For the
traditional lawyer, client decisionmaking may seem to be at bottom a debate
343. This proposition, while perhaps not provable absent empirical research designed to
compare the practices of client-centered and traditional lawyers, seems intuitively correct.
Compare Spiegel, supra note 22, at 110 (informed consent approach likely to add time to
lawyer-client interactions), with Strauss, supra note 55, at 335 (increased collaboration of
informed consent unlikely to add much time to lawyer-client sessions). Moreover, even though
the description in the text tracks the Binder and Price model of counseling, any counseling pro-
cess that engages the client in meaningful dialogue about the choices facing her takes more time
than counseling that simply has the lawyer tell the client what to do. See, e.g., Pepper, supra
note 60, at 631-32 (lawyer-client dialogue on moral issues time-consuming and therefore ex-
pensive).
344. In one of the relatively few studies of practicing lawyers actually engaged in inter-
viewing and counseling, Gary Neustadter studied the styles and practices of a number of
bankruptcy lawyers. He argues that client-centered approaches may compromise the financial
pressures affecting financially-strapped clients, creating a strong tendency towards lawyer-
dominating behavior. See Neustadter, supra note 327, at 178-79. Clients contemplating
bankruptcy would likely be especially vulnerable to such financial pressures.
345. Neustadter notes that bankruptcy courts set maximum fees schedules for lawyers.
Thus, the bankruptcy lawyer required to spend an extensive amount of time interviewing and
counseling clients cannot pass the costs on to the client even if he wishes. Id. at 237-38.
Neustadter also makes a more obvious point: to the extent that the client-centered lawyer explic-
itly raises the possibility of foregoing legal action or at least the legal action that the lawyer
offers, the lawyer has a strong economic incentive to avoid a full discussion of these possibili-
ties. Id. at 239-40.
346. See supra note 245. As David Gottlieb and Claudio Grossman have pointed out,
many lawyers (and, I would add, especially litigators) have a strong desire to win the legal mat-
ter entrusted to them. Insofar as such lawyers believe that client-centeredness makes winning
less likely, they might resist the concept, even if empirical support for the view that traditional
counseling maximized the chances of winning was limited.
347. See, e.g., Wasserstrom, supra note 77, at 21 n.5 (citing sociologist Erving
Goffman for the observation that professionals see clients not as people but as objectified prob-
lems). Cf. id. at 17 (professionals believe that clients are generally unable to evaluate profes-
sional performance). See also Simon, supra note 61, at 55 (tendency for Positivist lawyers to
turn clients into abstractions).
348. See supra note 17.
349. See Spiegel, supra note 22, at 144 & n.24; G. HAZARD, supra note 282, at 49.
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over means and not ends. Doctors' resistance to adoption of informed consent
practices provides a warning to those who would advocate a normative client-
centeredness divorced from the actual experiences of practicing lawyers.
Conceptually, a significant limitation on client-centeredness inheres in the
nature of professional work itself. As a number of commentators observe,
lawyers3 5O and other professionals351 tend to define client problems into
particular categories. While each client may believe that his problems are
unique, the stock-in-trade of the professional is to see client problems in terms
of categories and apply to the client's problem the techniques found to be suc-
cessful in previous cases. In some cases, such standardization relates to fairly
mundane office procedures; 352 in other cases, the lawyer specializes and thus
tends to see client problems (and perhaps more significantly solutions) as
calling for relatively straightforward solutions. 353 Lawyer channeling of client
concerns may also reflect a fundamental lack of sympathy for the client's
perspective.35 4 As one legal services lawyer whom Spangler interviewed put it:
[W]e preach client autonomy, but in reality, it's a little
impractical when the client isn't educated or doesn't know the
system so she can make choices. After the 450th case, where all
the clients make the same kind of decision, you've been through it,
you feel that you might as well make the decision for the next
client, because you're so familiar with the experience. When you
350. See, e.g., Neustadter, supra note 327, at 240 (bankruptcy lawyers in study tend to
view work as relatively routine and fitting within particular categories); Cain, supra note 342, at
109, 111, 116-18 (lawyers translate client concerns into legal discourse); Hosticka, supra note
342, at 607 (lawyers control the definition of the client's problem); Bellow, supra note 86 (legal
aid lawyers define client problems narrowly); Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection
Laws, 14 LAW & Soc'YREV. 115, 124-28 (1979).
351. See, e.g., Sarat, Abel & Felstiner, The Emergence and Transformation of
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming. . ., 15 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 631, 645 (1980-81) ("[The
essence of professional jobs is to define the needs of the consumer of professional services.
Generally, this leads to a definition that calls for the professional to provide such services.")
(citation omitted); E. FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE, supra note 117, at 105 (doctor-
patient relationship intrinsically problematic because professional necessarily develops routinized
ways of dealing with problems that the patient thinks of as unique and critically important).
352. See Hosticka, supra note 342, at 602 (secretary categorized client's legal problem
and scheduled the client for an appointment on the day those problems were being addressed).
353. See Neustadter, supra note 327, at 199-209 (comparing Lawyer A, who believes
that Chapter 13 bankruptcy is superior to Chapter 7 as the best approach for his clients, with
Lawyer B, who believes that Chapter 7 is superior to Chapter 13). The authors of another recent
study of bankruptcy clients and their lawyers note the ease with which bankruptcy lawyers
appear able to influence their clients to choose either Chapter 7 or 13. Sullivan, Warren &
Westbrook, Laws, Models andRea! People: Choice of Chapter in Persona! Bankruptcy, 13 LAW
& Soc. INQUIRY 661, 698(1988). They observe that the technical nature of bankruptcy and the
many advantages and disadvantages of each option make it"a simple matter of emphasis to make
one sound much more appealing." ld. The bankruptcy statute is unusual in that Congress,
concerned that bankruptcy lawyers were unduly influencing client choices, amended the statute
in 1984 to require that the lawyer submit an affidavit with his bankruptcy filing indicating that
she had informed the client about both chapters. The authors conclude, however, that
knowledgeable practitioners treat this provision as a joke. Id. For a wonderful description of
the way in which one bankruptcy judge influenced lawyers to submit Chapter 13 as opposed to
Chapter 7 petitions, see id. at 696.
354. See Macaulay, supra note 350, at 138-43 (many lawyers for consumers in study
lack sympathy for clients and implicitly decide to forego aggressive litigation efforts on their be-
half).
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take the time to explain all the options, the client still ends up
asking you what he should do. I wish all clients were as attractive
as their causes. 355
Lawyer resistance to client-centeredness can be seen not simply as a
result of the inherent conservatism of lawyers but quintessentially as part of the
way that the professional sees her world. Ironically, the professional-as-
technician image seems inconsistent with the view of the professional as a
person who is trained to, and in fact does, exercise good and nuanced judg-
ment.356 To be sure, the professional's demand for regularization of task is
balanced by her ability to know when a situation is truly unique (at least in her
experience) and act upon that knowledge.357 But few lawyers approach their
work lives day in and day out with an eye towards constantly remaking their
worlds. Under such circumstances, lawyers may find too demanding a client-
centered practice that calls for openness to new solutions and a continuing need
to justify to clients (and themselves) the approaches to be considered.
Client-centered lawyering stresses the desirability of the lawyer's neu-
trality towards the client's ends.358 But such neutrality is inevitably false;359 as
sentient and feeling beings, lawyers cannot help but have opinions about what
their clients should do, and cannot help but have those opinions affect how they
relate to clients. By denying the impossibility of neutrality, client-centered
lawyers fool themselves and ultimately misserve their clients. The client-
centered lawyer's neutrality also presents the risk that she will improperly see
her client's ends or goals as fixed, immutable, and uninfluenced by the lawyer's
actions 3 60 Both the traditional and critical lawyer often seek overtly to
influence their clients and bend client goals to fit the lawyer's purposes. Client-
centered lawyers, so the argument goes, do the same thing, but covertly.
355. E. SPANGLER, supra note 143, at 167.
356. See Kronman, supra note 5, at 846 (practice of law requires and tends to encourage
positive character traits, most especially the exercise of good judgment). See also Luban, supra
note 9, at 721 (describing Brandeis's view that lawyers are uniquely in a position to do justice
because they combine abstract reasoning, empirical keenness, decisionmaking under time
constraints, tolerance and judiciousness). In some hands, the description of what professionals
(or practitioners) do can sound positively poetic:
Through countless acts of attention and inattention, naming, sensemaking,
boundary setting, and control, [practitioners] make and maintain the worlds
matched to their professional knowledge and know-how. They are in transaction
with their practice worlds, framing the problems that arise in practice situations
and shaping the situations to fit the frames, framing their roles and constructing
practice situations to make their role-frames operational. They have, in short, aparticular, professional way of seeing their world and a way of constructing and
maintaining the world as they see it. When practitioners respond to the indetermi-
nate zones of practice by holding a reflective conversation 
with the materials of
their situations, they remake a part of their practice world and thereby reveal the
usually tacit processes of worldmaling that underlie all of their practice.D. SCH6N, EDUCATING THE RBLCTrVE PRAC1rrIONBR 36 (1987).357. Nor do I man that the act of categorizaation of client conerns into
legal categories is always devoid of creativity. Compare the descriptions of the lawyers in
Cain's study, Cain, supra note 342, with those in Hosticka's study, Hosticka, supra note 342.358. See Gifford, supra note 15, at 820-21.
359. Simon, supra note 61, at 51; Gordon, supra note 112, at 26, 29; Lehman, supra
note 278, at 1091.
360. See Gordon, supra note 112, at 72-73.
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Because they are less honest with themselves about their desire for influence,
they are more dangerous.
To assert that lawyers cannot be entirely neutral and objective towards
their clients - a proposition with which I agree - is not, however, to
demonstrate that there are no distinctions between the various ways in which
lawyers might talk with clients about the choices clients face. The traditional
and critical lawyers are more likely to dominate the client because they make
no effort to be neutral.361 Not seeing neutrality as a positive good, they will
likely be less sensitive to the risks for clients entailed in their strong statements
of opinion. So long as client-centered lawyers understand that express neu-
trality towards their clients' ends is a goal they will never quite achieve, and
that their neutrality must be tied to a commitment to facilitate client decision-
making, their posture towards clients raises considerably fewer problems than
the alternative approaches.3m2
3. The Lawyer-Client Relationship
Many of the aspects of the lawyer-client relationship affected by a client-
centered approach to lawyering have been addressed in previous sections.
There are three aspects of the critique of client-centeredness that remain,
however. that client-centeredness, far from promoting dialogue between lawyer
and client, actually stifles it; that it fosters a false dichotomy between the roles
of lawyer and client;363 and that it is politically naive.
361. I am using non-neutrality here in the specific sense of the lawyer taking a position
on what the client should do and advocating that position to the client. This is clearly the stance
that William Simon advocates in his discussion of critical lawyering. See Simon, supra note 60.
For traditional lawyers, the picture is slightly more complicated, because one staple of adversar-
ial representation (more or less equivalent to Simon's ideology of advocacy) is that the lawyer
does not judge the client's ends but simply does her bidding. Yet my sense of the traditional
approach is that while the lawyer might ultimately display such an attitude, he would be prepared
to use highly interventionist means with the client before reaching that point.
362. Although I argue for the goal of relative lawyer neutrality with respect to client
choice, I do not maintain that such an approach is valueless. William Simon properly criticizes
those who fail to see that the lawyer's attitude of not imposing her middle-class values on her
client, for example, may itself be a middle-class value. See Simon, supra note 61, at 137 n.244.
But given the choice among the various values that the lawyer could express, I simply do not
find the willingness to strive toward neutrality, when coupled with a commitment to fostering
client decisionmaking, to be as suspect as Simon does. To be sure, neutrality is not necessarily
appropriate in all kinds of law practices; the political practice that Simon, Gabel and Harris and
others envision, see supra note 95 and accompanying text, as well as some forms of public
interest practice, see D. LUBAN, supra note 63, Ch. 14, may well allow for and even demand
greater lawyer involvement in the client's goals. But such involvement must be debated between
lawyer and client, and the client, as the initiator of the relationship, should be able to opt in or
out of such an approach to representation. (In public interest practice, of course, the lawyer or
public interest organization itself may be the true initiator of the relationship. Nevertheless, the
lawyers in such cases need to understand the extent to which the control that they might ordinar-
ily expect to exercise in the case may be diminished because of its specialized nature.)
363. See Gifford, supra note 15, at 822 (Binder and Price model is overly structured
and "linear" and discourages conversational exchange); Tremblay, supra note 16, at 529 n.65(false dichotomy of lawyer and client choice; interaction between lawyers and clients under
Binder and Price model mechanical). These criticisms are of the Binder and Price model in par-
ticular, rather than of client-centeredness in general. Thomas Shaffer's brand of client-
centeredness does not seem as susceptible to these criticisms in light of his emphasis on the
importance of moral conversation between lawyer and client. See supra notes 272, 286.
However, Shaffer's approach is problematic for other reasons. See supra note 286.
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As I argued previously, it is just as possible to argue that client-cen-
teredness in general and the Binder and Price model in particular encourages
dialogue between lawyer and client. As with the dispute over whether the
Binder and Price lawyer provides her client with an opportunity to reassess her
values or merely accepts them as given, 364 the quality of lawyer-client dialogue
may depend more on the way in which the practitioner implements the model
than on any inherent characteristic of the model itself.30
The Binder and Price lawyer must conduct a dialogue with the client if
she is adequately to explore options and identify and assist the client with
weighing consequences. But this dialogue may not be a dialogue between
equals. As John Leubsdorf wrote, "It is difficult to conduct a dialogue between
equals, however, when one monopolizes the legal knowledge and the other's
interests are at stake." 3"6 If true dialogue entails mutual openness to risk and
even mistrust, 367 the client-centered lawyer's goal of neutrality towards his
client may preclude the development of meaningful dialogue.63 But those who
promote the value of dialogue between professional and layperson369 rarely
define the term or indicate the point at which dialogue becomes meaningful.
The criticism that client-centeredness is non-dialogic is ill-defined and must be
considered ultimately unpersuasive.
The same may be said for the criticism that the model falsely
dichotomizes lawyer and client choice. Failure to consider the different inter-
ests of lawyers and clients in the lawyer-client relationship is bound to lead to
confusion over the appropriate roles of both. To understand the interests at
stake, it is necessary to consider the actions of lawyers and clients as if they are
taken separately. But it fundamentally misreads the model to assume that
364. See supra note 303.
365. Certainly, observations of numerous student counseling simulation sessions could
lead one to conclude that the dialogue between Binder and Price lawyers and their clients is often
stilted and formal. To the extent that this observation is accurate, the fault is not necessarily the
students'. Apart from the difficulty of learning the counseling skill (and the possibility that the
students' teachers are not very effective in teaching it), the structure of the Binder and Price text,
with its provision of transcript excerpts of lawyer-client interactions, may lend itself to students'
wooden interpretations (though, as noted previously, see supra note 44, the transcripts can be an
effective learning tool). Nevertheless, my own experience suggests that such a stilted approach
is not an inevitable consequence of the model's use. Empirical research assessing practicing
attorneys' use of the Binder and Price model might well yield interesting insights on this point.
366. Leubsdorf, supra note 125, at 1050. See also supra note 174.
367. This is Robert Burt's view of the role of dialogue, as reflected in R. BURT,
TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONS, supra
note 107, and Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, supra note 165.
368. In his vision of a more fully realized political legal practice, William Simon's criti-
cal lawyer and client conduct their own form of dialogue. But it is not clear that the dialogue is
any more meaningful than that between the client-centered lawyer and his client. The critical
lawyer and client, in Simon's conception, are likely to spend much of their time trying to per-
suade each other of the virtue of their own political and moral visions. (Robert Burt's lawyer
and client are likely to spend most of their time talking about betrayal.) Compared to the client-
centered lawyer, the critical lawyer may be a better talker but a worse listener.
369. Jay Katz is the primary advocate for th importance of doctor-patient dialogue. See
J. KA'IZ supra note 18.
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lawyers and clients make decisions in a vacuum and without consideration of
the other's interests.370
I have already noted William Simon's criticism that client-centeredness is
deficient in failing to take account of the differences between clients who are
rich and poor, powerful and powerless.371 Advocates for client-centeredness
may make implicit assumptions about the kind of client they envision - the
poor client who is the staple of most clinical programs - but their rhetoric
implies and their students may assume that the decisionmaking model applies to
all clients under all circumstances. A client-centered lawyer who believes that
he is not exercising power over his client may be guilty of na~vet6. But a
client-centered lawyer aware of the potential for lawyer dominance can seek
ways to minimize the exercise of that power. Of course, recognizing that
clients, and the kinds of cases or matters that they bring to the lawyer, differ
does not resolve the thorny question of when the lawyer should or should not
defer to the client. Almost any effort to draw lines is risky.372 Still, the
rationales supporting client-centeredness differ depending on whether one
considers individual or organizational clients, or powerful or powerless clients,
and proponents of client-centeredness must consider the effect of such
differences on the model they espouse 73
370. Part V, infra, discusses the process of generating alternatives from the lawyer's
and client's respective perspectives. In a sense my adaptation of the Binder and Price model is
subject to the same criticism of perpetuating a lawyer-client dichotomy as the basic model. The
purpose of my separation of lawyer and client interests is, however, not to suggest an unbridge-
able chasm between the two but to clarify what the different perspectives contribute to the overall
goals of the mutual relationship.
371. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
372. As one example of the problem, see Morris, supra note 42, at 795-97. Morris
considers a domestic violence case in which a client faces criminal charges for past abuse and is
also involved in civil litigation over child custody and visitation. He argues that client-
centeredness, and especially deference to a client's goals, is justified in the former case because
of the seriousness of the potential consequences to the client, the constitutional protections avail-
able to criminal defendants, and the inchoate nature of the potential harm to the public. Morris
countenances less deference to the client in the related civil matter because, he maintains, the
client's liberty interest is less severely affected, the constitutional protections are fewer and the
burden of proof lower, and the potential harm to third parties, the client's children, is greater and
more definable. But Morris's distinction is insupportable on its own terms. For example, the
distinction fails to take into account that many people might conclude that permanent loss of
custody over one's children is more serious than a six-month jail term. The assertedly low level
of constitutional protection for parents seeking to maintain custody over their children may in
large part reflect society's and the legal system's historical disparagement of family-related inter-
ests. Morris's distinction serves to perpetuate that mistreatment. And it is too facile to say both
that the client's children are not affected in the criminal case (surely there is a difference for the
children between the client returning to the home or going to jail) and that they are so affected in
the custody case as to warrant overriding the client's interests. Assuming adequate representa-
tion of the child's interests and the person or entity seeking custody in lieu of the client - and,
perhaps, even absent such assumptions - there is no legitimate reason to permit lawyer domi-
nance in the one case and lawyer deference in the other.
My response to Morris's example is undoubtedly affected by the fact that the Criminal
Justice Clinic m which I teach meets jointly in a weekly seminar with the Women and the Law
Clinic, in which students, among other things, represent women charged with abuse and neglect
of their children. The interests and needs of many of these clients are at least as powerful and
intensely felt as those of our criminal clients.
373. Thus, the personal autonomy justification for client-centeredness, see supra Part
III.A.I., may be unavailable when the client is a partnership or corporation as opposed to an
individual. Cf. Spiegel, supra note 281, at 145; Rhode, supra note 164, at 608 (criticizing bar's
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V. CLIENT-CENTEREDNESS REFINED
A. The Context Defined
As a result of the above analysis, it is now possible to array the argu-
ments for and against client-centeredness and refine our thinking about the
concept. We can also suggest some factors that ought to be considered by the
lawyer contemplating whether to adopt such a method of client-counseling.
After briefly reviewing these arguments and factors, the article contends that
the Binder and Price model for the most part meets the criteria for a revised
client-centeredness. I argue, however, that the Binder and Price model is
insufficiently client-centered 374 in one key respect: the lawyer's counseling of
the client on the basic alternatives the client faces in the context of the legal
representation.
To review, client decisionmaking in the lawyer-client relationship is sup-
ported most clearly by the importance we place on individual autonomy. Client-
centered lawyers who adopt means designed to facilitate their clients' capacities
to make choices promote their clients' autonomy by allowing them to control
their fate. A commitment to autonomy requires lawyers to refrain from telling
many clients what to do or, in many circumstances, even advising them what to
do. Lawyers for powerful clients, however, especially clients with whom they
have a long-standing relationship, can certainly err on the side of using non-
coercive persuasion without fearing that the clients' autonomy will be undercut.
Client-centeredness as political empowerment is most attractive when
used on behalf of politically and economically powerless people. A client-
centered counseling approach for this group also has the virtue of being most
faithful to the historical origins of the concept. Though generalizations about
what counseling approach most benefits particular categories of clients are
troublesome, the significant possibility of lawyer domination of poor clients
militates in favor of the relative lawyer neutrality that client-centered counsel-
ing contemplates. Sensitivity to the plentiful opportunities for lawyer domina-
tion of clients not conventionally thought of as powerless argues in favor of a
wide berth for client-centered approaches.
Client-centeredness developed in response not only to concerns about
empowerment of poor people but also as an outgrowth of non-directive thera-
peutic approaches in psychology. But lawyering is not therapy, and advocates
for client-centered counseling ignore the distinction at their peril. Insofar as
traditional equation of responsibilities of lawyers for individuals and institutions). But see
Fried, supra note 61, at 1075-76 (arguing that corporations are entitled to protection of auton-
omy as well). It would be overly narrow, however, to conclude that only individuals should be
entitled to a client-centered form of representation. A small not-for-profit corporation whose
goal is to conduct grass-roots organizing may be an organization in form but could just as easily
be reconceived as a collection of individuals with mutual interests entitled to expression and
client-centered support. Nevertheless, determinations of who is the client in the corporate or
organizational context are likely to be more complicated than in the individual setting and thus
necessarily affect the manner in which a client-centered approach is implemented.
374. Interestingly, as limited as the criticisms of the Binder and Price model are, I found
no published criticisms that suggest the model is insufficiently client-centered. But see supra
notes 301-03 and accompanying text (Ellmann's criticism of Binder and Price model as under-
cutting client autonomy).
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client-centeredness emphasizes the creation of a supportive atmosphere for the
client, its use in most circumstances is unexceptionable. Client decisionmaking
gains further support from developments in the professions generally, informed
consent, and feminism.
Despite the inadequate (though improving) state of empirical research on
lawyers and clients, certain themes emerge from the consideration of the
relationship between client-centered approaches and the interests of individual
lawyers and clients. For many clients, client-centeredness offers the advantage
of a potentially supportive relationship with the lawyer that facilitates the
client's expression of the concerns that brought him to the lawyer in the first
place. Client-centeredness enables the client to tell her story in her own terms.
It is the lawyering model most likely to maximize the client's capacity to make
her own decisions and thereby exercise some control over her life. It also
promotes greater client understanding of the available choices because the
lawyer must communicate information in a manner understandable to the client
if the latter's choice is to be an informed one. The demands that client-
centeredness makes on clients - to participate fully in their case or legal
matter, to engage in a rational process of identifying alternatives and weighing
consequences; and to make a decision without the comforting advice of the
lawyer - are consistent with the notion that individuals should take respon-
sibility for decisions with the potential to greatly affect their lives. Because
most decisions clients face implicate their own values rather than issues of
technical professional expertise, placing the decisionmaking authority with the
client enhances the chances that the client's values will find expression in the
choice that is made.
The client-centered approach offers substantial attractions to lawyers as
well. It allows them to treat their clients as equals, thus diminishing the dis-
tance between their professional and personal lives. It provides lawyers with
the opportunity to share decisionmaking authority with the client rather than
requiring them to bear full responsibility for often weighty and awesome deci-
sions. The professional's need for regularization and the potentially time-con-
suming nature of client-centered counseling are less reasons to reject client-
centeredness outright than they are practical limitations on its adoption.
Finally, client-centeredness promotes conversation between lawyers and
clients. While the dialogue is not quite as intimate as the kind of conversation
that occurs between friends, it is potentially more meaningful than many of the
interactions in our daily lives. With dialogue comes the possibility that both
lawyer and client will affect each other, not because one exercises excessive
power but because both are committed to equal participation in the important
goal of assisting the client to make a decision that is most in keeping with his
hopes and aspirations.
This brief review suggests that client-centered counseling is or ought to
apply to a wide variety of lawyer-client relationships. The case for client-
centeredness is most compelling where lawyer and client are from different
socioeconomic backgrounds, especially if the client is a member of a powerless
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group; where the client is not economically, socially or politically powerful; 375
where the lawyer and client do not know each other well; 376 and where there is
sufficient time to allow for reciprocal exploration of alternatives and
consequences. 377 Despite efforts to suggest that client-centeredness may be
applicable in some categories of cases and not others,378 almost any such
distinction is likely to misconstrue the interests at stake in cases or legal
practices with which the author is unfamiliar.37 9 Nevertheless, considerations
in overtly political representation and in class action litigation differ suffi-
ciently from other kinds of practice to suggest that the argument for client-
375. As I define client-centeredness, however, some elements clearly apply even to
powerful clients. If one focuses less on the lawyer's neutrality with respect to her client's ends
(and concomitant willingness to pursue those ends even if she disapproves of them), and more
on the desirability of the lawyer engaging the client in a decisionmaking process that allows the
client to identify, articulate, and act on his goals, client-centeredness may well promote morality
and justice by allowing the client explicitly to consider these concepts in his decisionmaking cal-
culus. That lawyers for such clients may resist approaching their powerful clients in this manner
- in part because of their relative powerlessness with respect to such clients, combined with
clients' increased tendency to switch lawyers in the search for superior service and representa-
tion - does not mean thata client-centeredness model is inherently inapplicable.
376. This criterion requires some elaboration. Insofar as a client-centered counseling
approach seeks to promote rapport between lawyer and client, it seems that the approach would
tend to flourish where the parties knew each other well. Also, as various analyses of the differ-
ences between in-house corporate counsel and corporate law firm lawyers reflect, see, e.g., J.
DONNELL, supra note 233, at 111-12, more intimate knowledge of a business client's operations
may provide enhanced opportunities for interchange between lawyer and client But the need for
the lawyer to present choices to his client in a reasonably neutral manner- which I argue is the
essence of the client-centered approach, especially as defined by Binder and Price - is greater
when the lawyer and client are relative strangers. If the client knows the lawyer well, he is apt to
be in a better position to evaluate the lawyer's advice in the context of the inevitable biases that
any advice-giver brings to the counseling session. That evaluation process would tend to
decrease the possibility of the lawyer overwhelming the client's will. For her part, the lawyer
would be in a better position to evaluate whether the client was an independent decisionmaker,
both in general and in the particular matter at hand. See J. FREUND, supra note 25, at 269, 272-
73 (in corporate law context, the lawyer should generally not give the client his opinion about
what to do when discussing a go/no-go decision unless lawyer and client have close ties and
lawyer knows that client relies on his judgment).
377. Adequate time to conduct a client-centered counseling session means not only pro-
viding sufficient time in the session itself but arranging it, if possible, so that it does not occur
on the courthouse steps. One reason that cient-centeredness may seem intuitively inapplicable to
the criminal defense setting is that so much of what passes for client counseling occurs on the
day of the client's court appearance in the hallway outside the courtroom under conditions of
extreme pressure to make a quick decision.
378. See supra note 372.
379. One might be tempted to suggest that client-centeredness should be deemed inappli-
cable to high-volume, relatively routinized legal practices where the available choices for clients
seem fairly limited and the financial and time pressures on the lawyer are intense. But whether
or not lawyers with these types of practices choose to practice in a client-centered manner, it
seems to me that such lawyers and their clients would most benefit from adoption of that
approach. The studies on the directiveness of legal services, personal injury and bankruptcy
lawyers demonstrate a disturbing tendency for lawyers both to dominate their clients and miss
important legal issues because of preconceptions that they bring to the counseling session. See
supra notes 352-55 and accompanying text. If one believes that poor and near-poor clients are
most likely to benefit from a client-centered approach then it is precisely in these kinds of prac-
tices that advocacy for cient-centeredness must be strongest.
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centeredness is not nearly as compelling in such settings, although it is not
necessarily inappropriate.3 o
These rationales and arguments fully support a client-centered counseling
model along the lines that Binder and Price advocate. The Binder and Price
model promotes client autonomy even though it severely limits the lawyer's
advice-giving role. If the model is revised by allowing the lawyer to offer his
opinion to the client whom he believes is an independent decisionmaker, rather
than waiting for such a client to ask for his opinion, the protection of client
autonomy is adequate.381 The model's use of psychological technique is, for the
most part, restrained and avoids some of the pitfalls of more frankly
psychological client-counseling models.38 2 Binder and Price do not purport to
place client-centeredness in a political context, nor do they attempt to
distinguish kinds of clients who might differ in other than psychological
characteristics. But as the previous discussion suggested, it is possible to apply
the model in a way that accounts for these concerns.
There will be many situations in which lawyers committed in general to
using the model will find that they must adapt it to their specific needs.
Sometimes even the client-centered lawyer will need to shed his neutrality, give
his opinion, or risk rapport with the client. Moreover, a healthy respect for
client autonomy requires that we allow for circumstances in which a client can
opt out of a client-centered approach 83 But commitment to the model's use
380. For political cases, see supra note 95. For the role of the lawyer in class actions,
and its relationship to issues of client control, see D. LUBAN, supra note 63, Ch. 15. There is a
growing literature on the conflicts between lawyers and clients in the class-action context. See,
e.g., Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation
Litigation, 85 YALE LJ. 470 (1976); Burt, Pennhurst: A Parable, in IN THE INTERESTS OF
CHILDREN 265 (R. Mnookin ed. 1985); Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L
REV. 1183 (1982). In class action litigation, the lawyer and client approach each other on a
much different footing from their counterparts in more traditional cases. The lawyer has strong
autonomy interests of her own in bringing the lawsuit in the first place, and, indeed, may reverse
the usual paradigm of legal representation by first finding the legal problem and then finding the
client(s). Under these circumstances, the lawyer and client could negotiate over their respective
roles in the litigation; presumably the lawyer would have a greater than usual role in
decisionmaking that would otherwise be reserved to the client. The result might not be client-
centeredness in the usual sense of the term, but the lawyer would still need to respect the client's
autonomy by keeping the client informed about developments and being sensitive to those areas
where lawyer and client interests might diverge. This would allow the participants to make other
arrangements for client representation, or the client could withdraw from the suit if necessary.
381. One way for the lawyer to test herjudgment that the client is an independent deci-
sionmaker is to ask the client whether he wants to receive her opinion. Although this can be part
of a cat-and-mouse game between lawyer and client, it might be appropriate if the lawyer has any
doubts concerning the client's preferences.
382. See generally Simon, supra note 84.
383. To recognize that opting out is a possibility is not the same as being able to state
precisely the circumstances under which it should be permitted. For some people, delegation of
decisionmaking responsibility to another enhances autonomy; for others it severely compromises
it. See generally Shapiro, supra note 140. Some commentators suggest that particularly
sophisticated clients who seek only technical advice should be permitted to do so and hence
avoid a thorough client-centered approach. But there may be circumstances in which even these
clients might require counseling on broader grounds. Cf. Redmount, supra note 143, at 47. In
Spiegel, supra note 22, at 82-85, Mark Spiegel contends that clients should not be able to opt out
of client decisionmaking pre-emptively at the beginning of the representation, but must negotiate
decisionmaking authority as the particular decision arises. He tends to see the loss of client
autonomy as minor when compared to the risks that the client will not know enough at the
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requires the lawyer to use her judgment so that her variations are self-conscious
and thoughtful ones. 384 Lawyer intervention and influence over clients is
considerably easier to accept if it comes only after the lawyer exhausts other
alternatives.u 5 As Binder and Price themselves recognize, slavish adherence to
their counseling model would be inappropriate.38 6 Premature rejection of the
model is inappropriate as well.
Ultimately, the primary contributions of the model are its strong empha-
sis on the need for the lawyer to pay more than lip service to the ideology of
client choice and its concrete description of techniques designed to effectuate
that ideology and the attitude that animates it. The importance of technique is
critical because it allows the examination of the complex questions of client
choice and lawyer behavior in a specific, non-abstract context. If the theory is
sound and the technique suspect, we might conclude that the technique needs
refinement. Alternatively, we could conclude that the difficulties of technique
suggest conceptual flaws in the theoretical underpinnings of the model itself and
therefore call for its reassessment.
My concern with the technique of client-centered counseling and its
relationship to the concept's core values leads me to examine the Binder and
Price model from a perspective that differs from that of the client-centeredness
discussion that has proceeded thus far. In particular, assuming that the article
has demonstrated that in many circumstances client-centered counseling is a
viable approach to legal counseling, do the techniques of the Binder and Price
model foster cient-centeredness in all respects? I conclude that in one aspect of
the counseling process, the lawyer's initial discussion with the client about the
beginning of the relationship to make an intelligent waiver of his informed consent rights. Of
course, if lawyer and client have a longstanding relationship, the client could conceivably make
an intelligent waiver early in a particular case because the lwyer would be aware of the client's
dcisionmaking preferen~es and capabilities from past experience.384. See E. Milstein, What is Goad Judgment?, Speech Delivered to the 1984 Clinical
Teachers' Conference. Duke University (May 1984); Kronnman, supra note 5, at 846 (good
judgment is the key component of being a good lawyer); Freund, supra note 25. at 253-54
(same). My former clinical colleague Elliott Milstein, now dean at The American University's
Washington College of Law, has preached for years the importance of teaching clinical studentsthe need to develop good judgment in their lawyering, as well as assisting them to discover the
criteria that determine what constitutes such judgment.385. For example, even though client decisionmaking is considerably more difficult to
accomplish on the courthouse steps, it is not impossible. I have watched clinical students coun-
sel clients (and have counseled clients myself) according to the Binder and Price model even
when operating within fairly stringent time constraints. The counseling session may not last
long, but it is still possible to give the client as much choice as possible under the circumstances.Absent some commitment to applying the model if at all possible, however, the lawyer will
likely overpredict the circutmstancs where client decisinmaiting is inappropnate.
The approach that I suggest here is analogous to the courts' and legislatures' use of least
restrictive alternative analysis in examining statutes and practices that impinge upon a person's
liberty. See Sheltn v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). That is, even though a state's pur-pose s legitimate, it cannot use means to achieve that purpose that broadly stifle individual lib-
ert ifless restrictive or less drastic means are available. In the counseling context, I suggest
thtlawyers vary from the cient-decisionmaking model only when they can demonstrate that the
more interventionist approach is the least restrictive under the circumstances (such as extreme
time constraints, a client's inability to make a decision, etc.). To clarify, I am not saying that
lawyers would be legally required to be client-centered, only that they should adopt an attitude
that presumes the applicability of client-centered approaches.386. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8, at vi.
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client's alternatives, the Binder and Price model is too law- (and lawyer-)
centered. As I argue in the next section, the model, by focusing in the
"alternative" stage almost exclusively on lawyer-perceived choices,
unnecessarily undercuts the powerful client-centeredness message that the
authors otherwise wish to convey. In the following sections, I attempt to
demonstrate that such an approach is not inevitable and that, with the changes
suggested, the Binder and Price model can not only become even more client-
centered but can respond to some of the remaining critiques of lawyer neu-
trality lodged against the dlient-centeredness model.
B. The Binder and Price Model and the Discussion of Client Alternatives
The reader will recall387 that in the Binder and Price counseling model
the lawyer first tells the client what alternatives she sees for him; solicits the
client's input on any alternatives he sees; identifies and discusses the conse-
quences of the different options, predicting at least the legal consequences; and
assists the client in weighing the different consequences in order to enable the
client to make the choice most likely to maximize his satisfaction. In the
litigation context, the focus of their model, the authors state that the alternatives
for the client will usually be variations on the basic choices of litigation,
settlement, and abandonment of the matter or doing nothing.388 Binder and
Price call for the lawyer to present these basic alternatives or choices to the
client before getting the client's input. They distinguish this approach from two
other possible approaches to discussing the client's alternatives: (1) the client
first tells the lawyer what alternatives he sees before the lawyer identifies the
alternatives for the client, and (2) the lawyer first tells the client what factors
she considered before arriving at the alternatives she intends to discuss. 38 9
The primary difficulty with Binder and Price's preferred method of dis-
cussing client alternatives is that it perpetuates the lawyer dominance that the
model otherwise seeks to avoid. It does this by focusing on the client's alter-
natives in a manner that unduly emphasizes the lawyer's perspective that the
most important decision for the client is likely to be whether to litigate or set-
tle.390 This perspective has important negative consequences for both clients
and lawyers.
Clients faced with a decisionmaking structure that emphasizes the liti-
gate/settlement choice may find themselves shunted into particular conceptual
boxes that make sense for the lawyer but not for the client.391 For the lawyer,
whether to litigate, settle or do nothing may seem to be the principal choice
facing the client, but clients are apt to care more about substantive outcomes
387. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
388. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8, at 135-37, 158. For the sake of sim-
plicity, I will refer to this as the litigation/settlement choice, but in doing so I do not mean to
exclude the do nothing option.
389. Id. at 158-59.
390. The lawyer may have a strong economic incentive to stress the litigation or settle-
ment choices rather than the do nothing choice, which presumably entails the client deciding not
to retain the lawyer. The lawyer is more likely to emphasize the do nothing choice if in his
judgment the case is not worth much financially or does not present a viable cause of action.
391. See Menkel-Meadow, The Transformation of Disputes by Lawyers: What the
Dispute Paradigm Does and Does Not Tell Us, 1985 J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 25, 33-34
(limitations of traditional lawyer-generated categories).
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than the procedural question of whether, in the abstract, settlement or litigation
is the best way to achieve those outcomes. The Binder and Price focus on the
litigation/settlement choice privileges the lawyer's tendency to focus on the
means of addressing the client's problem rather than on the client's ends.392
When the client says explicitly "I want to sue," the statement is likely to be
shorthand for the client's true goals, which are more complicated and
contradictory than his seemingly straightforward statement suggests.393 This
client in fact may be thinking something like the following:
I have some deeply felt interests, beliefs and needs that I want to
meet or satisfy and, based on what I know about the law (which
may be very little), I assume that I have to sue in order to obtain
that satisfaction. But it is the satisfaction that I want, not neces-
sarily the litigation. If the lawyer can show me another way to get
what I want, I would certainly consider it.
The client might also be thinking as follows:
What do I know about what lawyers really do? My main goal is to
get this lawyer to represent me. Probably the best way to get her
on my side is to come across as very aggressive. If I say that I
want to sue the bastard the lawyer will sit up and take notice.
In either case, the lawyer cannot assume that the client's statement of his goal as
wanting to sue reflects his true desires.
Because clients and lawyers see the world in fundamentally different
ways,394 the early and immediate focus on the lawyer's perspective runs the risk
that the client's unique perspective will get submerged. The client's
imagination is stifled because he believes that the lawyer must have some spe-
cialized knowledge that allows him intuitively to know the rules of the game,
such that the client's views are really quite superfluous. 395 The lawyer and
even the client may believe that the client is making a free, unconstrained
392. I use the terms means and ends here in a different sense from the manner they are
used in discussions of lawyers' ethical responsibilities in decisionmaking. See supra note 223
and accompanying text. By calling the litigation/settlement decision one over means and not
ends I do not suggest that the lawyer is entitled to make this decision for the client. Far from it.
I suggest that for many clients the litigation/settlement decision is essentially meaningless when
divorced from its particular context. The choice only becomes meaningful for the client when it
is mapped against the primary goals that the client identifies (with the assistance of the lawyer)
for the legal relationship.
393. See Redmount, supra note 187, at 187 (the client's statement to the lawyer of "I
want a divorce" could mean many things); Lehman, supra note 278, at 1080-81 ("1 want a
divorce" at most means a client's prediction of what seems most likely to give him "interior state
of comfort or satisfaction that all of us ultimately seek."); cf. Macaulay, supra note 350, at 124-
25 (many consumer clients come to lawyers predisposed to sue; lawyers counsel them by point-
ing out the practical constaints).
394. See supra note 221 (different stories that lawyers and clients present); Kidder,
supra note 333, at 26-27 (lawyer-client negotiation over relevant facts to present in litigation).
395. Even though the Binder and Price model provides that the lawyer should follow her
listing of alternatives by asking the client if she sees any alternatives that the lawyer missed, see
D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8. at 158, the inquiry has a pro fornia quality to it, coming
as it does after the lawyer has already laid out the alternatives for the client. In my observations
of student simulations, lawyers and clients see the inquiry as so much surplusage.
[VOL. 32
CLIENT-CENTERED COUNSELING
choice to litigate, settle or do nothing. In fact, the lawyer's use of a legalistic
decisionmaking structure shapes the client's choices in not-so-subtle ways.396
The Binder and Price lawyer's primary focus on the legal alternatives of
litigation or settlement also affects the lawyer. The alternative-generation
portion of the model stifles the lawyer's creativity because it encourages her to
adopt reflexively the standard approaches of the legal profession and to miss the
possibilities offered by the client's fresh perspective. The lawyer's world view
is shaped by the legalistic paradigm presented in the first year of law school and
reinforced throughout her career.397 A lawyer trapped in that paradigm can
easily lose the ability to see the world from the lay perspective and possibly
become less effective as a result.398
In contrast, a more effective, client-centered method for discussing
alternatives is for the lawyer to brainstorm3 99 with the client about the client's
goals and the choices that the client sees available to him before discussing the
lawyer-generated choices of litigation, settlement or doing nothing.4o After the
lawyer and client have brainstormed about the client-oriented choices, they
consider the above lawyer-generated choices.40' But unlike the Binder and
396. My concern here is related, though not identical, to Stephen Ellmann's concern,
discussed supra note 301, that the Binder and Price lawyer's use of a rationalistic decisionmak-
ing model denies the client the right to make an autonomous choice to use a different decision-
making approach. As discussed more fully below, my adaptation of the Binder and Price model
allows greater play for the client's input in shaping alternatives, which could include more input
into the choice of decisionmaking models.
397. For an extended discussion of lawyers' legalistic ideology and its effects, see J.
SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS AND POLMCAL IIAL (2d ed. 1986).
398. For example, one practical consequence of this phenomenon could be the lawyer's
failure to predict adequately lay jurors' reactions to her client's case.
399. In brainstorming, the participants throw out ideas without first subjecting them to
evaluation or criticism. This suspension of evaluation frees up the participants' creativity by
preventing them from screening out potentially useful ideas because of a premature rush tojudgment. See Gifford, supra note 15, at 828 n.81 and accompanying text (citing R. FISHER &
W URY, GErHNG To YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENTS WrrHOUT GIVING IN 62-65 (1981)).
400. There is a distinction between the client's goals, which represent the objectives of
the legal representation as he perceives them, and the choices or alternatives the client contem-
plates, which represent the client's understanding of the means by which his goals could be
effectuated. Lawrence Grossberg, commenting on an earlier version of this article, queried
whether the client's perspective would not have been explored in the initial client interview, so
that the focus on that perspective in the discussion of alternatives in the counseling session
would be redundant or, alternatively, already contemplated in the Binder and Price model. With
respect to redundancy, there may be differences between consideration of client goals and client-
perceived alternatives. Presumably the lawyer will identify the client's goals in the first inter-
viewing session and consider those goals when thinking about the client's alternatives. While
the lawyer might want to check with the client in the counseling session to confirm that the
client's goals have not changed, the brainstorming about client goals conceivably could be fairly
short in duration. The client-perceived alternatives, however, may not surface until the counsel-
ing session because the lawyer could well decide that it is too early to have such a discussion at
the interview stage of interaction. Often the lawyer's goal in representing a client is to forestall
the client's premature closure of alternatives, especially before the lawyer conducts any investi-
gation or research. Thus, I do not believe that the first part of the counseling session in my
approach would merely recapitulate the client interview. In any event, the critical aspect of my
approach to the counseling session is that the client's perspective, whether limited to client-per-
ceived alternatives or broadened to include client goals, should precede the specific introduction
of the lawyer's perspective.
401. As I discuss below, however, even the lawyer's alternatives of litigation or settle-
ment (or doing nothing) are unduly constricting.
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Price approach, such a consideration would have a clear context, and, as shown
below, allow the client to assess the lawyer-generated choices in appropriately
instrunental terms.
While not identical to it, the approach I suggest is analogous to Binder
and Price's description of the counseling approach they reject, in which the
lawyer first asks the client about the choices he sees before discussing the
lawyer-conceived alternatives& 2 The reason for the authors' rejection is worth
quoting in full:
Not all lawyers, however, begin by articulating the alternatives
they see as available and then inquiring if the client sees additional
possibilities. Some lawyers begin, particularly with initial deci-
sions about entering litigation, by asking the client what he/she
feels or thinks ought to be done. When the client has spoken, the
lawyer then articulates other options. In short, some lawyers
reverse the process we have suggested. While this approach may
reduce the possibility that the client may feel restricted by the
lawyer's options, often we find this tack is counterproductive in
terms of building client confidence and rapport. When the lawyer
begins with a question such as, 'What do you think we should do?',
the client sometimes has a negative reaction. 'What the hell are
you asking me for? It's your help I'm paying for.' The question
sometimes creates a feeling that the lawyer is incompetent. Fur-
thermore, if the lawyer subsequently mentions additional choices,
the client may feel the lawyer is 'playing games.' The internal
reaction is something like the following: 'You started by asking me
402. As noted above, Binder and Price also describe an approach in which the lawyer
might first tell the client what led him to recommend the alternatives that he was prepared to pre-
sent I agree with the authors that such an approach is likely to be ineffective because it does not
respond to the client's need to begin the focus on possible outcomes rather than on the lawyer's
reasoning. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8, at 159.
In his treatment of the discussion of alternatives in his informed consent model, Mark
Spiegel appears to take a position somewhere between Binder and Price and my own. He
writes:
First, the lawyer should have an obligation to identify for [the] client the alterna-
tive courses of action. In some cases this will be easy - to sue or not to sue -
but, in many cases, the set of options will be larger. Whether a particular option
should be communicated by the lawyer depends on a combination of professional
expertise and client standards of materiality. Professional expertise determines the
range of possible options; the client's needs determine whether a particular option
should be communicated.
Spiegel, supra note 22, at 134 (citations omitted). I part company with Spiegel in two and pos-
sibly three respects. First, I believe he is still too prone to see the choice available to clients as
whether to litigate or settle. Second, and more fundamentally, by stating that the lawyer's pro-
fessional expertise determines the range of available choices for the client, rather than the combi-
nation of lawyer and client expertise that I advocate, the Spiegel model may perpetuate the
lawyer dominance that I criticize in the Binder and Price model. Third, I am not sure he and I
agree on the scope of the lawyer's power to withhold communication of options from the client.
While the lawyer would have the duty, at least, to refrain from communicating illegal options to
the client, Spiegel's formulation can be read to suggest a paternalistic cast that I find troubling.
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what I thought, but now you're telling me that perhaps I'm wrong.
Why didn't you just tell me what you thought in the first place?' 40 3
This lengthy quotation not only clarifies the differences in approaches, but, in
my judgment, demonstrates the limitations of the Binder and Price model's
client-centeredness.
If the lawyer were not really interested in the client's perspective, then
the authors' criticisms about hostile client reactions to the lawyer's question to
the client might have some validity. But presumably the lawyer would not
simply ask the client for her input in order to placate her but rather because she
truly values the client's perspective. If so, she should be able to communicate
that attitude to the client and minimize the chances that the client will feel
patronized in the manner that Binder and Price suggest. In fact, a good Binder
and Price counselor using the adaptation I suggest could easily provide the
client with a preparatory explanation 44 in which the lawyer explains why she is
asking the client for her input. This would go some way towards assuaging the
client's concerns about her role in the decisionmaking process40 5
More significantly, the quotation demonstrates the Binder and Price
model's bias towards the lawyer's perspective, at least in the alternative-gen-
eration and discussion stage. The advantages to this approach are that it is
efficient and can reassure the client that his problem fits within categories that
the lawyer (and by extension the legal system) deems significant. But the dis-
advantages are that by starting with the lawyer-perceived options, the lawyer
limits the field of vision for the client, pretends that the legal options are
important ends in and of themselves, and contributes to the professional
mystification that persuades clients that the lawyer knows best.
I do not argue that the lawyer's perspective is irrelevant here. The pros
and cons of litigation and settlement, as well as other alternatives that the
lawyer is likely to see, must enter into the client's decisionmaking calculus.
What ultimately is called for is a merging of lawyer and client perspectives so
that the final product, the client's decision, is most likely to maximize the
client's satisfaction 4o6
403. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8, at 158-59 (emphasis added). At the UCLA-
Warwick Second International Clinical Conference (Sept. 18-19, 1989), David Binder indicated
that he now agrees with the approach of discussing client goals prior to the lawyer's statement of
alternatives.
404. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 8, at 64-69, 157, 188.
405. Another criticism of the authors' speculation about the client's resistance to talking
about the alternatives he perceives before the lawyer does so is that the same client resistance
could be posited for the lawyer's refusal to give the client his opinion on which alternative the
client should choose, which is a staple of the Binder and Price counseling model.
406. A word of caution is in order here over the terms lawyer-choice and client-choice.
As noted previously, see supra note 363, Paul Tremblay criticizes the Binder and Price model
for creating a false dichotomy between lawyer and client choice. My variation on the Binder and
Price model is open to the same criticism, as some commentators on an earlier version of this
article noted. I use lawyer-choice and client-choice as shorthand descriptions of choices that
emanate from either the lawyer's or client's perspective. For purposes of simplicity, I assume
that choices from the client's perspective are those that speak in terms of real-world conse-
quences, while choices from the lawyer's perspective are those that relate to the legal world
(hence the importance here of such legal solutions as litigation or settlement). Both lawyer and
client can contribute to each other's perspective; the lawyer can assist the client in identifying
real-world choices and the client can do the same with legal-world choices (though the client may
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It would be useful, of course, to have empirical data available to test
some of the assumptions about whether clients make better decisions (or are
provided more useful information with which to make such decisions) under
the Binder and Price model or my variation on it. In the absence of such data,
however, I will describe how the different approaches might work in the con-
text of a simulated counseling exercise that I have used with students in an
interviewing, counseling and negotiation course. Through a brief analysis of
the problem, the student efforts to conduct Binder and Price counseling ses-
sions, and the different conceptualization of the problem under my proposed
approach, I hope to provide a context in which some of the implications of
client-centered counseling can be assessed.407
C. The Fisher Smulation
The Fisher simulation is the second counseling simulation that I teach in
my interviewing, counseling and negotiation course.4o8 The client Fisher owns
five acres of land that he developed with a small shopping center that brings
him a modest income. Several years ago, the client became interested in the
purchase of twenty acres of land, contiguous to his property. Hunter owns the
twenty-acre parcel. At first, Fisher sought to buy the property outright, but the
price apparently was too high. After a series of negotiations between Fisher
and Newman, an agent for Hunter, Fisher purchased an option to buy Hunter's
land within five years. By the terms of the option, the client had to pay a sum
of money by November 1 of each year to keep the option in effect. Last
November 1, the client's bookkeeper was late in mailing in the payment.
Shortly thereafter, Hunter wrote a letter to the client in which he returned the
late payment and stated that he considered the option no longer in effect. It is
at this point in the story that the client comes to see the lawyer.
The client told the lawyer these things in the first interview, but the
lawyer and the client have not had any significant discussion about the client's
have less to add concerning choices like litigation or settlement). There is undeniably an artifi-
ciality to this division. But as I argue below, I see these steps as way stations along the road to a
more fully interactive decisionmaking process.
407. Actually, the discussion in the text reverses the manner in which I originally
approached the problem of Binder and Price's eient-centeredness. I did not set out to challenge
the Binder and Price theory of alternative-generation and then design a simulation to test out my
theory. Nor did I look at the model and immediately conclude that it was insufficiently client-
centered. Rather, I observed students counseling clients in simulations and was struck by the
fact that they did not seem to get at the heart of what alternatives would serve the client and why.
It was out of this observation that I experimented with variations on the Binder and Price model.
I suspect that many clinical teachers, who have a rich store of data on student lawyering, gener-
ate their "theories-in-use", see D. SCHON, supra note 356, at 134-35, in this inductive fashion.
For a discussion along similar lines of how practitioners make use of theory, see id. at 22, 25(practitioner use of "tacit knowledge" and "knowing-in-action"); Fish, Dennis Martinez and the
Uses of Theory, 96 YALE LJ. 1773 (1987).
408. The course is similar in design to the one described in Bastress & Harbaugh,
Examining Lawyers' Skills, in GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION: REPORT OF
THE AALS-ABA COMMTrEE ON GUIDELNES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 223-37
(1980). I last taught the course in 1986. The simulation described in the text comes about
halfway through the course, after the students have conducted four interview simulations and
one fairly uncomplicated counseling session. The Fisher simulation, which I inherited from Joe
Harbaugh when he last taught the course, apparently was originally a problem in the ABA Client
Counseling Competition. I am indebted to Arnie Siegel for this last point.
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goals.409 Based on the state of the law, the client has a reasonably good chance
to prevail on the issue of the continued viability of the option contract (or
alternatively that the client breached the contract but termination of the deal
would be a disproportionate response). The lawyer and client are also both
aware, however, that between the signing of the option contract and the present
time the value of the land that is the subject of the option increased greatly. It
seems apparent that the seller Hunter is using Fisher's arguable technical breach
as an excuse to get out of the contract, or at the very least extract more money
from Fisher.
There is a remarkable similarity in the way that the student lawyers dis-
cuss the client's alternatives. With some minor variations, the students
approach the problem in essentially the following manner. 4 10 They begin the
counseling proper with a discussion of the alternatives that the lawyer sees for
the client. The student tells the client that he has several options. The client
can litigate over the option contract (some students, though not many, break
this down into different causes of action, such as specific performance,
declaratory judgment, or damages action); negotiate with the seller Hunter; or
do nothing. A few students add the option of filing the lawsuit first and then
negotiating with Hunter, while others distinguish between settlement between
the principals and settlement between the lawyers or between lawyer and the
agent Newman. Following the suggested Binder and Price format, some stu-
dents ask the client if he sees any alternatives. The client is primed by his
instructions to suggest several additional alternatives that all relate to reforming
the deal in some manner, such as buying a smaller portion of the land outright
or paying more money to keep the option contract in force. Students will
typically then include these alternatives at the top of their page of options that
they see for the client, although it is not clear what relationship they bear to the
original division of litigate/settle/do nothing.
The client tells the lawyer that his primary goal is to restore the status
quo represented by the option contract. From this listing of alternatives, the
counselor then goes on to explore with the client the consequences of each of
these alternatives. The client is instructed to say that he is fearful of litigation
but that he has heard that Hunter is a "tough bird" with whom it would be dif-
ficult to negotiate. From there, the students, with varying degrees of skill,
409. By way of clarification, the law student does not actually interview the client, but
receives a fact pattern with information supposedly gleaned from the first interview. The lawyer
also receives a copy of the option contract at issue and some legal research leads that she might
pursue to determine the validity of the option contract and the parties' respective rights. Prior to
the counseling session, the lawyer is unaware of the details of the original negotiation between
Fisher and Newman, but the client is given information about the negotiation should the lawyer
inquire.
410. In any class, one-half of the students perform the lawyer role in the Fisher simula-
tion. I have examined the counseling plans of thirty students over four years (including one year
when a colleague taught the course but collected counseling plans at my request). Of these
thirty, twenty-five can fairly be described as using the litigation/settlement/do nothing approach
to alternative-generation, with minor variations. Of the remaining students, several included an
option of "purchase the land now" but no other "non-legar options. Of all the students, only
one student really explored the different business options up front, though he did so under the
unsatisfactory structure of "specific performance (lawsuit)" and "informal settlement with
Hunter."
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engage the client in a process in which lawyer and client weigh the alternatives
and at least some of the clients make a decision.
The trouble with the above approach to this counseling simulation is that
it misses the point of the problem. The client is presented with a first-level
choice about means - whether to sue or settle - before his goals are really
discussed. The client must fit his concerns into the legal alternatives devised by
the lawyer.411 It is not that all the considerations cannot come to the fore in
this process, but rather that there is a discontinuity between the lawyer's set of
choices and the client's real world concerns of getting the option contract back
on track, which is what the client wants most, or reforming the deal in some
manner. Application of the Binder and Price structure here does not facilitate
the goal of maximizing client satisfaction. As a result of this discontinuity, the
counseling process comes across as stilted and the client is more likely to make
a decision about what the lawyer sees as the ultimate issue with less than
complete information, on incomplete grounds, and, perhaps, for the wrong
reasons. One can imagine the client responding to the above description of his
alternatives by saying or thinking "I don't want to negotiate with Hunter
because I am afraid of him" or "I don't want to litigate because I am concerned
about having to testify." Obviously, these client concerns need to be addressed,
but if the client first hears that he must decide whether to sue or settle, the
client may not have a context in which to confront these fears in a balanced
manner.412
My adaptation to the Binder and Price model would remove the above
constraints to the client's decisionmaking process. First, the lawyer and client
would discuss the client's goals for the transaction or matter without reference
to the constraints, real or imagined, of the legal system. This part of the dis-
cussion is in the nature of a brainstorming session. The lawyer can and should
do some of this exploration prior to the counseling session with the client,4 13
but can benefit from the client's participation in the session itself. The primary
goal of brainstorming is to get the ideas on the table without attempting to
evaluate them. The critical aspect of this part of the process is for the client
and lawyer to think of the alternatives as the client perceives and experiences
them. The alternatives may look odd or "non-legal" at first and may be
unrealistic. But at this stage of the process the lawyer and client should not be
concerned with evaluation of the alternatives.
In the context of the Fisher problem, the client's expression of alterna-
tives might include getting the option contract back as it was before the client's
bookkeeper missed the payment; buying the land outright at the contract price;
411. There is another negative consequence of the approach the students adopt. Thedescription of the settlement alternative tends to be almost vacuous, with little consideration of
the likely outlines of a possible settlement, the parties' incentive for settlement, and settlement
timetables. This phenomenon may be a function of student inexperience in the real world. But it
also reflects a premature focus on the settlement choice that is essentially meaningless until the
client's goals are more fully articulated.
412. Binder and Price indicate that the lawyer should encourage the client to refrain from
making a decision until all the alternatives and consequences are discussed. See D. BINDER &
S. PRICE, supra note 8, at 189. But the presentation of those first alternatives to the client is
likely to shape the way the client listens to the rest of the presentation.
413. See supra notes 147, 148 and accompanying text.
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buying a smaller portion of the land; paying more for the land; and getting his
money back, among other possibilities. At this point, the lawyer and client are
not focusing on how realistic these choices are or how to effectuate them. They
are looking at the choices from the standpoint of transactions rather than
litigation or settlement, because this client likely sees the world in terms of
transactions. Indeed, the lawyer or client might even come up with some more
creative approaches such as a joint venture with Hunter or a joint venture with
another buyer.
It facilitates the client's understanding of the counseling process to render
the above process graphically414 The choices from the client's perspective are
listed along a horizontal axis as follows:
Get land on Get Get land on new basis Take
same basis money _ loss
(status quo) back Buy now I Buy less I Pay more
The lawyer cannot leave the discussion of alternatives there of course.
We have yet to bring the lawyer's expertise and special competence to bear on
the problem. At this point, the lawyer goes back to the choices that I earlier
described as unduly constraining and that my students listed as their starting
point. That is, we list the choices as litigation (broken down into sub-categories
corresponding to the different causes of action); file suit and open settlement
discussions; attempt settlement discussions in advance of or instead of filing
suit; do nothing;, and seek out available forms of formal or informal alternative
dispute resolution options 41s Once the lawyer and client exhaust discussion of
these legal alternatives the lawyer lists them down a vertical axis as follows:
414. The graphic presentation can also be valuable as a tool to teach the model to stu-
dents.
415. One of the messages worth communicating to students here is that one can be cre-
ative in looking at legal alternatives as well as client-perceived alternatives, and sometimes non-
litigation alternatives, including alternative dispute resolution devices, are superior to litigation
for the achievement of the client's goals. Of the thirty student plans I examined, only two men-
tioned alternative dispute resolution or arbitration, while several others listed the option of the
client approaching Hunter directly.
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Litigation:
Spec. Perf.
Dec. Judg.
Damages
Restitution
Litigate &
Settle
Settle
informally
Alternative
Dispute
Resolution
Do nothing
The next and last step for this portion of the session is to merge these two
analyses together. There are many ways to accomplish this, but one way I
experimented with is to create a matrix where the "client choices" appear on the
horizontal axis across the top and the "lawyer choices" appear vertically. Then
lawyer and client look at each box created by the matrix. The matrix displays
which of the possible legal alternatives allows the client to get what he wants in
the most efficient manner (or in the manner that maximizes the client's position
as the client defines it). Graphically, the matrix for the Fisher problem might
look as follows:
[Text continued on following page]
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CLIENT CHOICES
Get land on Get Get land on new basis Take
same basis money loss
(status quo) back Buy now I Buy less I Pay more
L litigion
A Dec. Judg.
W Spec. Perf.
Y Damages
E Restitution
R
File litig.
& seek
C settlement
H Settle
0 informally
I Altenative
C Dispute
E Resolution
S Do nothing
For example, if the client says that what he really wants is to get the
option contract back as it was, we look at the matrix and analyze this client
choice in light of all the possible legal possibilities identified. With this particu-
lar example, the lawyer would look at the litigation box and say it is possible
that the client could sue and get the option contract restored. Later, the lawyer
would assess and communicate to the client what the lawyer thinks his chances
are, a determination informed by the lawyer's knowledge of the substantive law
and the formal and informal workings of the legal system. At this stage,
however, it is unnecessary to go into detail because all the lawyer is trying to
do is to see whether restoration of the option is a possibility under the litigation
choice. Continuing along the vertical axis of the matrix, the lawyer examines
the option of filing suit and then negotiating. Again at this stage the lawyer
would say that restoration of the option is a possible result of this strategy.
We then get to the legal option of negotiation in lieu of filing suit. The
lawyer realizes that there is virtually no chance (theoretically, probably a slight
chance) that the client could have the status quo with respect to the option
contract restored simply as a result of calling up the seller. 416 Otherwise, there
416. Unlike the initial part of the alternative-generation process, where the lawyer and
client make no attempt to assess the likelihood of the possibilities identified, it is necessary and
appropriate for the lawyer and client to evaluate whether the client's goals can be achieved
through any particular alternative. The process described in the text inevitably leads to winnow-
ing out some of the proposed choices as unrealistic. The lawyer, who is likely to take the lead in
conducting this part of the process, would explain, of course, her basis for concluding that a
particular alternative would not allow the client to achieve his goal.
1990] 599
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
would have been no reason for the seller to construe the late payment as
grounds for a breach. The lawyer realizes and, more importantly, can make
the client realize, that if they wish to negotiate they will have to give up
something in order to get something.
The above analysis is then repeated for each client choice. Insofar as the
client expresses a willingness to pay more money for the land if he must, the
lawyer can observe that such a goal is not a likely result of the litigation option,
because the court's options are more limited. The court can make the
aggrieved party whole through some form of specific performance, restitution
or damages but cannot renegotiate the deal for the parties. But it is obviously
possible to obtain this result through negotiation. To be sure, the lawyer still
has a great deal of work to do with respect to developing a negotiating strategy
and gaining much greater specificity from the client about the parameters of his
negotiating authority. But the client can examine the legal alternatives not in a
vacuum but from the following perspective: can this legal alternative (settle,
litigate, or some combination of them) get me what I really want? Is this an
effective means to achieve the end that I desire? Once the choices are mapped
out in this fashion, the lawyer and client can then examine in more depth the
consequences of the different choices and begin the process of weighing the
alternatives.
The result of this process is a concrete presentation that allows the client
to make sense of the choices he faces. This approach offers several advantages
over the strict Binder and Price model. First, it restores the balance between
lawyer and client in the counseling process. The client is actively involved in
the generation of alternatives. It responds to the client who comes to the
lawyer and says "I want to do something, or I want to avoid having something
done to me, and I want you to tell me whether it can be done and how." Under
this approach, the focus becomes the what in the first part of the process, the
part in which the client's alternatives are generated, and the how in the second
part, when the lawyer's alternatives are presented. The approach avoids over-
emphasis on the lawyer's perspective by providing for a more expansive
consideration of choices beyond that between litigation and settlement. The
client does not have to focus on an alternative before he has heard anything else
on the things that he might fear most, such as, in the Fisher problem, testifying
in court or engaging in an open-ended negotiation process with Hunter. These
concerns must be addressed eventually, but only in the context of what the
client seeks to accomplish. So rather than the client saying, as he might in the
Binder and Price model, "You say litigation is a choice, but I don't want to
litigate. I just don't think that I could go through that process, it's too lengthy,"
the client is more likely to say, "Well, what I really want is to get the option
contract back. The only way that you've told me that it looks that I can get it
back is to litigate. And so, while I am not crazy about litigation, it seems that if
that's what I want it looks like litigation is the only way to get it." If, as has
been argued throughout this articlej the essence of client-centered counseling is
fostering the client's capacity to make his own choices in his own way, the
proposed adaptation to the Binder and Price model is superior to the original
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model because it enhances the client's role and perspective in
decisionmaking. 417
Another advantage of this approach is that it enables the client to engage
more self-consciously in the process of weighing alternatives that will proceed
in earnest later in the counseling session. Because the very process of
generating and discussing alternatives focuses on the utilitarian side of the
various legal choices, the client and the lawyer must articulate the rationales for
the different choices that the lawyer has presented. The weighing process is
difficult to implement well, and because it is critical to the client's ultimate
decision, some redundancy between the alternative generation phase and the
weighing phase can be advantageous.
The revised Binder and Price approach also could be useful in assisting
the lawyer in the process of counseling her client about negotiation options and
strategy. As Donald Gifford observes, when the lawyer counsels the client on
negotiation strategy and goals, it is especially easy for her to dominate her
client in the processX41 The client's active involvement in the alternative-
generation process provides him with the opportunity to understand the basis
for the negotiation posture that the lawyer recommends. 419
As with any model, this approach to the discussion of client alternatives
has some potential disadvantages. By generating multiple alternatives for the
client, it may provide him with an overload of information; people can only
process so much information at one time.420 The model may needlessly
complicate the decisionmaking process by suggesting that clients' legal prob-
lems are less routine than they really are. For run of the mill problems, the
more effective decisions may be the "standard solutions" rather than esoteric
417. The greater role for the client in the alternative-generation process is also likely to
increase the likelihood that the client will be able to tell her own story in her own way or at least
have the opportunity to tell the lawyer that such a goal is important to her. See supra note 221.
In addition, the give-and-take between lawyer and client at this stage is likely to promote more
meaningful dialogue between the two. See supra Part mI.B.3.
One consequence of the adaptation's focus on the client's alternatives first is to highlight
the differences between client-centered legal counseling and medical informed consent. See
supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text. It makes considerably less sense in many contexts
for a physician to approach his patient by asking her first about the alternatives she has consid-
ered than for Fisher's lawyer to start the counseling session by asking the client about the alter-
natives he sees. This is not to say that there are not other parts of the physician's counseling
session that could look very "client-centered." This observation merely emphasizes the differ-
ences between much medical and legal knowledge.
418. Gifford, supra note 15, at 839-43.
419. My suggestion that the lawyer and client brainstorm about alternatives is similar to
Gifford's suggestion, along the lines suggested by Fisher and Ury and Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
that lawyers and clients brainstorm about negotiation goals and strategy. See id. at 849-50 &
nn. 169-70. The approach I suggest also seems likely to ameliorate some of the problems with
the initial description of the negotiation option that were referred to supra note 411. As lawyer
and client discuss the client goals and the ways in which different alternatives can meet them, the
lawyer can develop from the start a fuller understanding of the client's substantive negotiation
goals and, to some extent, possible negotiation strategies.
420. See Ellmann, supra note 16, at 730 (citing I. JANIS & L. MANN, DECISION
MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE AND COMMITMENT 11 (1977)(people can usually only process seven plus or minus two categories of information at one
time)). But cf. Sammons, supra note 73, at 82 C"Mhe good lawyer produc[es] the maximum
amount of complexity that can be confronted and tolerated by the client in making decisions.").
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ones suggested by non-expert clients 2' The lengthier the alternative-gen-
eration process, the lengthier and, therefore, the more expensive the counseling
session. To the extent that the client's ultimate decision is identical to the one
that he would have made under a more traditional approach, the client might
bridle at the excessive time and cost involved. Those who view the Binder and
Price counseling model as impractical are likely to see my adaptation as even
more so.
The selection of the Fisher problem as a test of my model may skew the
analysis because of the richness of the choices apparently available to the client.
In cases where the client's choices are likely to be less varied the model can be
criticized as superfluous. 422 Alternatively, some cases are so specialized that
freewheeling brainstorming about alternatives may be inappropriate 4 23
My variation of the Binder and Price model has not been tested empiri-
cally, either with lawyers or students. Impressionistic feedback from my stu-
dents about the model's utility has generally been positive, but is so unreliable
as to be essentially meaningless. 424 Moreover, the legalistic focus of the Binder
421. See Nathanson, The Role of Problem Solving in Legal Education, 39 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 167, 175-76 (1989). Nathanson does not deny the role of creativity in the consideration
of alternatives for non-standard problems, though the process he describes focuses exclusively
on the lawyer's role in generating alternatives. Id.
422. In criminal litigation, for example, a defendant's options would probably be more
limited, although there is a danger of underestimating the number of choices that defendants
have, especially with respect to dispositions. In my judgment, the model is most likely to be
useful in litigation and mixed litigation/planning contexts. In pure planning contexts, where the
choices devised by the lawyer might not look that different from those conceived by the client,
the model may also be less successful. The model might not be incorrect in such settings, but it
might not be particularly useful nor provide much insight into the alternative-generation process.
The choice of the Fisher simulation as a test of my model has other consequences. For
example, the Fisher problem does not present a sharp conflict between the client's long- and
short-term goals (though arguably the client's long-term goal of securing the Hunter property is
at odds with the short-term goal of conserving his cash on hand). In many cases it may be
appropriate for the lawyer and client to attempt to distinguish goals along these lines so that the
client can see the ways in which some of his goals work at cross-purposes. In criminal cases,
for example, some clients express the long-term goal of vindication and the short-term goal of
getting the case over with. The lawyer may assist the client in goal clarification by clearly delin-
eating these goals as long- and short-term and pointing out how an alternative that serves the
long-term goal of vindication (e.g., trial) may be inconsistent with the client's short-term goal (if
a possible plea agreement could be reached earlier).
423. See, e.g., K. MANN, supra note 342, Ch. 6 (white collar criminal defense
attorneys utilize various techniques to avoid learning too much about their clients' situation,
fearing that in some cases too much information limits their freedom of action). In addition, to
the extent that the client's legal problem is highly technical, the client may have few alternatives
to propose and the lawyer may risk rapport (and arguably waste valuable time) by forcing the
client to articulate goals and alternatives first. If a relatively inexperienced businesswoman seeks
to incorporate her business, for example, the client may have little to add regarding the different
facets of how to set up the corporation (though the lawyer would explore with the client what her
goals were in part to see whether incorporation was consistent with them). My response to this
criticism is twofold. First, there may be some kinds of cases where the technical nature of the
issues makes my adaptation infeasible, in which case it should not be used. Second, insofar as
lawyers, especially traditional lawyers, are likely to overstate the technical nature of their work,
recourse to the model will at least serve to minimize the lawyer's inappropriate retreat into the
technical side of counseling.
424. To test the model adequately, one would have to compare the counseling practices
of students using the standard Binder and Price approach with those of students employing my
variation. One would then have to develop clear criteria to determine what constituted a success-
ful counseling session.
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and Price model which I have observed may be more a function of students'
lack of counseling competence than inherent defects in the model. If that is so,
lawyers in practice may already be doing something along the lines I suggest
without the need for the elaborate process that I set out 425
By expanding the Binder and Price alternative-generation process in the
manner that I suggest, my approach may not meet the needs of clients who
express a desire to be guided by the lawyer in the selection of alternatives4 26 It
would certainly not meet the needs of traditional clients who want their lawyers
to make decisions for them, nor of lawyers who deeply wish to comply with
such desires. Moreover, the approach runs the risk of encouraging clients to
think and talk about all manner of irrelevant matters, thereby increasing the
lawyer's frustration and possibly the client's if the lawyer later must patiently
inform the client why some of his proposed alternatives are impossible or at
least implausible. But the premise of this article is that clients can and should
make their own decisions, and that lawyers who do not adopt client-centered
approaches are likely to underestimate the contributions of their clients. Under
such circumstances, the cost of increased client participation seems well worth
incurring.
These potential criticisms of my Binder and Price adaptation are in the
nature of practical limitations on the model. One response is that my goal is
not merely to describe what lawyers and clients now do but to suggest the need
for reform of the lawyer-client relationship. In this sense, my critique of the
Binder and Price model is meant not to repudiate it but to extend the dialogue
that the text has obviously generated. Yet accepting the basic premises of the
Binder and Price model creates a different kind of problem. At some level
legal counseling addresses ineffable subjects and requires not only the exercise
of nuanced judgment, but attention to non-cognitive matters. Some would
argue that such skills cannot be taught. Both the Binder and Price model and
my adaptation are susceptible to the criticism that they are too structured, too
rational. My only response to this criticism is that clinical education is based on
the assumption that tasks such as client counseling can be broken down into
smaller components and analyzed. Learning a structured counseling model may
not be enough to transform students into wise counselors, but it is a start.
425. Cf., e.g., J. HARBAUGH & B. BRrZKB, supra note 11, at 20-21 (presenting coun-
seling chart in which alternatives generated by the lawyer include mix of legal and business
alternatives).
426. Stephen Ellmann, in commenting on an earlier version of this article, questioned
whether the discussion of alternatives between lawyer and client is equivalent to the lawyer and
client discussion of consequences in the Binder and Price model. I see these processes as dis-
tinct. In my approach, when the lawyer and client brainstorm about the client's alternatives and
examine whether legal choices can effectuate them, they are not assessing the consequences of
those choices. In the Fisher simulation, the client might raise the alternative of buying the land
immediately. The lawyer would note this possibility and then examine the legal options with the
client to see which of those options, if any, could be used to implement this goal. At this stage,
the lawyer and client would not discuss whether it was a good idea to buy the land, nor whether
the client had thought through such consequences as whether he could afford to pay cash now,
how he felt about Hunter, etc. But when the lawyer and client did discuss such issues, the client
would have in the back of his mind that the key decision is whether he wants to seek to buy the
land, not whether he should litigate or settle.
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V. CONCLUSION
For clinical teachers, the attractions of client-centeredness are many,
both as ideology and as technique. As the unexamined life is not worth living,
the unexamined concept is not worth employing. This article has attempted to
contribute to the examination, or more properly the re-examination, of client-
centered counseling. Its conclusions are necessarily tentative, as perhaps all
conclusions about such a complex human endeavor as lawyering must be.
Reappraisal of the theories underlying client-centeredness is a necessary
but not sufficient condition of our re-examination of the concept. We cannot
assume that simply because we preach client-centeredness that the models we
employ necessarily implement client-centered approaches. The Binder and
Price model has enjoyed extraordinary success as an orienting model for law
students. Like any model of human behavior, it is not perfect. It is hoped that
the modest suggestions offered in this article for modification of the Binder and
Price model will serve to continue the dialogue among clinical teachers,
students, lawyers and clients over how we can best assist clients to make the
kinds of choices that we know they are capable of making.
